Paying Restitution: Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Information and Rationale

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12094
• Author: Brendan Lantz,Andrew S. Gladfelter,R. Barry Ruback
• Date: 01 August 2014
• Published date: 01 August 2014

RESEARCH ARTICLE

PAYING RESTITUTION

Paying Restitution

Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Information

and Rationale

R. Barry Ruback

Andrew S. Gladfelter

Brendan Lantz

Penn State University

Research Summary

Most crime victims do not receive the restitution they are owed. This study is an

experiment that addresses two reasons offenders give for why they do not pay their

court-ordered restitution: (a) lack of understanding of how much they owe and where

their payments are directed and (b) a belief that the sanctions are unfair.A total of 771

offenders were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 ×2 between-subjects

design in which, over a 6-month period, three quarters of the offenders received monthly

letters that contained (a) information or no information about the economic sanctions

they had paid and what they still owed (Informationmanipulation) and (b) a statement

or no statement about reasons for paying restitution (Rationale manipulation). The

remaining offenders did not receive a letter. The results 1 year after the experiment

began (6 months after the last letter had been sent) indicated that offenders who had

received letters containing information (Information condition) paid significantly more

money and made significantly more monthly payments than did offenders in the other

three experimental conditions. A cost-effectiveness analysis indicated that for every

dollar spent on the experimental manipulation, approximately $6.44 in restitution

was received.

We thank the staff of the Centre County Department of Probation and Parole, particularly Tom Young, its

Director, for their help with this project. The findings, conclusions, and points of view expressed in this article

are solely those of the authors. This research was funded by Grant #1127014 from the Law and Social Science

Section of the National Science Foundation. Direct correspondence to R. Barry Ruback, Department of

Sociology and Criminology, Penn State University, 211 Oswald Tower, University Park, PA 16802 (e-mail:

bruback@psu.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12094 C2014 American Society of Criminology 405

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 13 rIssue 3

Research Article Paying Restitution

Policy Implications

Research on deterrence has suggested that threatenedpunishment can lead to compliance

only if the threat is real. The problem with such enforcement measures, however, is that

this type of deterrence is too expensive to be broadly imposed. By contrast, inducing

offenders to act based on internal motivation rather than in response to external

contingencies of reward and punishment can lead to long-term behavior change. This

study suggests that informing offenders on a regular basis about how much restitution

they have paid and how much they still owe can lead them to pay more restitution and

to make more monthly payments. We believe these effects primarily are the result of a

change in internal motivation because if it were fear of being monitored that led to

the increased payments, then the absence of monitoring (i.e., no letters for 6 months)

should have reduced that fear, meaning that payments should have been reduced.They

were not. Although the question of the generalizability of the procedure remains open,

the results of this experiment suggest that, at relatively little cost (because information

about payments was gathered from individuals’ court dockets publicly available on the

Web), governments can increase restitution payments, benefiting victims, society, and

perhaps the offenders themselves.

Keywords

restitution, economic sanctions, experiment, behavior change, probation

Economic sanctions on criminal offenders can serve three different purposes: pun-

ishment, deterrence, and the restoration of justice. Fines (monetary penalties for

crime) as well as costs and fees (monies used to reimburse the government for the

expenses of administering the criminal justice system) are aimed primarily at the relationship

between the offender and society, especially by correcting the offender’s behavior through

punishment and deterrence (Ruback and Bergstrom, 2006). In contrast, restitution (court-

ordered payments from an offender to a crime victim for the harm caused by the crime) is

primarily aimed at restoring justice to the victim. Even those critical of fines, fees, and costs

believe that restitution is a justifiable economic sanction (Beckett and Harris, 2011).

Restitution is imposed in only approximately two thirds of cases where it could be

imposed (Ruback, Ruth, and Shaffer, 2005), a pattern that is a result of a combination

of factors about the offender, the crime, and the county context (Ruback and Clark,

2011). Even when restitution is imposed, it is fully paid in less than half of those cases

(Davis, Smith, and Hillenbrand, 1991). In general, little can be done to offenders who do

not pay their court-ordered restitution because, under the U.S. Constitution, individuals

cannot be imprisoned for debt unless there is a determination that their failure to pay is

406 Criminology & Public Policy

Ruback, Gladfelter, and Lantz

willful (Bearden v. Georgia, 1983). Proving willful nonpayment often is difficult in that the

information needed about assets and income is usually unavailable.

Because paying restitution helps restore justice to the victim, helps the offender recog-

nize the harms caused by the crime and the need to repair the harm, and helps reintegrate

the offender into society,increasing the payment of restitution to victims would accomplish

several goals of the criminal justice system. This study is an experimental test of whether

noncoercive messages can increase the amount of restitution paid and the number of resti-

tution payments made. In the experiment, probationers who were delinquent in paying

court-ordered restitution were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions,

and their payment history was followed for 1 year after the beginning of the study.

Paying Restitution

Studies in Pennsylvania have suggested that (a) the imposition of economic sanctions varies

across counties, offenses, and offenders (Ruback, 2004; Ruback, Cares, and Hoskins, 2006;

Ruback and Clark, 2009, 2011; Ruback, Shaffer, and Logue, 2004); (b) the imposition of

restitution increased after a statute making it mandatory primarily because judges agreed

with the aim of the statute (Hoskins, Ruback, and Cusick, 2010; Ruback, Ruth,and Shaffer,

2005; Ruback and Shaffer, 2005); and (c) only approximately half of victims receive their

full restitution (Ruback, Cares, and Hoskins, 2008). Surveys of offenders indicated that

they do not understand the system, do not know how much money they owe, and do not

know what their payments are for (Ruback, Hoskins, Cares, and Feldmeyer, 2006).

It could be that offenders are more motivated to pay sanctions when they understand

where their payments are sent. Moreover, understanding that their payments go to victims

has implications for rehabilitation because restitution is likely to be an effective tool for

rehabilitation only if offenders understand that they are taking responsibility and making

reparations for their wrongdoing (Outlaw and Ruback, 1999). This rehabilitative effect

seems to be stronger among married individuals, and it is somewhat stronger among

employed and older individuals, which is consistent with Braithwaite’s (1989) notion that

marriage, employment, and age are indicators of integration.

Aside from not paying restitution because they do not know and understand the

restitution they owe, offenders might not pay because they believe restitution is unfair;

that is, the amounts are too high or the procedures used to determine the amounts are

not legitimate. With regard to unfairness, research in social psychology has suggested that

individuals care about both the outcomes they receive (distributive fairness) and the process

by which those outcomes were reached (procedural fairness). Research in criminal justice

has supported this notion. For example, probation officers typically have some flexibility in

terms of payment schedules for fines and restitution (Alexander et al., 1998). Thus, offenders

might be treated inequitably and could feel that their sanctions are unfair. Consistent with

this argument, in their survey of individuals sentenced in two Pennsylvania counties in

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