PERSUASIVE DEFINITIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS.

• Author: Walton, Douglas

The case studies in this investigation show how persuasive redefinitions of terms already defined in science, law or everyday usage are very often, in a clever and subtle way, deployed to serve the interest of the definer. Persuasive definitions are commonly treated in logic textbooks, and how they work as rhetorical tools used in argumentation has already been studied, most notably by Stevenson (1944). However, in the literature, they tend to be treated as potentially confusing but fairly harmless logic-chopping devices used to boost up the plausibility of arguments in intellectual, philosophical discussions. The case studies analyzed below show that persuasive definitions are far from the harmless verbal tricks they may appear to be. They are extremely powerful and significant argumentation tactics in legal and political argumentation with highly significant financial implications at all levels of government and at all levels in the justice system. Arguments about definitions are often taken to be trivial, but only a brief investigation of the facts will show that this superficial impression is far from accurate.

Very little if any advance has been made on studying persuasive definitions since Stevenson (1938) first began the systematic study of them as tools of persuasion. Precise determination of when their use is legitimate or illegitimate in the kinds of significant cases studied below is too much to hope for, at this point in the development of the subject. Still, some interesting findings are revealed through the case studies below that cast light on how persuasive definitions work rhetorically and how they ought to be evaluated from a logical point of view. The implication drawn from these findings is that a new approach to the study of the use of definitions in argumentation is needed. The new dialectical approach needed to cope with the phenomena illustrated below steers a middle way between the old, but still widely accepted viewpoint of essentialism, and the new, or at least newly more influential viewpoint of postmodernism. According to the new dialectical view, a definition should always be evaluated in light of the purpose it was supposedly put forward to fulfill in a context of conversation. It will also be shown why definitions should often be presumed to be argumentative in nature, even though in some cases the purpose of putting forward a definition is that of explanation rather than argumentation. The hypothesis suggested by the cases below is that a persuasive definition should be treated as a particular kind of argument.

1. STEVENSON'S THEORY OF PERSUASIVE DEFINITIONS

   The concept of the persuasive definition, as used in a certain way in argumentation, is a theory due to the philosopher Charles L. Stevenson, introduced in his article published in the journal Mind (1938). It was then elaborated and presented in the form most of us are familiar with it today in his book, Ethics and Language (1944). A basic assumption behind Stevenson's concept of the persuasive definition theory is that words used in argumentation, for example in ethical discussions, have both an emotive and a descriptive meaning. This distinction between the two types of meaning appears to have been drawn from earlier theoreticians of language use. According to the account given by Aomi (1985, p. 187), the phrase "emotive meaning" was coined by Ogden and Richards in their book, The Meaning of Meaning (1923). Ogden and Richards postulated that the "descriptive meaning" is the core factual or descriptive content of a word, while the "emotive meaning" represents the feelings or attitudes (positive or negative) that the use of the word suggests to respondents. Stevenson's theory of how persuasive definitions work in argumentation is built on this distinction. How a persuasive definition works, according to Stevenson's theory, is by redefining the descriptive meaning of the word, while covertly retaining its old familiar emotive meaning. The ambiguity, and potential deception in this technique is that while the word ostensibly appears to have been given an entirely new meaning, it continues to retain its past emotional meaning. The emotional connotation expressed by the old meaning could be positive or negative. For example, a word like "liberation" has positive connotations, while a word like "oppression" has negative connotations. Because of the lingering of this emotive meaning, the respondent is covertly persuaded to accept (or reject) the new definition, based on persuasive positive or negative connotations in the existing usage of the word.

   To show how Stevenson's concept of the persuasive definition works in practice, it is best to give an example. Stevenson (1944, p. 211) offered the following illustration, in the form of a dialogue between two parties called A and B.

   Case 1

   A: He has had but little formal education, as is plainly evident from his conversation. His sentences are often roughly cast, his historical and literary references rather obvious, and his thinking is wanting, in that subtlety and sophistication which mark a trained intellect. He is definitely lacking in culture.

