As we discuss in Chapter I, there have been several major
developments in case law since the first edition of Antitrust Law and
Economics of Product Distribution. In particular, the legal analysis for
some specific aspects of product distribution has changed dramatically
since this book originally was written nearly a decade ago, most notably
relating to resale price maintenance. In other areas, such as tying and price
discrimination, legal doctrines have not changed as much, but plaintiffs
appear to be having much less success under the rules and analyses that
have already been established. In areas such as cross-border distribution
and the sale of products over the Internet (and other manifestations of
technology in product distribution), the law has reached puberty in the last
decade. Application of existing rules to those newer situations is causing
progress in the evolution of both legal and economic thinking. Finally,
there has been some progress in economic learning regarding
distributional arrangements, although economics is still better at
identifying the key questions rather than providing clear answers.
For these reasons, it was time to update this book. Picking up on the
concept envisioned by the preceding editors, the approach was to have a
lawyer and an economist work together to provide drafts of each chapter.
With the assistance of both the Economics Committee and the Distribution
and Franchising Committee of the Section of Antitrust Law of the
American Bar Association, we have done that. Each pair was assigned to
review what had been written before, to scrap what no longer applies, and
to describe anew the latest and best legal and economic analyses that will
apply to product distribution.
In addition to the topics covered in the seven chapters in the original
book, this second edition of Antitrust Law and Economics of Product
Distribution adds three entirely new chapters. Chapter II is the first of the
new chapters. This chapter sets forth an overview of the many economic
principles that apply to distribution and franchising, highlighting the
principles that undergird modern analysis of each type of vertical restraint
or relationship. A group of economists, Serge Moresi, Spencer Graf, John
Woodbury, and Joshua Wright, and attorney Rob McNary shouldered the

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