Obstruction and the Politics of Civilian Nominations

• Published date: 01 May 2020
• Date: 01 May 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X19870995
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X19870995

American Politics Research

2020, Vol. 48(3) 414 –421

© The Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X19870995

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Article

Introduction

The confirmation process for presidential nominees has

grown quite acrimonious in recent decades. The U.S. Senate

has regularly been criticized by presidents, critics, and pun-

dits alike for its plodding process that has resulted in long

delays in considering nominations and scores of unfilled

vacancies across numerous areas of the federal government.

Although the process has been reformed on a number of

occasions, few would describe it as efficient (Bond, Fleisher,

& Krutz, 2009; Peters, 2013).

Merrick Garland’s nomination to the D.C. Circuit Court

of Appeals in 1995 illustrates many of the obstacles that

presidential nominees face in the Senate. Garland’s nomina-

tion was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary

Committee in late 1995, but was not brought to the floor dur-

ing the 104th Congress. Garland’s nomination was delayed

in part because a “hold” had been placed on it by Senators

Jesse Helms and Lauch Faircloth, both Republicans from

North Carolina. Holds are not a formal Senate procedural

tactic, but rather are a private threat issued by a senator to his

or her party leader. In this case, Helms stated that he would

“object to any time agreement or unanimous consent request

with respect to consideration of the nomination of Merrick

B. Garland to be United States Circuit Judge for the District

of Columbia Circuit, calendar number 434.”1 These threat-

ened objections are often considered filibuster threats by

leaders, so nominees and measures that have a hold placed

on them rarely move until the hold is lifted. As such, many

observers have noted that holds can serve as a de facto veto

over a nominee or measure (Sinclair, 1989).

Although many have noted the importance of holds in

understanding how the Senate functions, our understanding of

the effects of holds are limited by lack of data. They are typi-

cally not part of the public record and are typically retained in

the leadership offices of the Senate. We were, however, able to

create a unique dataset on holds based on records found in the

personal papers of former Senator Robert J. Dole (R-KS). We

use these data to analyze how holds affect the nomination and

confirmation process. Specifically, we ask and answer two

questions: First, what pattern exists for holds on nominees?

Second, how do holds affect the disposition of nominees?

Senators may use holds in an attempt to permanently forestall

a nomination or to delay confirmation while they seek lever-

age on other matters before the Senate. Our data allow us to

examine the types of nominees held, confirmation rates, dura-

tion, and disposition methods for nominees targeted by holds

to address these questions. We find that nominees that are sub-

ject to holds face significant delays in the confirmation pro-

cess and are more likely to be subject to a roll call vote in the

Senate. However, we do not find evidence to suggest that

nominees subject to a hold fail at a higher rate than those who

are not subject to a hold.

870995APRXXX10.1177/1532673X19870995American Politics ResearchHoward and Roberts

research-article2019

1Auburn University at Montgomery, Montgomery, AL, USA

2The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Nicholas O. Howard, Department of Political Science and Public

Administration, Auburn University at Montgomery, P.O. Box 244023,

Montgomery, AL 36124-4023, USA.

Email: nicholas.howard@aum.edu

Obstruction and the Politics of

Civilian Nominations

Nicholas O. Howard1 and Jason M. Roberts2

Abstract

Conflict over presidential nominations has grown more acrimonious in recent decades. Senators have increasingly exploited their

procedural prerogatives to block or delay nominations that they oppose. In this article, we utilize a newly collected dataset on

holds placed by Republican senators to explore the usage and effect of obstructive tactics on nominations in the 100th to 104th

Congresses (1987-1996). We find that nominees subject to a hold see a significant delay in disposition of their nomination, but we

do not find evidence that holds regularly prevent nominees from being confirmed by the Senate.

Keywords

obstruction, nominations, senate, holds