Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”

• Author: Jonathan GS Koppell
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00434.x
• Published date: 01 January 2005
• Date: 01 January 2005

94 Public Administration Review •January/February 2005, Vol. 65, No. 1

Jonathan GS Koppell

Yale School of Management

Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the

Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”

Accountability is a core concept of public administration, yet disagreement about its meaning is

masked by consensus on its importance and desirability. This article proposes a five-part typology

of accountability conceptions. Transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and respon-

siveness are defined as distinct dimensions of accountability, providing an improvement on the

current state of conceptual fuzziness. The typology provides a vocabulary for the core argument:

that conflicting expectations borne of disparate conceptions of accountability undermine organi-

zational effectiveness. This phenomenon—labeled multiple accountabilities disorder— is illustrated

with a case study. ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, is a

nascent organization charged with administering the Domain Name System, the Internet’s address

directory. In its four-year history, ICANN has been the object of much criticism. Conflicting ac-

countability expectations have been a source of difficulty for ICANN’s leaders as they have steered

the organization through its early years.

Accountability is good—there is little disagreement on

this point. Seldom is an organization branded “too account-

able.” Congressional oversight committees do not excori-

ate bureaucrats for excessive accountability. And yet while

everyone agrees on its desirability, the meaning of account-

ability remains elusive.

The Public Administration Dictionary defines account-

ability as “a condition in which individuals who exercise

power are constrained by external means and by internal

norms” (Chandler and Plano 1988). This definition pro-

vides a sense of the word and hints at its many meanings.

“External means,” for example, could include the direc-

tives of citizens, legislatures, elected and appointed execu-

tives, and courts. Laws, regulations, and moral principles

also “constrain individuals who exercise power.” Is an or-

ganization accountable only if it is constrained by all of

these external means? What if, to use the language of prin-

cipal–agent theory, there is conflict among principals? What

if a principal’s demand conflicts with an organization’s legal

mandate? The answers to these questions depend on one’s

understanding of accountability.

The lack of clarity regarding the meaning of account-

ability is particularly striking in contemporary popular use.

President George W. Bush, for example, has said that both

elementary schools and countries that support terrorism

must be held accountable (O’Neill 2001; Sanger 2002).

Scholarly literature reveals a similar multiplicity of usage.

Accountability connotes bureaucratic control in some ar-

ticles and transparency in others. Some analyses treat “ac-

countable” as a synonym for “law-abiding,” while others

envision a responsiveness to popular demands.

Relying on a single word to convey disparate concep-

tual understandings masks disagreement over a core issue

of political science. The perpetuation of fuzziness regard-

ing this important term is a failing of our discipline. As

Pennock (1952, 791) memorably observed with respect to

related terms, “Where we should have clear concepts for

scientific analysis, we are confronted with thought recep-

tacles whose unexplored ambiguities constitute standing

solicitations to fallacy—solicitations, it may be added, that

receive a beautiful response.”

The first objective of this article is to establish a typol-

ogy of the dimensions of accountability that are generally

Jonathan GS Koppell is an assistant professor of politics, policy, and organi-

zation at the Yale School of Management. His recent book,

The Politics of

Quasi-Government

(Cambridge University Press), considers the implications

of delegating government functions to hybrid organizations such as govern-

ment-sponsored enterprises and government corporations. His current work

focuses on the development of transnational governance institutions, pseudo-

governmental entities with authority and responsibility that span political

boundaries. He holds a doctorate in political science from Berkeley. E-mail:

jonathan.koppell@yale.edu.