Oil on the Jihadi Fire: The Repercussions of a Wagner Group Deployment to Burkina Faso.

• Author: Nsaibia, Heni
• Position: CTC SENTINEL

On January 18, 2023, Burkina Faso's military regime officially announced that it was ending its military accord with France that had been in place since 2018. (1) In addition, the ruling junta in Ouagadougou, led by Captain Ibrahim Traore, requested that French troops, stationed in the country as part of France's Operation Sabre, leave Burkina Faso within a month. (2) The removal of French troops comes after several months of intense anti-French sentiment from the junta, who also requested the withdrawal of France's ambassador in December 2022. (3) Burkina Faso has now joined its northern neighbor of Mali in officially ending military ties with France after more than a decade of French-led counterterrorism missions throughout the Sahel. With Russia's favorite private military company, the Wagner Group, already deployed in Mali for over a year, there is intense speculation that Ouagadougou may also hire the Russian mercenaries. (4)

Led by Traore, the ruling junta in Ouagadougou came to power in September 2022 in Burkina Faso's second coup d'etat in less than nine months by overthrowing Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, the military officer who led the country's previous coup in January 2022. (5) Much as Damiba had done to his predecessor in the earlier coup d'etat, Traore and his allies publicly argued that Damiba had done little to stymie the continuously mounting jihadi insurgency inside the country. (6)

This so-called 'coup within a coup' in Burkina Faso comes during a period of geopolitical transition in the Sahel. France, the former colonial power and the region's longtime security behemoth since 2013, withdrew from Mali with its final troops leaving the country in August 2022. (7) In its place, Mali has brought in Russia's aforementioned favorite plausible deniability asset, the secretive Wagner Group. (8) With the popular protests related to Burkina Faso's most recent coup featuring some overt pro-Russia sentiments, pundits, analysts, policymakers, and other relevant stakeholders within the international community have rightfully questioned if Burkina Faso will be Wagner's next destination. (9) In early October 2022, the United States warned Burkina Faso not to ally with Russia (and by extension, Wagner). President Traore assured U.S. diplomats that he had no intention of inviting Wagner troops to fight militants in the country, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland told the media in late October. The Russian war-media Telegram channel Rybar claimed in a December 18, 2022, post that the U.S. warning had come too late, claiming that "the Wagnerites are already conducting reconnaissance, and negotiations are in the final stage." (10) (a) Concerns that Wagner may deploy to Burkina Faso have grown in recent weeks, (11) with reporting suggesting that Wagner has already started to deploy to Burkina Faso--though the junta itself has not confirmed any Wagner presence in the country. (12)

In light of these fears, this article serves as an exploration of a possible Wagner deployment to Burkina Faso and what the implications might be. The article also assesses Wagner's previous fortunes (or oftentimes misadventures) in Africa. Wagner remains a popular alternative to Western powers among several African states and leaders, though its operations inside Africa have often been more detrimental than beneficial. It is important to note that Burkina Faso has already relied on private military companies (PMCs) in its fight against jihadis. And that if the country hires Wagner, it would only be a symptom of the wider structural malaise plaguing Burkina Faso. As this article will outline, the country's deep-seated problems are due to corruption, the hollowing-out of state institutions, and a militarization of society caused by the mobilization of civilian militias.

Starting with a brief background of Burkina Faso's political instability during the last decade, this article then turns to providing an overview of the country's worsening jihadi insurgency and the concerning spillover of jihadi violence into littoral states. The article then examines the likelihood and repercussions of a potential Wagner Group deployment inside Burkina Faso.

Part One: A Decade of Political Instability in Burkina Faso

The September 2022 coup d'etat in Burkina Faso is in many ways emblematic of the country's tumultuous political climate since 2014. Though the country has a long history of coups, revolts, and foreign meddling, (13) all of which have undoubtedly contributed to Burkina's current political instability, this article will focus on its political history over the last decade, including the most recent government overthrow. What is most important to understand are the motivations of the key protagonists within Burkina Faso. The policies and personal desires of these individuals have not wholly created the current concerning state of affairs in Burkina Faso but will help determine whether and to what extent Russian mercenaries will be hired by the country.

