Police Integrity: Rankings of Scenarios on the Klockars Scale by ‘‘Management Cops’’

• Date: 01 June 2011
• Published date: 01 June 2011
• DOI: 10.1177/0734016810384502
• Author: Scott Wolfe,Gennaro F. Vito,William F. Walsh,George E. Higgins
• Subject Matter: Articles

Criminal Justice Review
36(2) 152-164
Police Integrity: Rankings
ª 2011 Georgia State University
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DOI: 10.1177/0734016810384502
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Scale by ‘‘Management Cops’’
Gennaro F. Vito1, Scott Wolfe2,
George E. Higgins1, and William F. Walsh1
Abstract
Policing is recognized as a morally dangerous profession. This study extends analyses of police
corruption via a scale developed by Carl Klockars by surveying police managers attending the
Administrative Officers’ Course at the Southern Police Institute at the University of Louisville.
The findings indicate that these police managers acknowledge the existence of a questionable
moral climate in police agencies and a tolerance for official misconduct that is troubling to consider.
Keywords
police culture/accountability, police organization/management, police processes
Police officers are the ‘‘first responders’’ of the criminal justice system. They are responsible for
enforcing laws, protecting the public from dangers, and ensuring that citizens’ rights are upheld.
However, with these duties comes an opportunity for corrupt, deviant, or inappropriate behaviors
to take place. Policing is a highly discretionary, coercive activity that routinely takes place in private
settings, out of the sight of supervisors and witnesses and is thus an occupation that is ripe with
opportunities for misconduct of many types (Klockars, 1999, p. 208). Close contact with the public,
the monitoring and control of vice activities, and the discretionary power exercised by officers make
policing a ‘‘morally dangerous occupation’’ (Barker, 2006, p. 5). Because police officers are charged
with such important responsibilities in our society, their behavior must be monitored in some fash-
ion. Barker and Carter (1991) argue that what police officers do and how they do it affects the pub-
lics’ perceptions of the fairness and honesty of the entire criminal justice system. Consequently,
police corruption is an important research subject in criminal justice. Identifying the extent of police
corruption and offering ways to control it will lead to enhanced public safety while ensuring that the
rights of citizens are protected. This study examines police supervisor perceptions of police corrup-
tions through their responses to the Klockars scale with comparisons to data from previous studies
on this subject (Klockars, 1999; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005b).
1University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA
2Arizona State University, Phoenix Metropolitan Area, AZ, USA
Corresponding Author:
Gennaro F. Vito, 203 Brigman Hall, Louisville, KY 40292, USA
Email: gf.vito@louisville.edu

