Pressure Groups and Administrative Agencies

• Author: H. Sschuyler Foster
• DOI: 10.1177/000271624222100105
• Published date: 01 May 1942
• Date: 01 May 1942
• Subject Matter: Articles

Pressure Groups and Administrative Agencies
By H. SCHUYLER FOSTER, JR.
HE
perennial problem of subordi-
tive agencies in a fashion less public
Tnating special interests to the public
and less dramatic than is the mode in
interest appears in an acute form in the
legislative halls. The present account
phenomenon of pressure group activity
excludes not only legislative lobbying
upon the agencies of administrative
but also consideration of the nonregu-
regulation. Regulative agencies are cre-
latory functions of administration, such
ated for the very purpose of curbing
as planning, collecting information, pub-
special interests, and nothing could be
lic reporting, and providing aid and
politically more natural than that the
assistance.
interests should seek to reduce such ex-
In all countries pressure groups are
ternal control to the minimum. In 1942
constantly working on administrative
the world is witnessing the expansion of
agencies, and their activities can be
governmental regulation to an unprece-
noted at every level of government, from
dented extent, and this development has
the city hall to the international mecha-
notably intensified the activities of pres-
nisms dealing with sugar or opium. The
sure groups in the United States.
size of the group pressing for adminis-
trative action varies from the mass of
POPULAR CONCERN
the Japanese people desiring a reduction
The voters of the American democ-
in the price of rice to a single family (or
racy are responding, typically, with a
individual) eager to secure a reduction
mixture of alarm concerning the menace
in the valuation of property for tax
to the public interest implicit in the
purposes. The type of pressure applied
stressing of such special interests, and
ranges from the political power of an
of realistic appreciation that each in-
outraged citizenry, through various de-
terest deserves &dquo;just&dquo; recognition. Few
grees of economic power as represented
Americans expect businessmen to fill
by campaign contributions and outright
war orders without some profit, or work-
bribes. Another factor which deserves
ers to receive wages without considera-
consideration in the analysis of pressure
tion of increased living costs, or farmers
is the degree of organization which
to produce at depression prices. The
unites the group and concentrates its
average citizen, however, does not seem
force.
Here again the variations run
fully to appreciate the significance of
from the loose union which characterizes
devices for &dquo;interest representation&dquo; em-
the very large groups (consumers) to
ployed in the last war and in the Na-
the tight associations encountered in
tional Recovery Administration, such as
some branches of business (electrical
advisory committees, consumers’ coun-
utilities) .
sel, and employee-employer collabora-
tion.
PRESSURE ON ADMINISTRATION
The materials concerning
THROUGH LEGISLATURE
group pres-
sure
AND COURTS
upon administration are more elu-
sive than those relative to legislation.
In assessing the significance of group
Some of the wartime administrative de-
pressure upon the administration, it is
cisions have received widespread news-
important to realize that administrators
paper and radio publicity, but as a rule
frequently complain about the inade-
the pressure is applied to administra-
quacy of their statutory authority. As
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soon as special interests realize that they
decisions in both our state and national
cannot prevent some form of govern-
courts. As soon as one inferior court
mental regulation, it becomes their natu-
decision questions the constitutionality
ral concern to see that the adopted law
of the policy, doubt is cast upon the
contains the minimum authority for
authority of the regulators. So it was
interfering with accustomed practices.’
with the National Recovery Administra-
’When the regulatory agency is set up,
tion, the Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
special interests press for the adoption
ministration, and the National Labor
of interpretations of the statute which
Board. Special interests such as the
were certainly not intended by the cru-
National Association of Manufacturers
saders who pushed the measure through
undermined the Labor Board, and the
the legislature. Annual attempts are
electrical utilities hampered the admin-
made to hamper the regulators by re-
istration of the &dquo;death sentence&dquo; to
ducing the appropriations requisite for
holding companies.3 However the Su-
the maintenance of the agency in full
preme Court may eventually hold, the
vigor. The administrators are threat-
appeal to the courts is likely to interpose
ened with the necessity of fighting a
a two-year delay in the effectuation of
keen legislative contest if they persist in
the regulatory agency’s decisions. Cer-
disliked practices. Agricultural groups,
tainly the business groups of the Nation
for example, proposed to fix the interest
have been well-nigh unanimous in their
rate on farm loans by statute unless the
support of the Walter-Logan bill, which
administrative agency consented to a
provides for an appeal to the courts on
reduction.2
2
Even if the administrative
the validity of administrative regula-
agency emerges unscathed, much of the
tions before they need be observed.4
available time and energy have been
This brief discussion of the efforts of
turned into fighting for funds or ward-
special interests to circumvent admin-
ing off legislative attacks.
istrative decisions by recourse to the
The fact that a special interest can
other two branches of government not
appeal to the courts, following an ad-
only clarifies the conditions under which
ministrative decision, is sometimes more
the regulators work, but serves also as
hampering to the regulatory agency
a testimonial to the fact that on numer-
than the threat of appeal to the legis-
ous occasions the administrative agen-
lature.
It is, of course, part of our
cies offer greater resistance to special
traditional scheme that every party dis-
interests than do the legislature and the
satisfied with an administrative inter-
judiciary. In one further respect have
pretation of a law may secure a judicial
pressure groups employed the legislature
interpretation; and every regulatory
to further their preferences: the naming
agency must work with one eye fixed on
of administrators.
the courts.
New regulatory ventures
have been brought
SECURING FAVORABLE ADMINISTRATORS
to a sudden halt by
The special interests...