The late September 2022 coup saw Traore, a previously unknown captain within Burkina's army who led an artillery regiment in the country's north, overthrow the previous junta leader, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. (14) Traore, himself a member of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR)--the movement led by Damiba that perpetrated the January 2022 coup--appointed himself the new leader of the MPSR in a televised address shortly after deposing Damiba. (15) A few days later, the MPSR formalized this appointment by announcing Traore as the new interim president of Burkina Faso. (16) After mediation by local community leaders, Damiba was allowed to go into exile and fled to neighboring Togo. (17) Since coming to power, Traore has attempted to assuage concerns from the international community by saying he still intends to allow planned elections by July 2024 "if the situation allows it." (18) (b)

Traore's Motivations

Damiba's failure to improve the steadily deteriorating security situation has frequently been cited as the primary driver of Traore's coup. Indeed, a deadly ambush in late September 2022 by al-Qa'ida's West African branch, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), against a transport convoy escorted by soldiers and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) (c) near the village of Gaskinde was apparently the final straw for those seeking to overthrow him. At least 27 soldiers and 10 civilians were killed, dozens were wounded, and others went missing, according to a government statement. (19) Indicative of the Burkinabe military's monumental failure to secure the convoy heading to resupply the town of Djibo, the provincial capital of the northern Soum Province, is that JNIM claimed at least 90 trucks and military vehicles were burned in the attack. (d) Subsequent analysis of satellite imagery by the investigative journalism group Bellingcat confirmed that 95 vehicles had been destroyed in the attack, scattered along a more than five-kilometer strip of road. (20) (e)

However, the worsening jihadi violence was far from the only factor that precipitated the most recent coup. Other factors played an equally important role. One was unpaid bonuses estimated at six million CFA (approximately 10,000 USD) per soldier. Another was Damiba's special treatment of the army's special forces through the allocation of land parcels that sowed further discord within the ranks of the armed forces. (21)

Popular protests occurring throughout Burkina's capital of Ouagadougou related to the September 2022 coup revealed explicit pro-Russia sympathies that portended a widening battle between France and Russia for influence in the country and the region. For instance, on October 1, 2022, protestors were widely seen waving Russian flags, (22) particularly at the French embassy in Ouagadougou, after rumors that Damiba was sheltering there ran rampant amid the chaos. (23) In Bobo-Dioulasso, a city in Burkina's southwest, a French cultural center was also targeted by protestors. (24) Pro-Russia demonstrations occurred off and on throughout 2022, with nearly 30 such demonstrations recorded in various urban centers (see Figure 1), although the vast majority were concentrated in Ouagadougou and the second largest city, Bobo-Dioulasso. (f)

It is difficult to unravel to what extent Russian actors are whipping up such sentiment. In January 2023, an influence operation targeted the population of Burkina Faso through an animated video clip depicting the Wagner Group as a good friend and savior of Burkina Faso and Mali, and France as an evil enemy in the form of demons and a giant cobra snake. (25) The clip was infantile and unsophisticated, but it cleverly reinforced anti-France narratives.

On January 20, 2023, several hundred people gathered in Ouagadougou to again protest the French military presence in the country with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Traore featured on large adjoining banners. (26) As already noted, two days earlier, >the junta had withdrawn from the military accord with France and demanded that French troops leave within a month.

Notwithstanding the optics of such demonstrations, Traore himself has played coy on his sentiments regarding Russia, saying that Burkina Faso has "many partners." (27) France strongly denied rumors it was interfering on the ground on the side of Damiba during the September 2022 coup. (28) And although the Russian state has not formally commented on the coup, Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group and a close ally of Putin, stated he "salute[s] and support[s] Captain Ibrahim Traore" who he calls "a truly courageous son of the motherland." (29) Prigozhin's statement was likely meant to publicly open the door for cooperation between Wagner and Burkina's new junta, in addition to acting as a means to further divide public sentiment between the...