Of Two Minds About Plain Meaning: the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Word "any" in 28 U.s.c. Section 2680(c) - Kevin Hembree

• Publication year: 2009

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Of Two Minds about Plain Meaning: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Word "Any" in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(c)

I. Introduction

Can a word have a plain meaning that is independent of linguistic context, or is a word's plain meaning always relative to and dependent on linguistic context? The United States Supreme Court often faces this question, as it did when deciding whether the word "any" has a commonly understood, independent meaning, and whether context affects that meaning. In a heated linguistic battle, the Court held in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons¹ that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(c)² exempted from the government's waiver of sovereign immunity any and all law enforcement officers from claims arising out of the detention of property.³ Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, concluded that Sec. 2680(c) barred federal prisoners from bringing a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)⁴ against the Federal Bureau of Prisons for personal property lost by prison officers during a prison transfer.⁵ The dissenters argued that Sec. 2680(c) only exempted customs and excise officers, not federal prison officers, from the government's waiver of sovereign immunity.⁶ This five to four decision could significantly alter the government's accountability for property that is negligently lost or damaged while detained by federal law enforcement officers.

II. Factual Background

Most travelers know the precarious nature of checking luggage, which despite being sent to the same destination seems, all too often, to encounter an obstacle the traveler does not. Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali was such a traveler. After being confined for nearly two years in the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, Ali was transferred in December 2003 to the United States Penitentiary Big Sandy (USP Big Sandy) in Inez, Kentucky. His luggage arrived at USP Big Sandy several days after he did. Missing from his luggage were several items worth an estimated $177, a small amount were it not for the religious significance of the items to Ali. The missing items included religious magazines, a prayer rug, and two copies of the Qur'an.⁷

When Ali first received his luggage at USP Big Sandy, he signed a receipt form. Ali's signature on the receipt was meant to acknowledge, among other things, that Ali had received all the items that were in his luggage when he left Atlanta. Despite signing the receipt, Ali later filed an administrative tort claim seeking damages for the missing items. The administrative agency denied Ali relief, claiming that he had waived his right to bring claims for missing property by signing the receipt form. This denial prompted Ali to file a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act⁸ (FTCA) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) successfully argued that Sec. 2680(c) exempted all federal law enforcement officers from tort claims arising out of the detention of property.⁹

Ali appealed the judgment of the district court, but the BoP's interpretation of Sec. 2680(c) was upheld in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In holding that the BOP's interpretation of Sec. 2680(c) was correct, the Eleventh Circuit cited not only its own precedent¹⁰ and that of the United States Supreme Court,¹¹ but it also cited the decisions of other circuits.¹² While some circuits advocated an interpretation of Sec. 2680(c) similar to the BoP's interpretation,¹³ other circuits interpreted Sec. 2680(c) to apply only to customs or excise officers and officers acting in a customs or excise capacity.¹⁴

To resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and Ali's claim was given one last chance for success.¹⁵ In a five to four decision, the Court held that Sec. 2680(c) exempted all federal law enforcement officers from tort claims arising out of the detention of property, thus affirming the Eleventh Circuit's ruling.¹⁶

III. Legal Background

A. Statutory History

By passing the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)¹⁷ in 1946, the United States government waived sovereign immunity for torts inflicted by government employees acting within the scope of their employment.¹⁸ Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that arose, at least in part, in medieval England.¹⁹ The doctrine arose from the idea that tenants should not be able to sue their lords in the very courts that the lords established.²⁰ The doctrine further developed into the political maxim that "the King can do no wrong," signifying that the state could not be liable to citizens in the civil courts.²¹ In 1821 the United States Supreme Court first recognized the concept of sovereign immunity in Cohens v. State of

Virginia,²² stating, "It is an axiom in politics, that a sovereign and independent State is not liable to the suit of any individual, nor amenable to any judicial power, without its own consent."²³

The FTCA was enacted to limit sovereign immunity by providing a general waiver of the government's immunity from legal liability.²⁴ While allowing claims "for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property" resulting from the tortious actions of government employees, the FTCA nevertheless exempted specific claims from the government's general waiver of immunity.²⁵ Section 2680(c) of the FTCA exempts "[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer."²⁶ In 2000, Sec. 2680(c) was amended by adding subsections (1) through (4), which restored the waiver of immunity for tort claims relating to the detention of property if the property was detained pursuant to a federal forfeiture law.²⁷

B. Caselaw History

About half of the United States courts of appeals have broadly interpreted the word "any" in Sec. 2680(c) of the FTCA.²⁸ As a result, these circuits have consistently held "any other law enforcement officer" to include officers other than customs and excise officers and officers acting in a customs or excise capacity.²⁹ For example, in Schlaebitz v. United States Department of Justice,³⁰ the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Sec. 2680(c) to hear a parolee's claim against several United States marshalls for releasing the parolee's detained property to a third party.³¹ The court chose to follow several other circuits and give the statute its literal, or plain, meaning.³² Although the court noted that this meaning comported with the statute's purpose,³³ the court chose not to employ any other interpretative tools, such as legislative history or statutory canons.³⁴ Thus, the court held that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because the marshalls were law enforcement officers exempted under the "any other law enforcement officer" clause in Sec. 2680(c).³⁵

Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached the same holding regarding "any other law enforcement officer" in Bramwell v. United States Bureau of Prisons.³⁶ There, a federal prisoner tried to file a claim under the FTCA for the detainment and destruction of his eyeglasses, but the Ninth Circuit ruled that the prison officers were exempted from FTCA liability under Sec. 2680(c).³⁷ Following the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Chapa v. United States Department of Justice³⁸ held that prison officers were exempt from a prisoner's FTCA claim arising out of the loss of his personal property when being transferred from one prison to another.³⁹ The Fifth Circuit looked to Sec. 2680(h), which defined law enforcement officer as "'any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.'"⁴⁰ The court also examined statutes that defined "law enforcement officer" as meaning any and all law enforcement officers.⁴¹ According to the Fifth Circuit, Sec. 2680(c) should be interpreted consistently with the examined statutes.⁴² Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that prison officers are "'law enforcement officer[s]' for purposes of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(c)."⁴³

In contrast, approximately halfof the circuits have held that Sec. 2680(c) does not include law enforcement officers other than customs and excise officers and officers acting in a customs or excise capacity.⁴⁴ For example, in ABC v. DEF,⁴⁵ the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed an appeal by a prisoner whose personal property was lost during his transfer from one prison cell to another.⁴⁶ Noting that "statutes are not construed in isolation,"⁴⁷ the court determined that "any other law enforcement officer" is "confined by context to customs and excise."⁴⁸ In support of this holding, the Second Circuit, among other arguments, employed two linguistic canons: the rule against surplusage and ejusdem generis.⁴⁹ Linguistic canons function as interpretive guides by helping judges extract meaning from statutory language.⁵⁰ The rule against surplusage requires courts to interpret a statute so that no word, clause, or sentence is rendered superfluous.⁵¹ Not only does this canon demand that every word, phrase, and clause have an independent meaning, but it also demands that the same meaning not be applied to two different words, phrases, or clauses in the same section.⁵² According to the court in ABC, if "any other law enforcement officer" means "any law enforcement officer doing anything," then the other references in Sec. 2680(c) to customs and excise officers are superfluous.⁵³

The other linguistic canon raised by the court in ABC was ejusdem generis.⁵⁴ Ejusdem generis stands for the principle that a general, catchall phrase following a list of specific items should be "'understood as a reference to...