On Rawlsian Neoliberalism.

• Author: Carden, Art

Neoliberal Social Justice: Rawls Unveiled

By Nick Cowen

256 pp.; Edward Elgar, 2021

When I read political philosophy, I'm regularly struck by just how naive the analyses are. Frequently, political philosophers commit what UCLA economist Harold Demsetz called the Nirvana Fallacy: comparing the actually existing world with an ideal that only exists in our imaginations. They also regularly indulge what Notre Dame political economist James Otteson calls the Great Mind Fallacy: assuming a super-brain of some kind can plan and create a good society. Together, these are part of self-styled philosopher-kings' presumption that their moral and intellectual superiority entitles--indeed, obligates--them to boss other people around. What else are you to do when you are more equal than others?

University of Lincoln political scientist Nick Cowen's Neoliberal Social Justice: Rawls Unveiled takes these presumptions to task and explains how classical liberal institutions accomplish high liberal goals. Rawlsian equality, Cowen argues, is classically liberal--or at least more classically liberal than many Rawlsians think, and they should take economic liberty much more seriously than they do.

Intentions and outcomes / Cowen grounds his argument in Robust Political Economy. It approaches institutions very much like public choice does, on the assumption that people don't suddenly change their motivations and abilities too substantially when moving from the commercial to the political sphere. Importantly, he criticizes the conviction that bad outcomes result solely from bad intentions and the related conviction that "the social problem" is more dispositional than it is institutional. As he explains, "Coordination problems emerge from even the most unselfish cooperative agents." He offers the example of someone serving nuts to someone with an allergy. I'm reminded of people at the pond in my local park throwing white bread to ducks and geese despite the large sign that reads, "Thank you for not feeding us bread," and explains how bad it is for them. While we can know and monitor one another pretty efficiently in very small groups like families or groups of friends going on a camping trip together, the problem, Cowen argues, is epistemic: "Coordination problems are bound to emerge as communities of unselfish cooperators get larger."

What does this mean for our obligations to one another? As befits a scholar who spent some time with Mario Rizzo at New York...