Participatory and incremental development in an African local government accounting reform

• Author: Trevor Hopper,Teerooven Soobaroyen,Andrew Wynne,Philippe J. C. Lassou
• Date: 01 August 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12154
• Published date: 01 August 2018

Received: 1 October 2016 Revised: 30 March 2017 Accepted: 30 May2017

DOI: 10.1111/faam.12154

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Participatory and incremental development in an

African local government accounting reform

Philippe J. C. Lassou1Trevor Hopper2,3,4 TeeroovenSoobaroyen5

Andrew Wynne6

1Departmentof Management, University of

Guelph,Guelph, ON, Canada

2Schoolof Business, Management & Economics,

Universityof Sussex, East Sussex, UK

3StockholmSchool of Economics, Stockholm,

Sweden

4VictoriaBusiness School, Victoria University of

Wellington,Wellington, New Zealand

5EssexBusiness School, University of Essex,

Colchester,UK

6Schoolof Business, University of Leicester,

Leicester,UK

Correspondence

PhilippeJ. C. Lassou, Department of Manage-

ment,University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, N1G

2W1,Canada.

Email:plassou@uoguelph.ca

Fundinginformation

Universityof Southampton, Grant/Award Num-

ber:AAiR.

Abstract

Despite significant donor funding, government accounting reforms

seeking transparent and effective management of public resources

often fail or have limited success, especially in Africa, prompting

questions about donors’ implementation approach and calls for stud-

ies of successful reforms. This paper investigates a local government

accounting reform in Benin supported by a German development

agency–perceived as successful due to the participatory, pragmatic,

and incremental approach reinforced by conditionalities in the face

of neo-patrimonial leadership.

KEYWORDS

accounting, Benin, development agencies, local governance, poverty

reduction

1INTRODUCTION

Government accounting reforms in Africa to fight corruption and mismanagement, and improve transparency and

accountability have disappointed (Andrews, 2012, 2013; Harrison, 2004; Hopper,Lassou, & Soobaroyen, 2017; Hop-

per,Tsamenyi, Uddin, & Wickramasinghe, 2012). They generallyemanate from the World Bank (WB), the International

Monetary Fund (IMF), and bilateral development arrangements agencies from developed countries, who often con-

tract out the design and implementation to consultants from "Northern,"often "Big 4," accounting firms (Graham&

Annisette, 2012). Research (Goddard, Assad, Issa, Malagila, & Mkasiwa, 2015; Iyoha & Oyerinde,2010; Lassou & Hop-

per,2016) and donor reports (Hove & Wynne, 2010; Lienert & Sarraf, 2001) suggest indigenous civil servants are often

marginalized (Schiavo-Campo, 2009), perceivednegatively and as "passive recipients" of Northern technologies (Neu,

Gomez, Graham, & Heincke,2006) likely to resist due to self-interest (Bierschenk, Thioléron, & Bako-Arifari, 2003). In

parallel, foreign consultants neglect gradual,incremental change, and import overly complex systems unsuited to local

circumstances (Andrews, 2013; Hove & Wynne, 2010; McLeod & Harun, 2014). Hence calls for studies of successful

accounting reforms, especially decentralized donor-led developments within communities, villages, and social groups,

to determine what produces better outcomes (Rondinelli & Nellis, 1986).

252 c

2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/faam FinancialAcc & Man. 2018;34:252–267.

LASSOU ET AL.253

Research examining greater indigenous involvement is sparse, especially on local government where good gover-

nance initiatives foster decentralized, grassroots budget participation (Fontana & Grugel, 2016; WB, 1997, 2003).

Hence, this paper analyses how civil servants in Benin, with support from GIZ1(a German development agency),

successfully designed and implemented a local government accounting reform (WMONEY) under difficult circum-

stances, especially neo-patrimonial governance. It contributes to research on participatory development of govern-

ment accounting in developing countries (Lassou & Hopper, 2016). Section 2 presents the research arguments and

analytical framework; Section 3 the research methods; Section 4 the reform's context; Section 5the findings; and Sec-

tion 6 the conclusions.

2ACCOUNTING REFORM IN AFRICA: RECONCILING PARTICIPATORY

DEVELOPMENT WITH NEO-PATRIMONIALISM

Development policies in Africa have veered from state socialism to neo-liberalism,and currently around good gover-

nance (Hopper et al., 2017). A recurring finding is that (regardless of approach), when sound accounting and account-

ability systems are adopted, they often play a ceremonial role to gain legitimacy from citizens and external funders

rather than aiding ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny, operational decision-making, and accountability (Hopper,

Tsamenyi, Uddin, & Wickramasinghe, 2009). Political, not legal–rationalor economic criteria dominate when politi-

cians exercise patronage to bolster political support or for personal gain. The result is often fiscal crises and requests

for assistance from international financial institutions, especially the IMF and the WB, who in the 1980s and 1990s,

regarded many governments as too big,unwieldy, corrupt, and a hindrance to development. Conditions for assistance,

often in structural adjustment programs, reflected a neo-liberal, market-based agenda. New Public Management,

incorporating private sector-based accounting and, from the late 1990s, integratedfinancial management information

systems and medium-term expenditure frameworks were frequently prescribed. Being aware of the fact that fiscal

crises precipitate political crises, African governments knew they must (or appear to) comply.IMF and WB officers,

until recently predominately macroeconomists, saw accounting as a technical matter and usually followed advice from

Northern accounting professional bodies, transnational accounting bodies (e.g., International Federation of Accoun-

tants), and "Big 4" accounting firms (Hopper et al., 2009, 2012). They tended to recommend "one-size fits all" pack-

ages (Hedger & de Renzio, 2010) incorporating "best practices" from developed countries, albeit with terminologi-

cal changes to insinuate local adaptation (Awio, Lawrence, & Northcott, 2007; Hove & Wynne, 2010; Schiavo-Campo,

2009). The results often disappointed (Andrews, 2012). Many reforms lacked contextual fit, outstripped local capac-

ity, demoralized civilservants, lacked political support, and were overlycomplex and "ill-conceived" (Andrews, 2013;

Bakre, 2008); leading to allegations that the WB is obsessed with large development programs and evaluatinga coun-

try's accounting progress by its adoption of international standards and systems (Harrison, 2004).

Recently, emphasis has switched to the "CapableState" and "Good Governance" (WB, 1992, 1997). Market-based

reforms remain but alongside building capacity in state institutions, increasing business and civil society involvement,

and transparent information. Manycountries undertook such reforms voluntarily although they were often conditions

for financial assistance (Chang, 2006). More donor funding now enters governmentcoffers directly rather than to spe-

cific projects and delivery agencies. This requires better accounting controls; better motivated, trained, and remuner-

ated civil servants; and greater delegation of powers and resources to local governments and communities, for exam-

ple, through village development committees, commune accountability boards, and citizen complaint procedures.

“Participatory development,” while not novel (Cleaver, 1999; Morris, 2003), has moved up the discursive agenda

of international development institutions (Ackerman, 2004; WB, 1997, 2003), which tallies with researchers’ calls

for more indigenous involvement in government accounting reforms (Schiavo-Campo,2009). This does not preclude

learning from developed countries but uses local knowledge to incorporate citizen priorities into local decisions and

to improve accountability (Bland, 2011). However,different "shades" and models of participatory development exist.

Who is "invited,"how they participate, and when "local" participation arises, underpin the motives for,and outcomes of,