Performance Appraisal Politics in the Public Sector: The Effects of Political Skill and Social Similarity on Performance Rating

• Published date: 01 June 2020
• Date: 01 June 2020
• Author: Hyang Won Kwon
• DOI: 10.1177/0091026019859906
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0091026019859906

Public Personnel Management

2020, Vol. 49(2) 239 –261

© The Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0091026019859906

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Article

Performance Appraisal

Politics in the Public Sector:

The Effects of Political Skill

and Social Similarity on

Performance Rating

Hyang Won Kwon1

Abstract

This study investigated the main effects of a subordinate’s (ratee) political skill

dimensions (social astuteness, apparent sincerity, interpersonal influence, and

networking ability) on supervisor (rater) performance rating and further analyzed

the interactive effects of social similarity in the subordinate–supervisor dyad on the

relationship between political skill dimension and performance rating. To test these

relationships, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) was used on a matched sample of

337 subordinate–supervisor dyads who worked in South Korea’s central government.

Findings showed that subordinates with higher social astuteness, interpersonal

influence, and networking abilities (but not apparent sincerity) will likely achieve

more positive supervisor ratings. More importantly, the relationship between these

political skill dimensions and performance ratings is stronger when there is greater

social similarity between a subordinate (ratee) and his or her supervisor (rater).

The findings’ practical and academic implications and future research directions are

discussed.

Keywords

performance appraisal, performance ratings, political skills, social similarity,

performance appraisal politics

1Associate Research Fellow, Korea Instute of Public Administration, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Corresponding Author:

Hyang Won Kwon, Office 403, New Wing 235, Jinheung-ro, Eunpyung-gu, Seoul 110-745, Republic of

Korea.

Email: 99blackmonday@hanmail.net

859906PPMXXX10.1177/0091026019859906Public Personnel ManagementKwon

research-article2019

240 Public Personnel Management 49(2)

Introduction

Subjective performance appraisal is a management tool linked to pay-for-performance

where a supervisor (appraiser) qualitatively assesses his or her subordinates on task

aspects that are difficult to quantify using objective indicators (Murphy & Cleveland,

1995). As it originated in the Western part of the developed world, particularly in the

United States (e.g., Civil Service Reform Act [CSRA] of 1978), it has become a domi-

nant paradigm over the past few decades and has spread internationally (Kim &

Rubianty, 2011; Park, 2014).1 Despite its popularity, there has also been a growing

skepticism both in theory and in practice over whether performance appraisal practice

can achieve its expected effects in the public sector (Poon, 2004). This is partially due

to the awareness that “rating accuracy” can be hampered by various “factors other than

ratee performance” in subjective appraisals such as human error and bias (Chen,

2014). Furthermore, there is also the risk that supervisors may exploit appraisal prac-

tices to further their own interests or personal agenda such as taming subordinates and

treating certain employees preferentially (Dhiman & Singh, 2007; Longenecker &

Gioia, 2001). According to an organizational justice perspective, if such problems

occur, this can increase the chance of unintended consequences in the workplace

(Smither, 2015), including morale deterioration, loss of leadership authority, and the

growth of uncertainty and stress (Campbell, Campbell, & Chia, 1998). Particularly in

the public sector, defining and measuring performance are elusive (Frumkin &

Galaskiewicz, 2004), and thus, the potential for aforementioned human bias or error is

larger than among private business counterparts (e.g., sales; Eremin, Wolf, & Woodard,

2010; Goss & Tohmatsu, 2001).

In this regard, previous research has attempted to explore what behavioral determi-

nants can explain performance rating variance and have extended our theoretical

understanding of the factors that lead to systemic variance in supervisor performance

rating (see Bretz Jr, Milkovich, & Read, 1992; Fletcher, 2001; Levy & Williams, 2004,

for review and discussion). However, our knowledge is far from complete for the fol-

lowing reasons:

First, little is known thus far about how appraisees’ (subordinates’) use of interper-

sonal political skills on their appraisers (supervisors) influences appraisal processes

and the resultant ratings in the public sector. Politics are inherent in performance

appraisals because rating results are closely linked to the rewards and promotions for

appraisees (Longenecker, Sims Jr, & Gioia, 1987). In this regard, an appraisee may be

considered a player participating in a game to attain a better score than his or her peers

or competitors. Picturing the appraisee this way may make one wonder what strategies

or characteristics of an appraisee are conducive to better results, a question that

deserves further attention in performance appraisal research. Nevertheless, extant

studies have exclusively focused on the side of the appraiser (supervisor) as the pri-

mary cause of rating accuracy and have thereby keenly examined the link between

appraiser motivation (e.g., felt accountability or Public Service Motivation [PSM];

Park, 2014), appraiser abilities (e.g., training; Woehr & Huffcutt, 1994), and