Preventive Detention: The Impact of the 1984 Bail Reform Act in the Eastern Federal District of California
| Author | Carole Barnes,Tina Hodgins,Rodney Kingsnorth,Cynthia Davis,Camille Nicholes |
| Published date | 01 June 1987 |
| Date | 01 June 1987 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/088740348700200204 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
150-
Preventive
Detention:
The
Impact
of
the
1984
Bail
Reform
Act
in
the
Eastern
Federal
District
of
California
Rodney
Kingsnorth
California
State
University
Carole
Barnes
California
State
University
Cynthia
Davis
California
State
University
Tina
Hodgins
California
State
University
Camille
Nicholes
California
State
University
Abstract
Utilizing
a
longitudinal
research
design,
this
study
evaluates
the
impact
of
the
1984
Bail
Reform
Act
in
the
Eastern
Federal
District
of
California.
Contrary
to
other
experiments
with
preventive
detention
in
the
U.S.,
it
was
found
that
this
legislation
is
being
implemented
on
a
substantial
scale.
The
substitution
of
detention
orders
for
secured
bonds
in
most
cases
suggests
that
preventive
detention
before
the
Bail
Reform
Act
was
achieved
by
less
formal
means.
Overall
detention
rates
have
remained
unchanged
as
has
average
detention
length,
suggesting
the
law
has
not
contributed
significantly
to
overcrowding
of
detention
facilities.
The
greatest
impact
was
felt
by
drug
offenders
for
whom
rates
of
detention
have
significantly
increased.
Discriminant
analysis
suggests
that
the
judicial
decision-making
process
has
been
routinized
by
the law.
Rates
of
pre-trial
crime
and
failure-to-appear
rates,
extremely
low
before
the
law,
were
unaffected
by
the
new
legislation.
Introduction
On
October
12, 1984,
President
Reagan
signed
the
Comprehensive
Crime
Control
Act
(CCCA)
which
introduced
major
revisions
in
a
number
of
areas
of
federal
criminal
law
(for
an
excellent
overview
of
the
principal
features
of
151
this
omnibus
legislation
see
Cohen,
1985).
Title
1
of
the
CCCA
contains
the
Bail
Reform
Act
(18.
U.S.C.A.
Sections
3141-50),
which
grants
to
the
federal
judicial
system
the
authority
to
detain
criminal
defendants
prior
to
trial
on
the
grounds
that
&dquo;no
condition
or
combination
of
conditions
will
reasonably
assure
the
appearance
of
the
person
as
required
and
the
safety
of
any
other
person
and
the
community&dquo;
(18
U.S.C.A.
Section
3142
(e)).
This
act
substantially
revised
the
Bail
Reform
Act
of
1966
in
order
to
reflect
the
mounting
concern
in
Congress
with
the
problem
of
pre-trial
crime:
Many
of
the
changes
in
the
Bail
Reform
Act
incorporated
in
this
bill
reflect
the
committee’s
determination
that
federal
bail
laws
must
address
the
alarming
problem
of
crimes
committed
by
persons
on
release
and
must
give
the
courts
adequate
authority
to
make
release
decisions
that
give
appropriate
recognition
to
the
danger
a
person
may
pose
to
others
if
released.
The
adoption
of
these
changes
marks
a
significant
departure
from
the
basic
philosophy
of
the
Bail
Reform
Act,
which
is
that
the
sole
purpose
of
bail
laws
must
be
to
assure
the
appearance
of
the
defendant
at
judicial
proceedings
(98th
Congress,
1st
Sess.
8,
at
3
(1983),
hereinafter
cited
as
S.
Rep.
225.)
The
Bail
Reform
Act
(BRA)
of
1984
represents
the
culmination
of
several
years
of
passage
of
similar
legislation
at
the
state
level,
such
that,
by
1984,
34
states
and
the
District
of
Columbia
had
adopted
preventive
detention
legislation
(for
a
detailed
discussion
of
the
state
laws,
see
Goldkamp,
1985).
While
a
substantial
literature
addressing
the
constitutional
implications
of
the
BRA
for
fifth
and
eighth
amendment
jurisprudence
has
since
emerged
(see,
for
example,
Jett,
1985;
Natalini,
1985;
Overbeck,
1986;
Powers,
1985),
this
literature
has
not
yet
been
supplemented
by
research
documenting
the
impact
of
this
law
on
court
decision-making
practice.
A
number
of
impressionistic
observations
are
reported
in
newspapers,
magazines,
and
professional
publications,
but
these
are
somewhat
contradictory
and
unsupported
by
reliable
data.
For
example,
some
Department
of
Justice
attorneys
are
reportedly
pleased
with
the
implementation
of
the
BRA,
pointing
to
data
indicating
that
3,724
persons
were
ordered
held
without
bond
in
the
first
21
months
after
passage
of the
law
(Murphy,
1986).
However,
this
figure
is
disputed
by
the
Administrative
Office
of the
U.S.
Courts
which
places
the
true
figure
for
the
same
period
at
&dquo;closer
to
7000&dquo;
(Murphy,
1986).
The
U.S.
Marshal’s
Office
argues
that
&dquo;the
new
law
was
primarily
responsible
for
a
32.0%
increase
in
prisoner
population
and
an
11.0%increase
in
total jail
days
during
the
first
year
after
its
passage&dquo;
(Riley,
1986).
Yet
very
little
confidence
can
be
placed
in
this
conclusion,
since
it
fails
to
take
account
of
such
unrelated,
but
possibly
contributing
factors,
as
an
increase
in
the
number
of
cases
filed
(Riley,
1986).
Whatever
the
true
figures
may
be,
it
is
clear
from
these
reports
that
the
BRA
is
being
implemented
throughout
the
federal
system,
though
apparently
to
varying
degrees
in
different
districts
(Riley,
1986).
This
is
contrary
to
the
expectations
of
some
observers
(e.g.
Gordon, 1984),
who
anticipated
that
the
new
law
might
prove
to
be
more
symbolic
than
real.
However,
the
mere
fact
of
enforcement
tells
us
very
little
regarding
the
effectiveness
of
the
law
in
achieving
legislative
goals.
Reported
rates
of
detention
under
the
law,
along
with
average
detention
lengths,
pre-trial
crime
rates
and
failure-to-appear
rates
will
reveal
nothing
unless
juxtaposed
in
a
systematic
impact
analysis
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