Organized Labor as a Pressure Group
| Published date | 01 March 1951 |
| Author | Avery Leiserson |
| Date | 01 March 1951 |
| DOI | 10.1177/000271625127400115 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
108
Organized
Labor
as
a
Pressure
Group
By
AVERY
LEISERSON
TO
what
extent
have
the
gains
in
la-
bor’s
economic
strength
and
status
since
1930
produced
correlative
changes
in
its
political
influence
and
strategy?
1
During
these
twenty
years
the
envi-
ronment
of
public
policy
toward
labor
unions
has
undergone
two
major
shifts:
first,
from
an
atmosphere
of
negative
toleration
or
restrictive
disapproval
to
active
encouragement
of
collective
bar-
gaining
as
an
instrument
of
national
economic
policy;
and
second,
from
un-
critical
governmental
encouragement
to
public
regulation
of
unions’
internal
af-
fairs
and
even
of
the
process
of
collec-
tive
bargaining
itself.
These
shifts
were
attended
by
a
five-
fold
increase
in
union
membership,
a
vast
expansion
in
the
coverage
of
union
agreements,
and
a
marked
enhancement
of
union
leaders’
status
in
industry,
in
all
levels
of
government,
and
in
local
community
affairs.
It
is
only
natural
that
union
leaders,
members,
and
non-
members
should
develop
great
political
expectations
traceable
to
the
power
po-
tential
inherent
in
the
disciplined
or-
ganization
of
between
15
and
16
million
wage
and
salary
earners.
Yet
in
1950
the
effects
of
these
changes
and
anticipations
upon
the
character
and
forms
of
labor
political
action
are
by
no
means
clear.
There
is
remarkably
little
evidence
to
confirm
the
growth
of
a
unified
class
conscious-
ness
among
wage
earners
and
lower-in-
come
groups’in
the
population.
No
po-
litical
organization
has
successfully
chal-
lenged
the
claims
of
the
international
unions
and
their .
federating
organiza-
tions
to
represent
the
views
of
organized
workers.
At
the
same
time,
institutional
unity
in
the labor
movement
as
a
whole
has
not
been
achieved,
and
it
seems
un-
likely
that
such
unity
would
carry
with
it
the
ability
to
insure
union
members’
votes
for
either
party
as
a
solid
elec-
toral
bloc.
The
legislative
position
of
labor
is
even
less
clear.
A
striking
ex-
ample
is
provided
by
the
passage
of
the
Taft-Hartley
Act
in
1947
at
a
peak
pe-
riod
of
the
unions’
numerical
strength
and
economic
power.
Are
we
to
infer
from
its
inability
to
prevent
enactment
of
this
avowedly
restrictive
statute
that
organized
labor
is
economically
power-
ful
but
politically
weak?
TRADE
UNION
ECONOMIC
AND
POLITICAL
ACTION
When
the
frame
of
reference
is
ob-
scure,
general
propositions
are
not
very
helpful
in
explaining
the
connection
be-
tween
the
economic
and
political
influ-
ence
of
organized
labor.
The
Taft-
Hartley
example
just
cited
seems
to
contradict
the
adage
that
&dquo;political
power
follows
economic
power,&dquo;
but
it
would
support
the
normative
and
condi-
tional
proposition
that
&dquo;if
an
organiza-
tion
is
to
maintain
its
economic
power
it
must
be
able
to
exert
political
power
also.&dquo;
The
complexity
of
the
relation-
ship
has
not
only
a
normative
aspect,
but
a
factual
one,
growing
out
of
the
historical
conditions
to
which
the
state-
ment
refers
and
which
it
proposes
to
analyze.
There
is
a
widespread
conviction
that
organized
labor
in
the
United
States
is
&dquo;economically&dquo;
rather
than
&dquo;politically&dquo;
oriented.
Actually,
of
course,
American
1
A
convenient
benchmark
is
the
chapter
on
"Labor"
by
Leo
Wolman
and
Gustav
Peck
in
President’s
Research
Committee
on
Social
Trends,
Recent
Social
Trends
in
the
United
States
(New
York:
McGraw-Hill
Book
Com-
pany,
1932),
Ch.
16.
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