Once bitten twice shy? Experience managing violent conflict risk and MNC subsidiary‐level investment and expansion
Date | 01 March 2017 |
Author | Chang Hoon Oh,Jennifer Oetzel |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2498 |
Published date | 01 March 2017 |
Strategic Management Journal
Strat. Mgmt. J.,38: 714–731 (2017)
Published online EarlyView 1 March 2016 in WileyOnline Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/smj.2498
Received 13 May 2014;Final revision received2 November 2015
ONCE BITTEN TWICE SHY? EXPERIENCE MANAGING
VIOLENT CONFLICT RISK AND MNC
SUBSIDIARY-LEVEL INVESTMENT AND EXPANSION
CHANG HOON OH1,2and JENNIFER OETZEL3*
1Beedie School of Business, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada
2Korea University Business School, Korea University, Seoul, Korea
3Kogod School of Business, American University, Washington, District of Columbia,
U.S.A.
Research summary: Researchers have increasingly emphasized the need to better understand
how context affects the value of experiential learning. We address this gap by investigating
when corporate-level experience can be leveraged across borders and when experience needs
to be country-specic to be valuable. We test our hypotheses using a unique multi-source
panel dataset of 379 large MNCs from 29 home countries and their subsidiaries in 117 host
countries over a 10-year period, 1999– 2008. In contrast to prior research, we nd that the
ability of a rm to leverage its experience with political risk across borders is limited by the
type of risk involved. Experience with nonstate violent conicts may be transferrable, but only
country-specic experience appears to yield measureable benets for conicts involving the host
country government.
Managerial summary: Violent conicts not only increase social unrest but also impose added
costs of doing business. Formanagers who nd themselves in the midst of violent conicts or who
wish to survive and potentially gain a competitive advantage in operating in such challenging
environments, is it possible to learn to manage such a seemingly “unmanageable” problem? In
contrast to studies that have examined other types of political risk, we nd that the ability of a
rm to leverage its experience with violent conictrisk across borders is limited. Specically, only
country-specic experiential knowledge about how the host government prepares and manages
such conictrisks yields measureable economic benets for MNCs and their subsidiaries operating
in countries during conict. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
On any given week a review of the The Economist
or any other major newspaper reveals the challenge
posed by violent conict around the world. Accord-
ing to the Council on Foreign Relations (2013),
armed conict and its aftermath affect nearly every
Keywords: experiential learning violent conict; polit-
ical risk; corporate-level knowledge; country-specic
knowledge
*Correspondence to: Jennifer Oetzel. Kogod School of Business,
American University, 4400 Massachusetts, Ave., NW, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20016. E-mail: oetzelj@american.edu
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
aspect of society, including the privatesector. While
addressing such intractable problems is not usu-
ally part of management education, the challenge
posed by violent conict requires a greater under-
standing of how to manage a rm and its opera-
tions during periods of unrest— whether the unrest
is in Baltimore, Maryland, in the United States or in
Cairo, Egypt.
For managers who nd themselves in the midst
of such conict or who wish not only to survive
but potentially to gain a competitive advantage
in operating in such environments, is it possible
to learn to manage a seemingly “unmanageable”
Once Bitten Twice Shy 715
problem? According to Telefónica, the Spanish
telecommunications rm, the answer is yes.
Ms. Elena Valderrabano, Director of Corporate
Identity and Sustainability at Telefónica, has said
that the company’s efforts to address violent con-
ict in countries where they operate are critically
important to the rm’s ability to operate and expand
internationally (Valderrabano,2015). Scholars have
found that it is possible for managers and their rms
to learn from a variety of infrequent and even rare
events (Lampel, Shamsie, and Shapira, 2009). In
some cases, such experiential learning can be trans-
ferred across borders while in others there are limits
on the transfer capacity of experiential learning
(Delios and Henisz, 2003; Luo and Peng, 1999).
Here, we adopt the denition that experiential
learning is the acquisition of knowledge that
“transpires in the organization as it performs its
task” (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011: 1124).
Experiential learning is argued to be an important
intangible rm-specic asset that enables the
multinational corporation (MNC) to expand to and
successfully compete in other countries (Buckley
and Casson, 1981). One source of tension in
the literature is around the limits of experiential
learning. On the one hand, companies operating
abroad gain a variety of different experiences in
the course of their operations, some of which are
transferable to other markets. They gain knowledge
of the host country, its institutions, culture, and
ways of doing business (e.g., Holburn and Zelner,
2010; Perkins, 2014). On the other hand, there
may be limits on the ability of a rm to leverage
experiential knowledge in other countries.
To the extent that there is a high degree of
variability in the cultural and institutional envi-
ronments of the countries in which the MNC has
operated, prior experience may not be valuable in
a new country context (Barkema, Bell, and Pen-
nings, 1996; Kostova and Roth, 2002). In that
case, not all knowledge may be transferable across
countries and subsidiaries (dened here as wholly
owned entities of a MNC). Local knowledge— or
country-specic knowledge— may be necessary.
Wide variance in governance quality across coun-
tries is likely to increase the value and complexity
of country-specic knowledge.
We attempt to contribute to the literature at
the nexus of international strategy and experiential
learning by investigating the question: when can
risk management experience be leveraged across
different markets and when does that experience
have to be country-specic to be valuable? To
examine when and whether certain risks have
country-specic characteristics that require spe-
cialized, location-specic knowledge or not, we
chose to study violent conict risk. Examples
of violent conict are war, revolution, rebellion,
and terrorism. Conicts are the ideal phenomenon
for our research purposes because they are con-
sidered to have both a general cause (i.e., an
enabling environment)— such as a weak institu-
tional environment, corruption, poverty, income
inequality, among others—and a particular cause
or triggering event that is potentially context- and
conict-specic (Davies, 1996: 896).
Another value in studying conict risks is that
they are often seen as issues that are “unmanage-
able” for business. If managers assume that it is
not possible to learn from certain events or man-
age conict risk effectively, no learning will take
place (Lampel et al., 2009). When rm survival and
protability are threatened, some rms will develop
innovative strategies to surmount the challenges
they face. Other rms will die out. Firms that adapt
to new risks and challenges, though, can survive and
even gain a competitive advantage.
Research on political risk, and country risk more
broadly, tells us that, all else being equal, risk deters
new entry and new investment by foreign rms
(Delios and Henisz, 2003; Feinberg and Gupta,
2009: 381). Given these arguably well-established
ndings, researchers are increasingly focused on
whether and under what conditions rms can gain
experience advantages from operating in countries
with high levels of political risk and when such
experience may be leveraged into new markets
(Oetzel and Oh, 2014). Since much of the research
on political risk has focused on policy uncertainty
and contract efcacy,we also seek to test the bound-
ary conditions of existing theory by examining other
types of political risks.
VIOLENT CONFLICT AS THE FOCUS
OF EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
Violent conict is dened here as the organized
and sustained use of physical force that results in
injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruc-
tion to property (Oetzel and Getz, 2012). It may
include war, revolution, rebellion, insurgency, and
sustained campaigns of violence or terrorism, but
not petty crime. Conicts are generally categorized
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J.,38: 714–731 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
To continue reading
Request your trial