Police Deception Tactics and Public Consent in the United States and Great Britain
| Author | Joanna Funk,Robert Panzarella |
| DOI | 10.1177/088740348700200203 |
| Published date | 01 June 1987 |
| Date | 01 June 1987 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
133
Police
Deception
Tactics
and
Public
Consent
in
the
United
States
and
Great
Britain
Robert
Panzarella
John
Jay
College
of
Criminal
Justice
Joanna
Funk
John
Jay
College
of
Criminal
Justice
Abstract
Various
deception
tactics
have
become
commonplace
in
police
work,
such
as
"sting
operations"
for
snaring
burglars,
alluding
to
non-existent
witnesses
during
interrogations,
and
"abscam"
type
operations.
Courts
have
accepted
such
practices
in
the
belief
that
(1)
deception
is
a
preferred
substitute
for
coercion
and
(2)
deception
can
be
limited
to
the
investigation
stage
without
extending
to
the
courtroom
phase
of
a
case.
A
survey
of
both
American
and
British
police,
police
superiors
and
civilians
inquired
about
the
acceptability
of
deception
tactics.
Only
minor
differences
were
found
between
these
different
groups
in
terms
of
their
approval
of
deception
tactics.
All
groups
showed
a
generally
high
level
of
approval.
But
there
were
differences
in
terms
of
the
kinds
of
situations
in
which
deception
was
regarded
as
acceptable.
The
consistent
finding
was
that
there
was
greater
approval
of
a
deception
tactic
if
the
tactic
was
believed
to
be
in
common
use.
However,
widespread
use
of
deception
tactics
seems
to
have
injured
the
credibility
of
police
testimony
in
court
cases.
It
is
suggested
that
police
agencies
attempt
to
formulate
specific
guidelines
regarding
the
use
of
deception
tactics.
Deception
has
become
an
integral
part
of
police
work.
Over
a
century
ago
a
U.S.
Postal
Service
Inspector,
J.
Holbrook,
was
famed
for
trapping
dishonest
postmasters
by
sending
marked
cash
through
the
mail
to
post
offices
where
the
postmaster
was
dressed
a
bit
too
nicely
and
then
apprehending
the
crooked
postmaster
with
the
marked
money
in
his
pocket.
In
recent
years
various
police
agencies
have
used
undercover
decoy
officers
to
snare
robbers,
faked
fencing
operations
to
lure
in
burglars
disposing
of
stolen
property,
and
staged
&dquo;abscam&dquo;
style
operations
to
net
drug
dealers
and
political
influence
peddlers.
Even
in
routine
patrol
and
detective
work
the
use
of
deceptions
is
commonplace.
Although
police
officers
are
expected
to
be
honest,
they
are
also
expected
to
be
deceptive-in
the
right
way,
with
the
right
people.
Manning
(1974)
catalogued
the
types
of
lies
commonly
used
by
police
officers
in
dealing
with
suspects,
the
courts,
and
police
superiors.
He
has
CJPR,
VOL.
2,
NO. 2,
6/87,
134
preaictea
mai
me
roie oi
iyng
in
ponce
worK
is
more
uxeiy
to
increase
tnan
to
decrease
or
remain
the
same,
given
the
police
subculture’s
norms
about
lying
as
a
useful
strategy
for
dealing
with
obstacles
to
crime
control.
Marx
(1982)
has
underlined
the
increase
in
the
use
of
deception
tactics
in
proactive
policing.
Although
the
courts
have
apparently
accepted
deception
tactics
in
police
interrogation
of
suspects
as
preferable
to
physical
coercion
in
extracting
information
or
confessions,
the
courts
have been
unable
to
protect
themselves
from
police
deception
when
lies
are
used
to
mask
abuses
by
police
officers.
Lying
can
be
adjunct
to
brutality
instead
of
a
substitute
for
it.
Recent
exposure
of
the
systematic
use
of
torture
and
perjury
by
the
Israeli
security
agency,
Shin
Beth,
has
underscored
the
point
that
deception
may
be
a
partner
rather
than
a
substitute for
physical
coercion
in
obtaining
confessions;
an
inquiry
commission
found
that
&dquo;Shin
Beth
agents
had
routinely
lied
in
court
over
a
16-year
period
to
cover
up
the
physical
abuse
of
suspected
terrorists&dquo;
(New
York
Times,
1987:
A6).
The
theory
that
deception
is
a
substitute
for
coercion
(e.g.,
Kerstetter, 1983)
must
be
weighed
against
the
theory
that
either
practice
may
contribute
to
a
general
breakdown
of
integrity.
It
has
been
argued
that
the
major
effect
of
the
exclusionary
rule
in
the
United
States
has
been
to
increase
police
perjury
(see
Burger,
1964;
Oaks,
1970).
If
police
are
convinced
that
a
suspect
is
guilty,
they
feel justified
in
lying
to
secure
the
conviction.
Skolnick
(1983)
has
pointed
out
that
the
courts’
endorsement
of
deception
tactics
in
the
investigatory
phase
of
a
case
provides
the rationale
for
the
use
of
deception
in
the
trial
stage
also.
Courts
sometimes
accept
deceptions
by
police
in
applying
for
warrants
and
giving
testimony
(Rubinstein, 1974:
386,
392).
And
courts
engage
in
their
own
deceptive
practices.
Courts
will
accept
an
attorney’s
request
to
postpone
a
hearing
because
the
attorney’s
associate,
Mr.
Green,
has
not
arrived,
although
the
judges
know
that
&dquo;Mr.
Green&dquo;
is
a
euphemism
for
payment
of
the
attorney’s
fees
by
the
client
(see
Blumberg,
1967).
Even
the
U.S.
Supreme
Court
has used
deception
when
it
has
been
convenient
for
making
a
legal
point
in
decisions
which
would
set
precedents.
Deciding
a
case
about
police
questioning
of
a
suspect’s
wife
(Coolidge
v.
New
Hampshire, 1970),
the
Court
wanted
to
say
that
such
questioning
was
legal
but
did
not
want
to
approve
the
fact
that
police
had
coerced
and
intimidated
the
suspect’s
wife
into
answering
questions.
In
the
Court’s
written
opinion,
the
facts
of
the
case
were
deliberately
misrepresented
by
the
statement:
&dquo;There
is
not
the
slightest
implication
of
an
attempt...to
coerce
or
dominate
her.&dquo;
This
was
a
well
known
and
deliberate
falsehood,
as
reported
by
Woodward
and
Armstrong
in
their
account
of
how
the
decision
was
drafted
(1981:135-136;
for
another
instance
of
deliberate
distortion
of
facts
in
an
opinion,
see
page
262).
A
court
may
sanction
the
use
of
deception,
even
though
the
court
may
not
be
at
ease
with
a
deception
which
involves
the
court
itself.
The
Washington
Supreme
Court
refused
to
overturn
a
conviction
based
on
a
deception
in
a
case
where
police
officers
gained
entry
to
a
house
by
showing
a
bogus
traffic
warrant
signed
by
a
fictitious
judge.
The judges
upheld
the
arrest
based
on
the
ruse
but
complained
that
&dquo;the
officers
should
have
come
up
with
a
trick
that
didn’t
call
into
question
the
integrity
of
the
judicial
process&dquo;
(Law
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