Pricing mergers with differential synergies
Date | 01 January 2018 |
Author | Paul Kwan,Nipun Agarwal |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.2175 |
Published date | 01 January 2018 |
RESEARCH ARTICLE
DOI: 10.1002/jsc.2175
Strategic Change. 2018;27(1):3–7. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jsc © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 3
Abstract
Mergers and acquisions (M&A) transacon pricing is a negoaon between the acquirer (buyer)
and the target rm (seller). Both these rms have a dierent esmate of the synergies that can
be obtained from this merger and as a result the valuaon of the target rm is dierent for the
acquirer and the target rm. This percepon of synergies can be easily impacted by the behavior
of the acquirer and the target. This arcle analyzes the pricing of M&A transacons based on dif-
ferenal synergy percepons, while looking at risk‐averse–risk‐taking behavior of acquirers and
opmisc–pessimisc behavior of the target rm. Results show that the acquirer’s risk‐taking
behavior and percepon of merger synergies determines the price oered for the M&A transac-
on. The target rm’s percepon of synergies is less relevant (if at all) and their opmisc be-
havior is most useful, when the acquirer perceives high synergies exisng in the potenal M&A
transacon.
1
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INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisions (M&A) transacons are a negoaon of the
price that the acquirer is ready to pay for the target rm and the price
that the target rm believes its worth. This price is obtained from the
synergies that both the acquirer and the target rm believe they will
obtain from the merger. If there is a substanal dierence between
the percepon of synergies and the nal valuaon, then the trans-
acon will oen fall through. The target rm valuaon and percep-
on of synergies oen is impacted by behavioral characteriscs of
the acquirer and target rm. We can oen see two rms in the same
posion may have dierent valuaons and consideraon of the syn-
ergies that can be obtained. This arcle reviews how synergies and
the risk‐averse–risk‐taking behavior of the acquirer and opmisc–
pessimisc behavior of the target rm can impact this valuaon. Fur-
ther, we develop an agent‐based model to analyze this problem. In
the next secon, we undertake a literature review M&A and agent
based modeling literature that relates to the problem of pricing M&A
transacons. Aer that, we review the methodology and discuss the
results from the agent‐based model to explain the outcomes of the
experiment.
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DIFFERENTIAL SYNERGIES IN MERGER
& ACQUISITION TRANSACTIONS
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) state that human beings value gains
more than losses, which means that a drop in the valuaon of the
target rm is more valuable to an acquirer than an equivalent gain in
the valuaon and vice versa from the target rm’s perspecve. Baker,
Pan, and Wurgler (2009) have empirically shown that the shareholder
of target rms usually accept oers that are above the 52‐week high
stock price. This would mean that the shareholder of the target rm
usually believe that the value obtained is equal or less than what they
would receive and that the 52‐week high stock price provides a beer
valuaon. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) have raised the queson that
oen rms can undertake misvaluaon. This could potenally occur
if the acquirer believes that it can gain greater synergies than actual
occur in reality aer the postmerger integraon is completed. Robin-
son and Viswanathan (2005) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) nd that
mergers occur in waves and the valuaon depends on the market con-
dion and reason for the merger.
Explaining this further, Kiymaz and Baker (2004) state that merg-
ers occur to maximize synergies, while divestments occur to spin‐
o misaligned parts of a rm. Kummer and Steger (2008) nd that
these merger waves reoccur, while Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009)
acknowledge that rms oen undertake herding behavior, where
Pricing mergers with dierenal synergies*
Nipun Agarwal | Paul Kwan
School of Science & Technology, University
of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia
Correspondence
Nipun Agarwal, 152 Williams Road, Prahran,
Victoria 3181, Australia.
Email: nipun1@msn.com
* JEL classicaon codes: G3, G34, G4.
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