Poland's Evolving Violent Far-Right Landscape.

• Author: Duffin, Michael

After more than two decades of countering Islamist terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State, many counterterrorism policymakers, practitioners, and scholars have become accustomed to associating the threat level in a country with the number of mass-casualty terrorist plots that were successful, thwarted, or failed. Beyond some prominent examples of successful attacks perpetrated by violent far-right individuals in Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, and the United States, a majority of violent far-right groups since 9/11 have perpetrated low-level attacks that either do not result in a significant loss of life (if any) or are not categorized as hate crimes and/or acts of terrorism. (1) This conundrum is best exemplified in Poland, which since the fall of communism in 1989 has been a source of and destination for violent far-right actors who are more likely to assault their victims with knives, clubs, and fists than with bombs or guns.

Despite extensive reporting about individual incidents, there has been little analysis published to date about the regional and global counterterrorism implications of a potentially growing violent far-right threat in Poland. (a) This article, which is intended to encourage more scholarship on this topic, begins with an overview of the complex threat environment. It then outlines the connections some violent far-right individuals and groups in Poland have had to Russia. It will then look at two elements commonplace with most violent far-right ideologies in Poland: nationalism--including its role in stoking polarization (b)--and anti-Semitism. Next, the article will explore how nationalism and anti-Semitism in Poland have contributed to violent far-right activities, including the murder of Gdansk Mayor Pawel Adamowicz in 2019 by a man inspired by a sustained campaign of hate against the mayor by violent far-right groups and ultra-nationalist commentators on Polish media; and the annual Independence Day march in Warsaw, which at its pre-pandemic peak attracted 200,000 people in 2019, including members of violent far-right groups outside of Poland. The article will then explain why violent far-right groups across Europe travel to Poland, including the perception that Poland is a more permissive environment for their activities than their home countries and the allure of Poland being a mostly homogeneous country of white Christians with a socially conservative government. Finally, the article will discuss information gaps and emerging challenges posed by violent far-right groups in Poland.

The description provided here of relevant violent far-right activities in a mostly racially and religiously homogeneous Central European country of 38 million people (c) draws on an extensive review of open-source material and background interviews with dozens of researchers, journalists, and policy makers, and articulates why violent far-right movements in Poland should garner more attention from the global counterterrorism community.

A Complex Threat Landscape

In Poland, violent far-right groups are disparate, including but not limited to neo-Nazis, neo-fascists, ultra-nationalists, and racist soccer hooligans. (d) The first post-communist violent far-right attack occurred in 1989 against the Warsaw office of the Polish Socialist Party. (2) Restrictive gun laws have hampered the ability of violent far-right actors from Poland to carry out mass-casualty attacks, with the Polish government interdicting multiple plots over the past decade. (3) In November 2012, for example, Polish security services arrested a man with links to Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik who planned to ram a vehicle with explosives into parliament; he was later sentenced to 13 years in prison for this plot. (4) Donald Tusk, the prime minister at that time, said, "This is a new and dramatic experience. This should be a warning." (5) On November 10, 2019, Polish security services raided a Warsaw home and arrested two men who allegedly planned a "Christchurch-style" (e) attack against a mosque. (6)

Political rhetoric, particularly during the lead up to parliamentary elections, has contributed to a rise in support for violent far-right extremism since at least 2015--the next parliamentary elections are in fall 2023. With fewer than 10,000 Muslims living in Poland at that time, (f) debate in July 2015 about the government potentially admitting tens of thousands of Syrian refugees shifted the focus of parliamentary elections that October to xenophobic hyperbole, which contributed to the election of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party on a socially conservative platform. (7) In the lead-up to parliamentary elections in 2019, PiS officials depicted LGBTQI+ rights as a dangerous foreign idea that undermines traditional values--such rhetoric was blamed in part for violent counter-protestors at Pride parades across Poland. (8) In July 2019, racist soccer hooligans and other violent far-right groups attacked marchers at a Pride parade in Bialystok, the largest city in northeastern Poland, with flash bombs, rocks, and bottles. (9) In September 2019, a man and woman were arrested at a pride parade in Lublin in southeastern Poland for possession of crudely made explosive devices they had planned to detonate at the event. (g) The organizers of the event said they received death threats, and police arrested 30 counter-protestors before the parade even began. (10)

