A Plea from a Former Careerist to Presidential Appointees

• Author: Susannah Bruns Ali
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12860
• Published date: 01 November 2017
• Date: 01 November 2017

Book Reviews 951

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 77, Iss. 6, pp. 951–954. © 2017 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12860.

A Plea from a Former Careerist to Presidential Appointees

Susannah Bruns Ali is assistant

professor at Florida International University.

She previously worked as a policy analyst

at the Office of the Assistant Secretary

for Planning and Evaluation in the

U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services where she collaborated with the

White House, Congress, various federal

government agencies, and advocacy groups.

Ali ’ s research focuses on factors that

influence public sector employee career

paths, with attention to the influence of the

political environment on careerist choices.

E-mail: susannah.ali@fiu.edu

G. Edward DeSeve ,  e Presidential Appointee ’ s

Handbook, Second Edition ( Washington, DC :

Brookings Institution Press , 2017 ). 186pp. $18.00

(paper), ISBN: 9780815728931 .

H ow do you write a handbook for new

political appointees of an administration

that has the goal of uprooting the status

quo? DeSeve gives a balanced overview that grounds

new appointees in some of the challenges of their

new positions and gives a constructive guide to help

navigate the tangled complexity of getting work done

in a political environment. Where the book could

contribute more is by speaking to the Hobbesian/

Machiavellian nature of an appointee ’ s job when he/

she is tasked with creating drastic changes that are

often in opposition to the mission of the organization

that he/she is to lead .

DeSeve ’ s approach is based on his exemplary

experience as an appointee in many roles at multiple

agencies. I offer this review from the perspective of

careerists who work directly with appointees and

encourage all appointees to view their workforce as

a powerful asset if they are willing to spend the time

to develop relationships and learn from careerists’

technical and institutional knowledge. From this

lens, the five themes that emerge are accountability,

innovation and change, appointee–careerist relations,

collaboration, and values.

The opening chapter is about leading an organization

with an eye toward accountability and transparency.

Concentrating an appointee ’ s actions on data and

results is an approach that will generate constructive

change for federal programs. What deserves more

emphasis is that the choice of goals and what to

measure is never neutral. Instead, these are political

choices reflecting the values of the group that

establishes them.

DeSeve rightly points out that Congress has an

important role in accountability and agency actions.

Instead of presenting this as a factual reality, new

appointees need to understand that it is in their

interest to leverage relationships with those both

within and outside of their agency. All administrations

seek to protect themselves by controlling the

information flow beyond executive appointees. While

understandable, it also means that administrations

forgo the advantages of collaboration. Fostering

relationships with Congress on smaller issues like

providing information and advice builds trust that

will encourage members to rely on agency experts,

including senior careerists, for legislative efforts.

Congress is perpetually understaffed—they will

use any help they can get. Through this assistance,

appointees can then influence legislative outcomes.

Where accountability becomes challenging is when

the goals of the administration are at odds with

the mission of the agency. What do appointees do

if programmatic success differs from their policy

agenda? Here lies the reality of that legal phrase in

Washington, “congressional intent.” If Congress

funds a program, appointees must implement the

program. However, administrations often seek to

undermine programs that they find distasteful. This

walks a careful line of legally fulfilling congressional

directives without strengthening a program. In terms

of accountability, an administration needs to balance

whether they risk the ire of Congress by not giving

a program full attention, or using accountability

to show from the inside that the program does not

warrant future congressional support.

In many cases where the president ’ s views differ from

agency missions and goals, appointees are placed in

their positions to undo agency actions instead of to

promote the agency (Auer 2008 ). This can create

great strains in careerist–bureaucratic relations as

career staff have often self-selected into an agency

because they support agency programs and policies

(Edwards 2001 ). One of the most important insights,

especially for an administration that disagrees with

the policies implemented at many agencies, comes in

Danny L. Balfour , Editor

Susannah Bruns Ali

Florida International University