Peers and offender decision‐making

• Author: E. M. Hoeben,K. J. Thomas
• Date: 01 November 2019
• Published date: 01 November 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12462

DOI: 10.1111/1745-9133.12462

RESEARCH ARTICLE

PEERS AND OFFENDER DECISION-MAKING

Peers and offender decision-making

E. M. Hoeben1K. J. Thomas2

1University at Albany,SUNY

2University of Colorado—Boulder

Correspondence

E.M.Hoeben, School of Criminal Justice,

Universityat Albany, State Universityof

NewYork (SUNY), 135 WesternAvenue,

Albany,NY 12222.

Email:ehoeben@albany.edu

Wewould like to thank Frank Weerman, Jean-

Louisvan Gelder, the editor of this special issue

GregPogarsky, and the anonymous reviewerfor

their valuablecomments and suggestions. We

alsog ratefullyacknowledge the contributions

oft he attendees of the symposium on decision-

makingat t he Universityat Albany (April

19and 20, 2018), and of the attendees at t he

plenary session at the Annual meeting of the

American Society of Criminology in Atlanta

(November16, 2018).

Research Summary: Offender decision-making generally

occurs in social context. In this article, we discuss the

potential for integrating insights on peer processes and

decision-making processes to advance our understanding

on the decision to engage in crime. In particular, we address

the developmental and situational influence of peers on

perceptions, preferences, and dual-systems processing. We

contribute to this literature by elaborating on situational

peer processes and discuss the ways in which peers can

affect decision-making through their mere presence as well

as through their active involvement as instigators, conver-

sational partners, and co-offenders.

Policy Implications: Programs to effectivelyreduce cr ime

and delinquency require a holistic approach that takes into

account the interdependency between internal and external

factors that impact behavior.The pur pose of this article was

to detail how our understanding of two prominent explana-

tions of crime —peer influence and rational choice—can

mutually benefit from such integration.

KEYWORDS

offender decision-making, peer influence

When adolescents engage in delinquent conduct, they generally do so in the presence of peers

(Bernasco, Ruiter, Bruinsma, Pauwels, & Weerman, 2013; Reiss, 1988; Van der Laan, Blom, &

Kleemans, 2009; Warr, 1996; Weerman, Bernasco, Bruinsma, & Pauwels, 2015). There is increasing

evidence that these peers impact delinquency in part by affecting an actor’s decision calculus

concerning the anticipated consequences of crime. For example, research has shown that the presence

of peers both lowers one’s expectations about the risks associated with crime (McGloin & Thomas,

2016a) and makes individuals more tolerant of such risk (Chein, Albert, O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg,

2011; Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & Van Aken, 2015; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; O’Brien, Albert, Chein,

Criminology & Public Policy. 2019;18:759–784. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/capp © 2019 American Society of Criminology 759

760 HOEBEN AND THOMAS

& Steinberg, 2011; Vinokur, 1971). Still, despite the growing attention to this topic, work on the inter-

dependence of offender decision-making remains both theoretically and empirically underdeveloped.

Generally, the peer literature tends to concentrate on group processes external to the decision-maker,

whereas the decision-making literature tends to concentrate on internal cognitive processes—that is,

the perceptions and weighing of the benefits, costs, and risks associated with crime. To date, these

two prominent areas of criminological inquiry have developed relatively independent of one another.

The aim here is to provide an integrative—albeit not exhaustive—account of various ways in which

peers can affect offending decisions. Wefirst begin with a brief discussion of the literatures on offender

decision-making and peer influence that have developedindependently of one another. We then discuss

three prominent examples in which peers and decision-making have been combined in the extant lit-

erature: (1) the interdependency of human choice, (2) differential susceptibility to peer influence, and

(3) social influences on perceptual updating of risks, costs, and rewards. Throughout this discussion,

we highlight how these three perspectives haveser vedto advance our understanding of both peer influ-

ence and offender decision-making. In the remainder of the article, we discuss how integrating insights

from the decision-making literature can help advance both normative (Akers, 1998; Sutherland, 1947)

and situational theories of peer influence (Osgood, Wilson, O’Malley, Bachman, & Johnston, 1996;

Warr, 2002) and, further, how such insights can be used to help integrate these mechanisms that are

often viewed as competing (Haynie & Osgood, 2005; Hoeben & Weerman,2016; Thomas & McGloin,

2013). Put simply, we argue that peers can affect perceptions and preferences through socialization in

the long term as well as through situational factors in the short term.

1OFFENDER DECISION-MAKING

The literature on offender decision-making is predominantly situated in rational choice theory (Becker,

1968; Smith, 1976/1761) and has emphasized cost–benefit analysis as a core mechanism for explaining

crime. Traditionally, offending decisions are viewed as a function of two distinct, yet interdependent,

components.

The first component comprises the perceptions of the anticipated risks, costs, and benefits of the

act under consideration. Risk of crime is generally conceptualized as the probability of detection (i.e.,

certainty of arrest). The costs of crime can include the formal costs imposed through legal sanctions

from the criminal justice system (i.e., severity of punishment), self-imposed costs such as feelings

of shame and guilt, and socially imposed costs such as embarrassment or disapproval by family and

friends (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster, 1989). The benefits of crime include material elements

obtained when the act is completed without detection (e.g., stolen goods, monetary returns), psychic

benefits, such as the thrill derived from engaging in the act of crime (Becker, 1968; Katz, 1988), and

“social benefits” such as status among peers (Matsueda, Kreager, & Huizinga, 2006).

The second component of decision-making is the weight that individuals place on these anticipated

risks, costs, and benefits (i.e., the marginal (dis)utilities, preferences). Not all risks, costs, and benefits

carry equal weight in the decision-making process for different individuals (i.e., between individual)

or for the same individual over time (i.e., within individual; Paternoster & Bushway, 2009). In this way,

two individuals who both believe there is a 40% chance of arrest risk may act differently if one views

40% as acceptable and the other as too precarious. Thus, individuals will have preferences regarding

which rewards they value over others, or regarding which costs are more important to avoid com-

pared with other costs. Part of the differences in weights placed on specific costs and rewards can

be a function of individual preferences for various factors, such as time and risk. Time preferences, in

classic economic terms, capture the trade-off between immediate consumption and consumption in the