Russia: A Comrade for Segments of Poland's Violent Far-Right

Unlike Hungary and Serbia, anti-Russia sentiment is rampant across Poland, including among PiS leadership, because of the historical legacy of Polish-Russia relations as well as accusations by some in the government and their allies that Russian officials played a role in the 2010 plane crash that killed President Lech Kaczynski and 95 others in Smolensk, Russia. (11) Despite widespread antipathy toward Russia, some violent far-right groups are pro-Kremlin. In February 2018, three Poles from the pro-Russia Falanga organization were arrested for firebombing a Hungarian cultural center in Ukraine. (12) Hired by a Kremlin-aligned member of Germany's Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) party, the perpetrators were attempting a "false flag" operation to reinforce Russian claims that Ukraine had been overrun by violent far-right groups. (13) Polish nationals have also sought training from the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), which the United States designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists in 2020. (h) In November 2017, an extreme far-right conference held the day before the annual Independence Day march in Warsaw featured Denis Nikitin, the Russian founder of the white nationalist clothing brand White Rex. (14)

Russian hostilities in Ukraine have led to divisions among violent far-right groups in Poland. Many of those who are pro-Russia believe President Vladimir Putin's authoritarianism and far-right policies serve as a model for Poland. (15) Russian propaganda and disinformation have also been credited for stoking anti-American and anti-E.U sentiment among those Poles who feel like they have been excluded from the prosperity promised by E.U membership. (16) The first known formal engagements between Polish and Russian violent far-right actors occurred in August 2000 when neo-Nazis from Poland visited Russia. (17) One member of this delegation, Mateusz Piskorski, was elected to parliament in 2005 and served a single term. (18) He was arrested on espionage charges in May 2016 for his connections to Russia and was released on bail in 2019 pending trial, which remains in limbo awaiting a court review of the charges. (19)

The Intersection of Nationalism and Polarization

Beyond violent far-right groups, far-right political figures have contributed to polarization in Poland by demonizing religious and ethnic minorities, immigrants, and others they believe undermine their socially conservative agenda, such as those who support abortion, the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons, and Poland's membership in the European Union. Many followers of the country's far-right movement trace their roots back to the late Roman Dmowski, a politician and ideologue who in the interwar period argued that only Catholics make good Poles. (20) One of Dmowski's ideological heirs is Radio Maryja, a far-right Catholic media company founded in 1991 by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, a Catholic priest who has pushed back against Vatican attempts to rein in his divisive and overtly political rhetoric. (21) The U.S. Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report has cited instances of anti-Semitism featured on Radio Maryja programming several times, most recently in the 2017 report. (22)

While far from monolithic, the base of support for nativist groups in Poland often comes from older, conservative Poles and those who live in economically depressed rural regions in the south and east. (23) Even before the massive influx of refugees from Ukraine as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, Poland had transitioned from "a country of emigration to a country of immigration." (24) As an E.U. member with a relatively low cost of living, Poland attracts workers and students from around the world. It is estimated that 10 percent of Poland's 300,000 tech sector jobs, for example, are occupied by foreigners. (25) The top source country for temporary stays in Poland from 2018-2020 was Ukraine, and other countries high up on the list included China, India, and Vietnam. (26)

The League of Polish Families, while no longer attracting many voters, was instrumental in bringing xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and homophobia into Poland's mainstream political discourse in the 2000s. (27) In 2006, Polish media exposed senior party members' involvement in neo-Nazi activities, including the head of All Polish Youth, its youth wing. (28) The ruling PiS party, which absorbed many of the League of Polish Families' voters...