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Vito et al.
153
Police Corruption Defined
Police corruption is difficult to define because of jurisdictional differences in legal statutes and the
multitude of behaviors that can be included under a definition. Police corruption involves illegal
behaviors as well as acts that are not always illegal but considered inappropriate behavior for officers
(e.g., receiving free meals). Police corruption can involve organizational/rule violations such as gra-
tuities and sexual misconduct, money corruption, and abuse of authority such as use of force and
noble cause injustice (Barker, 2002). Kutnjak Ivkovic (2005a, p. 16) argues for a definitive defini-
tion that transcends jurisdictional boundaries and states that police corruption is
. . . an action or omission, a promise of action or omission, or an attempt by a police officer or a group of
police officers, characterized by a police officer’s misuses of the official position, motivated in signif-
icant part by the achievement of personal gain.
Law, policy, and procedures may attempt to regulate the discretionary power of police officers,
but the nature of patrol makes autonomy an essential part of the officers operational milieu. Police
officers on a daily basis engage in low-visibility decisions, in isolated locations, out of the public
view. These facts make uncovering police corruption a very difficult task to accomplish.
Controlling police corruption is difficult, if not impossible, largely due to a strong reluctance by
police officers to report fellow officers in what is often referred to as the ‘‘Blue Curtain’’ (Klockars,
Kutnjak Ivkovic, & Haberfeld, 2006). In her observational study of police precincts in the Bronx and
Manhattan, Reuss-Ianni (1983, pp. 13–16) indicated, this curtain exists at two levels in policing. Part of
the ‘‘street cops’’ code is to not ‘‘give up’’ (inform on) fellow officers and be secretive about their
on-the-job behavior. The traditional, pragmatic work place culture of the ‘‘street cops’’ was character-
ized by their self-image as crime fighters. These officers felt that their line experience, dealing with the
daily realities of life on the street, gave them a much more realistic picture of police work than the man-
agement bureaucrats who have lost touch with the job. Their views are an example of an occupational
culture: ‘‘a product of the various situations and problems which all vocational members confront and to
which they equally respond’’ (Paoline, 2003, p. 200). As a result, ‘‘street cops’’ tended to distrust policy
decisions made by the ‘‘management cops’’ who they believe traded in their experience for the physical
comforts of office work as well as rank and positional power. They were also suspicious of the motives
of their supervisors. The ‘‘street cops’’ viewed them as primarily interested in their own career and polit-
ical advancement in the agency rather than making decisions based on the realities of the situation.
However, ‘‘management cops’’ felt that they had a more realistic view of the organization in all of
its aspects—social, political, and operational. They believed that their administrative roles gave
them a different perspective based on professionalism. They were primarily concerned with issues
of ‘‘command and control’’ especially over the activities of the ‘‘street cops’’ (Reuss-Ianni, 1983).
Therefore, they were interested in enforcing the rules of the organization, establishing and maintain-
ing discipline and consistency of operations. In particular, middle managers tend to use management
themes to serve as a buffer between the ‘‘street cops’’ and the top level, police commanders (Paoline,
2003, p. 206). Their views are an example of an organizational culture whose values are defined by
top-level leaders. Yet, the ‘‘street cops’’ are likely to view their actions as ‘‘unpredictable and
punitive supervisory oversight’’ (Paoline, 2003, p. 201). As a result, rule enforcement by police
supervisors can lead ‘‘street cops’’ to engage in ‘‘lay low or ‘Cover Your Ass’’ behavior that is
unlikely to bring attention to themselves and thus avoid censure (Manning, 1995; Silverman, 1999).
The Klockars Scale
Several researchers have attempted to diminish the bias created by investigating police misconduct
through survey research using hypothetical scenarios involving police integrity. ‘‘Using the

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Criminal Justice Review 36(2)
organizational/occupational culture approach . . . modern social science can much more readily
measure the ability of police officers to recognize misconduct, how seriously police officers regard
misconduct, how amenable they are to supporting its punishment, and how willing they are to
tolerate misconduct in silence’’ (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2004, p. 6). These scenarios were
developed by Klockars (1999, pp. 210–211) and include 11 hypothetical situations involving police
officers engaging in activities that appear to be conflicts of interest.1 The scenarios are then accom-
panied by a series of six questions. Two questions ask about the seriousness of the act, two about
discipline, and two about willingness to report. All of the questions attempt to measure the same
organizational phenomenon: police integrity (Klockars & Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2004). Police integrity
is defined by Klockars and Kutnjak Ivkovic (2004) as ‘‘the normative inclination to resist tempta-
tions to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation’’ (p. 5). The advantage of using scenarios
of police integrity is discussed by Klockars (1999, pp. 209–212):
The major propositions of the idea that controlling corruption is an organizational rather than an
individual problem are questions of fact and opinion that can be explored directly and without any-
thing like the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt behavior are likely to provoke. It is, for
example, possible to ask factual questions about officers’ knowledge of agency rules, opinions about
the seriousness of their violation, and the punishment they deserve or are likely to receive, and their
estimates of officers’ willingness to report such behavior, without asking them directly about their
own or others’ corrupt behavior.
What has become known as the ‘‘Klockars Scale’’ allows researchers to investigate the issue of
police integrity rather than actual instances of police corruption (Klockars, 1999, pp. 210–211).
Although this does not remedy the problem of measuring the true rate of corruption, it allows agen-
cies to evaluate the integrity of their officers, whether their officers are willing to report unethical
behavior, and whether current punishment practices appear to be effective. With information from
such research, administrators can attempt to alleviate problem areas with advanced training pro-
grams aimed at increasing police integrity and by...