Preventing State Crimes Against Democracy

• Date: 01 September 2009
• Author: Lance deHaven‐Smith,Matthew T. Witt
• DOI: 10.1177/0095399709339014
• Published date: 01 September 2009

527

Administration & Society

Volume 41 Number 5

September 2009 527-550

© 2009 SAGE Publications

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Preventing State Crimes

Against Democracy

Lance deHaven-Smith

Florida State University, Tallahassee

Matthew T. Witt

University of La Verne, California

This article analyzes U.S. vulnerabilities to state crimes against democracy

(SCADs). SCADs are actions or inactions by government insiders intended

to manipulate democratic processes and undermine popular sovereignty.

Watergate and Iran–Contra are well-known examples of SCADs involving

top officials. SCADs in high office are difficult to detect and successfully

prosecute because they are usually complex and compartmentalized; investi-

gations are often compromised by conflicts of interests; and powerful norms

discourage speculation about corruption in high office. However, liberal

democracies can reduce their vulnerability to state political criminality by

identifying vulnerabilities proactively and instituting policies for SCAD

detection and prevention.

Keywords: State Crimes against Democracy; SCADs; political–economic

complexes; checks and balances; elite political criminality

Because of growing concerns about the health of U.S. political institu-

tions, public administration scholars have begun to conceptualize and

study state crimes against democracy (SCADs). SCADs are actions or inac-

tions by government insiders intended to manipulate democratic processes

and undermine popular sovereignty (deHaven-Smith, 2006).1 In principle,

SCADs can be committed at any level of government, but those involving

high office have thus far been the primary focus of scholarly interest

because of their potential to subvert political institutions and entire govern-

ments or branches of government.

Although only a few high-level SCADs in U.S. history have ever been

officially corroborated, evidence indicates that at least since World War II

American democracy has become vulnerable to subversion by top leaders.

Authors’ Note: Please address correspondence to Lance deHaven-Smith, Bellamy Building,

6th Floor, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2250; e-mail: ldehavensmith@fsu.edu.

528 Administration & Society

Examples of high-level SCADs that have been officially proven include the

Watergate break-ins and cover-up (Bernstein & Woodward, 1974), the secret

wars in Laos and Cambodia (Ellsberg, 2002), the illegal arms sales and covert

operations in Iran–Contra (Kornbluh & Byrne, 1993; Martin, 2001; Parry,

1999), and the effort to discredit Joseph Wilson by revealing his wife’s status

as an intelligence agent (Isikoff & Corn, 2006). There have been many other

political crimes in which involvement by high officials is suspected have

gone uninvestigated or unpunished. Examples of suspected SCADs in high

office include the fabricated attacks on U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin

(Ellsberg, 2002, pp. 7-20), the “October Surprises” in the presidential elec-

tions of 1968 (Summers, 2000, pp. 298-308) and 1980 (Parry, 1993; Sick,

1991), the election breakdowns in 2000 and 2004 (deHaven-Smith, 2005;

Miller, 2005), and the misrepresentation of intelligence to justify the invasion

and occupation of Iraq (Isikoff & Corn, 2006; Rich, 2006).

Nefarious involvement by high-ranking public officials in these and

similar events cannot simply be dismissed as improbable, for the investiga-

tions of Watergate and Iran–Contra showed that officials at the highest

levels of American government can and sometimes do engage in conspira-

cies to manipulate elections, wiretap and smear critics, mislead Congress

and the public, and in other ways subvert popular sovereignty (Summers,

2000; Walsh, 1997). Corruption in high office is also predicted by a number

of theoretical traditions in public administration and policy that point to

sinister, antidemocratic tendencies in modern representative government.

Examples include Harold Lasswell’s garrison–state construct, C. Wright

Mills’ theory of the power elite, and Jürgen Habermas’s critical theory. Yet

another reason to be open to the possibility of political criminality in high

office is the rise since the 1930s of what economists and criminologists

refer to as “control frauds” (Black, 2005; Calavita, Pontell, & Tillman,

1999). Usually occurring in waves, these are large-scale frauds, such as the

looting of savings and loan companies in the 1980s, that are perpetrated by

corporate officers with the tacit approval, if not active support, of high-

ranking public officials whose support has been purchased by campaign

contributions and other rewards.

Despite the grave implications of political criminality among top lead-

ers, public officials tend to downplay the threat of crimes in high office. As

a practical matter, oversight committees and government investigators are

usually reluctant to pursue suspicions about top leaders unless evidence of

guilt is already in hand. Even then, calls for prosecution or removal from

office are likely to be tempered by partisan calculations and other strategic

considerations.