Prisoner Exposure to a Pandemic: Measuring When Institutional Response Rises to Punishment
| Publication year | 2021 |
Prisoner Exposure to a Pandemic: Measuring When Institutional Response Rises to Punishment
Josh Slovin
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The Constitution prohibits the cruel and unusual punishment of inmates and detainees.1 Accordingly, when prison conditions fall below a humane level due to acts or omissions by prison officials, the prison may be found in violation of the Eighth Amendment,2 the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, against an inmate or the Fourteenth Amendment,3 the Due Process Clause, against a pre-trial detainee (hereinafter detainee).4
Specifically, the assertion of such claims regarding poor prison conditions raises the question of how prisons, and thus the courts, are approaching the novel health risks and administrative challenges posed by a global Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in which the virus is causing contagion, sickness, and unfortunately death.
Consequently, due to the extraordinary circumstances of COVID-19, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was placed "at the crossroads of public health and public safety, science and law, and constitutional and carceral demands"5 when presented with such an issue as described above. In Swain v. Junior,6 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the Miami Metro West Detention Center's (hereinafter Metro West) response to COVID-19 likely did not violate detainee
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appellees' Fourteenth or Eight Amendment constitutional rights even though Metro West was unable to ensure adequate social distancing and had seen increased rate of COVED-19 infections.7
Further, the Eleventh Circuit held that given the CDC guidelines for correctional and detention facilities,8 Metro West's obligation was only to respond reasonably to such guidelines.9 In using such a standard, the court determined that Metro West should not be faulted for guidelines which were concluded to be impossible to implement or if the harm caused by the virus was ultimately not averted.10 Thus, just because a prison's actions were ineffective at preventing the spread of COVID-19, does not mean that the prison was "deliberately indifferent" to the health and safety of its inmate/detainee population, rising to the level of a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.11
In late March 2020, Metro West began implementing health and safety measures to protect inmates against COVID-19, including cancelling inmate visitation, screening inmates and staff, and advising staff of sanitation practices.12 After the CDC introduced its guidelines for correctional facilities on March 23, 2020, Metro West altered its practices to reflect the guidelines by implementing, among other things, daily temperature screenings, social distancing efforts, a social hygiene campaign, and mask mandates.13
Plaintiffs Anthony Swain, Alen Blanco, Bayardo Cruz, Ronniel Flores, Deondre Willis, Peter Bernal and Winfred Hill were all pre-trial, medically vulnerable defendants being held at Metro West in Miami, Florida.14 Prior to the commencing of the Plaintiffs action, no inmate had tested positive for COVID-19 at Metro West.15
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Plaintiffs, on April 5, 2020, brought a class action lawsuit against Miami-Dade County and Daniel Junior in his official capacity as the Director of the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Center.16 The complaint alleged that the Defendants had violated Plaintiffs' Eight Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,17 arguing that "[d]efendants [were] deliberately indifferent to the risk that [p]laintiffs [would] contract COVID-19 within the current conditions of Metro West."18
Then, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida "granted in part [p]laintiffs' emergency motion and entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Defendants on April 7, 2020."19 As part of the order, and subsequent orders, the Defendants were required to provide descriptions of the measures currently employed to protect the individuals being housed at Metro West from the risk of COVID-19.20 Further, the order named two doctors who were to conduct an inspection of Metro West and its efforts, and present their findings back to the court.21 After the inspections were conducted, both doctors concluded that an urgent reduction in prison population and increased COVID-19 screenings were necessary to reduce the spread of the virus within Metro West.22 Additionally, both doctors noted the impossibility of adhering to CDC guidelines for social distancing measures, including maintaining six feet of distance between inmates, due to the dormitory-style housing units.23
By April 28, 2020, a total of 163 inmates at Metro West tested positive for COVID-19.24 One day later, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants to take a series of preventative actions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 at Metro West.25 In granting the preliminary injunction, the court found
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that plaintiffs had shown (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their § 1983 claim; (2) that they will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction; (3) that the threatened injury posed by the COVID-19 outbreak at Metro West outweighs any damage to the defendants resulting from an injunction; and (4) that the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest.26
On the first prong, the court rested its opinion on the belief that the plaintiffs satisfied both the objective and subjective components of the Eighth Amendment "deliberate indifference" analysis.27 The court found the objective component easily satisfied as a result of a deadly virus currently spreading among inmates and staff at Metro West a portion of which have a legitimate medical need to be protected from the virus.28 Pertaining to the subjective component, despite defendants' assurances as to the steps taken at Metro West to reduce the spread of COVID-19, the court found the record to not unequivocally demonstrate successful implementation of such policies and procedures.29 This finding was based on evidence provided by the plaintiffs, which indicated that social distancing was not possible, social distancing was not uniformly enforced, and inmates lacked access to cleaning supplies and masks.30 Additionally, with the significant increase in infected inmates since the start of litigation, the court could not accept the defendants' continued contentions that their efforts were sufficient to reduce the spread of the virus.31
After the district court granted the preliminary injunction, the defendants filed a motion for stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal.32 The Eleventh Circuit subsequently granted defendants' motion.33 The Eleventh Circuit, in addressing the likelihood of success on
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appeal, determined that the district court committed error by "incorrectly collaps[ing] the subjective and objective components" of the deliberate indifference standard.34 Specifically, the court reasoned that the district court misapplied the subjective component by "treat[ing] the increase in COVID-19 infections as proof that the defendants deliberately disregarded an intolerable risk."35 Rather, the court of appeals stated that the harm, COVID-19 infections, that results does not, in and of itself, provide sufficient evidence of a culpable state of mind.36
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction.37 The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits of their deliberate indifference claim, specifically the subjective component, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.38
A. Constitutional Amendments Applicable to Prison Conditions
The Eighth Amendment provides protection from cruel and unusual punishment, while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits "any State [from] depriv[ing] any person of life liberty, or property, without the due process of the law."39 It has been understood that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects the rights of citizens, including detainees, who have not been convicted of crimes, while the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies only to sentenced criminals.40 However, detainees, under the Fourteenth Amendment, are entitled to "at least as great" of protection as given to inmates under the Eighth Amendment.41
A detainee or convicted inmate alleging a violation of their Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights would likely bring a claim under 42
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U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is a form of redress when persons, under the color of state authority, violate an individuals rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution.42 When an inmate, in prison-condition cases, alleges an Eighth Amendment violation, a court evaluates the claim under a deliberate indifference standard.43 Courts apply this same standard to detainees claiming Fourteenth Amendment violations due to the notion that "[F]ourteenth [A]mendment rights of detainees can be defined by reference to the [E]ighth [A]mendment rights of convicted inmates."44
B. A Deliberate Indifference Claim
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must provide humane conditions of confinement by "ensur[ing] that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care," and by "tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the [health and] safety of inmates."45 The Supreme Court of the United States has held that both an objective and subjective requirement must be met when determining if prison officials have violated an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights.46
1. Objective Requirement
In meeting the first requirement, the plaintiff must show that the deprivation alleged is objectively, "sufficiently serious."47 Specifically, "[f]or a claim...
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