Presidential Reorganization and the Politics of Public Agencies

• Author: Andrew B. Whitford
• DOI: 10.1177/0095399720945965
• Published date: 01 February 2021
• Date: 01 February 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399720945965

Administration & Society

2021, Vol. 53(2) 193 –221

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DOI: 10.1177/0095399720945965

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Article

Presidential

Reorganization and

the Politics of Public

Agencies

Andrew B. Whitford1

Abstract

Modern American public welfare agencies are the results of the continual

reorganization of multiple agencies, departments, and programs. I develop

four themes about the micro-foundations of reorganization in this article

to illustrate how politics intersect with agency structure and the reshaping

of the national bureaucracy. The empirical part of this article examines

President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s assembling of a national health, education,

and public welfare agency. The creation of the Department of Health,

Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1953 represents a critical juncture in that

evolutionary process.

Keywords

reorganization, executive politics, agency design

In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower became President and promptly created a cab-

inet-level agency devoted to the “human side” of government. The Department

of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was the first department to be cre-

ated at the cabinet level in 40 years, during the first Republican administration

in over 20 years, and with Republican control of both chambers of Congress. It

1University of Georgia, Athens, USA

Corresponding Author:

Andrew B. Whitford, Department of Public Administration and Policy, University of Georgia,

204 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA 30602, USA.

Email: aw@uga.edu

945965AASXXX10.1177/0095399720945965Administration & SocietyWhitford

research-article2020

194 Administration & Society 53(2)

was the largest reorganization until the creation of the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS). These events followed a fourfold increase in federal personnel

and 16-fold increase in federal expenditures over the preceding two decades

(Somers, 1954, p. 131). HEW’s creation followed debates over national health

insurance, socialized medicine, and a proposed Department of Public Welfare.

Also, it followed major wars, the suburbanization of America, and the creation

of Social Security. It coincided with the beginnings of the Cold War, the push

for civil rights, and the development of a modern health care and pharmaceuti-

cal infrastructure.

Over time, three prominent narratives emerged about reorganization. In

the first line of research, reorganization can be a technical means to achieve

effectiveness and efficiency, to attain an orthodox bureaucracy (e.g., Seidman,

1980). Second, reorganization is a mechanism for constitutional inter-

branch conf lict (e.g., Moe, 1989). Third, reorganization lets the president to

de-emphasize parties generally, with the secondary effect of increasing

inter-branch conflict (e.g., Milkis, 1993). In one way, reorganization is a

path-dependent process (Sydow & Schreyögg, 2011), so choices dictate an

evolutionary process that makes it hard to conceptualize of an “average” reor-

ganization; each is a special case. Each is a mix of the three narratives.

I argue that presidents have been able to use reorganization to change the

meaning of partisan labels, of partisan affiliations. In this sense, the president

can use reorganization to shape public perceptions of the party itself. The

mechanics here flow from the strategic manipulation of policy locations by

partisan leaders (e.g., Miller & Schofield, 2003), but more generally this is

practical heresthetics (Riker, 1986). Strategic opportunities often create

unusual policy outcomes (e.g., Gilmour, 1995). This fourth narrative helps

illuminate the tension between short-run motives and the long-run evolution

of agencies. Short-run motives often lead to unexpected changes that perhaps

are intended by none of the involved actors. Over the long run, though, early

decisions can open gates of opportunity for following administrations.

Specifically, I center on the Eisenhower Administration’s creation of

HEW in 1953 from numerous smaller, dispersed programs as a critical junc-

ture in the process that produced the current U.S. health policy infrastructure.

HEW formed the basis for the rapid growth of the federal health programs of

the 1960s and 1970s. I focus on the process that elevated HEW to the cabinet

level and its fit with these views of reorganization as a venue for political

conflict and compromise. The first section of this article argues that HEW’s

creation was part of a larger attempt by the Administration to manage the

federal bureaucracy through organizational and management techniques

from business and the military. Yet, Eisenhower succeeded where the Truman

Administration failed in 1949 and 1950 to reorganize the Federal Security