   B: Much of what you say is true, but I should call him a man of culture notwithstanding.

   A: Aren't the characteristics I mention the antithesis of culture, contrary to the very meaning, of the term?

   B: By no means. You are stressing the outward forms, simply the empty shell of culture. In the true and full sense of the term, "culture" means imaginative sensitivity and originality. These qualities he has; and so I say, and indeed with no little humility, that he is a man of far deeper culture than many of us who have had superior advantages in education.

   B is arguing that the conventionally accepted definition of "culture" is superficial, and he proposes a new definition of culture that redefines it in terms of sensitivity and originality, and not just outward appearances. What might be the effects of such a redefinition if applied to a case of ethical judgment? Suppose Rodney uses bad grammar, has bad table manners, and displays an ignorance of history, literature and classical music, but is emotionally sensitive, and is highly original, even eccentric in his behavior. By the standard meaning of "culture," Rodney would definitely not be said to be a cultured person. But suppose that Rodney's boorish behavior is excused by arguing that according to the new definition, he is a cultured person. What would be happening in such a case is that Rodney's (apparently) bad behavior is being justified or excused by arguing that in the way that really counts, or really should count, he is a cultured person. What's really happening is that a kind of positive spin is bein g put on the case by using language that makes Rodney's behavior seem okay. How does the technique work? It works because the term "culture" retains its positive emotive meaning, thus seeming to support

   the view that Rodney is really behaving in an acceptable way. Stevenson (1938, p. 333) explained how the argumentation works to create a deception in such a case. The redefined word retains its old positive emotive connotations that it always had, as noted above. But people tend not to realize that they are still being influenced by them, even though they have agreed to change to the new descriptive meaning, which perhaps should not still continue to have positive connotations, at least of the same kind. The technique works because the descriptive meaning shift is typically not accompanied by a shift of emotive meaning. The result is a deceptive kind of blurring or ambiguity of meaning in the sequence of argumentation. This deceptive aspect has often led to quite a critical attitude toward persuasive definitio ns in logic textbooks, where they are treated as, if not fallacious, at least something to be wary about. However, persuasive definitions sometimes appear to be acceptable.

   A leading characteristic that helps us to recognize persuasive definitions, according to Stevenson (1944, p.214), is that they are often preceded by the word "true" or the word "real." In case 1, for example, B said that he is talking about the "true" meaning of culture. Another illustration presented by Stevenson (1938, p. 334) is the offering of the definition of "true courage" as "strength against adverse public opinion." Persuasive definitions are commonly found in intellectual writings, like works on philosophy, literary criticism, and the social sciences. Philosophical arguments and ethical treatises in particular are full of persuasive definitions. Hallden (1960) has described many cases of such writings that give persuasive definitions of concepts like love, humor, poetry, culture, life and democracy. It would be a sweeping condemnation to reject all these arguments as being somehow logically deficient, or even fallacious, just because persuasive definitions are used in them. So the diagnosis of exac tly what is wrong with using persuasive definitions appears to be an unsolved problem. Whatever the solution to the problem is, Stevenson was certainly right to warn that persuasive definitions can be quite tricky and powerful tools of persuasion.

   Aomi (1985, p.187) explained the basic components of Stevenson's theory very well by stating the four requirements of the effectiveness of a persuasive definition:

1. The word being defined has strong emotive connotations.

2. The descriptive meaning of the word is vague and ambiguous enough to be semantically manipulated.

3. The change of meaning by redefinition is not noticed by naive listeners.

4. The emotive meaning of the word remains unaltered.

   This four-tiered account of how persuasive definitions work shows how an emotive inertia factor is a key aspect of the process showing how the use of such definitions can be both persuasive and deceptive. The third and fourth clauses show how the function of a persuasive definition in persuading audience...