Norms of presentational force.

• Author: Manolescu, Beth Innocenti

A person's style of argumentation sometimes seems to force us to believe or do something. We may feel compelled by a case presented seductively. A vivid description of potential harmful consequences of a policy may pressure us to abandon our support for it. A child may speak with such sweetness and naivete that we can't refuse to buy a dozen boxes of candy to support her club's trip. In these cases we may say that the presentational style was effective since it persuaded us. But would we say that we were rationally persuaded? Can style or presentational devices as such reasonably compel us to believe, agree, act? I submit that they can, and that the normative pragmatic project explains how.

Presentational force is the force of style as argument. Although it is possible to abstract an argument from a discourse--when someone asks us what argument is made in an essay, we do not read the essay to her--presentational devices constitute the argument as designed and presented. (1) Presentational devices include but are not limited to language uses such as word choice, syntax, figures and tropes, and broader units of composition. Although some presentational devices in argumentation may be viewed as beyond the scope of argument proper (see for example Jacobs 267, 270, 272), presentational devices constitute argumentation (Jacobs 265; see also Conley 273-74; Manolescu, "Style" 64). Therefore at least some presentational devices are inseparable from argumentation itself and must be investigated as sources of force.

By presentational force I mean something other than a forceful style where forceful may refer to the strength, intensity, or impact of presentational devices. Instead, I use force in the sense of pressure or compel Some students of rhetoric and argumentation may object to the idea that arguments are compelling, that a forceful argument may pressure someone to believe or act. They may be in the good company of those who have understood rhetoric and argumentation as alternatives to physical force. (2) Still, it is commonplace to speak of arguments forcing responses, and this is not necessarily objectionable. It is good that arguments force politicians to make health care an issue in a political campaign, or force jurors to acknowledge evidence in a trial.

In what follows I aim to show how presentational devices may serve as sources of force and how they may be analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of normative pragmatics. After explaining the normative pragmatic project, I analyze and evaluate select presentational forces in Susan B. Anthony's "Is it a Crime for a U. S. Citizen to Vote?" and conclude with reflections on the compatibility of the normative pragmatic approach with the recently developed pragma-dialectical treatment of presentational devices.

NORMATIVE PRAGMATICS AND PRESENTATIONAL FORCE

Approaching argumentation from a variety of perspectives, researchers past and present have referred to force in their theories of argumentation (see for example Apostel 101; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Systematic 12; Johnson 334; Whately). There are at least three ways of theorizing force, where theorizing means explaining: intellectual, social, and pragmatic. Although these ways of explaining force are not mutually exclusive, they involve different emphases. In what follows I overview these ways with reference to how argumentation may pressure addressees to accept an argument's conclusion. Accepting a conclusion is not the only thing an argument may force addressees to do. Argumentation may aim to force addressees to accept a premise or burden of proof, for example. Still, forcing acceptance of a conclusion is a straightforward kind of case and so is a good way to introduce different ways of theorizing the force of argumentation.

First, an explanation of argumentation's ability to pressure, compel, force an addressee to accept a conclusion may be primarily intellectual. Intellectual accounts of force inform basic kinds of critical questions for different kinds of arguments. To ask of an argument from analogy if the relationships compared are sufficiently similar, to ask of a causal generalization if causation and not just correlation is present, to ask of a hypothetical syllogism if the antecedent is denied or the consequent affirmed is to ask about the intellectual force of these kinds of arguments. In all cases, we assess their force apart from audience and context and based on what may be taken as objective, impersonal standards of rationality. From this perspective, we may say that argumentation pressures a physician to accept the conclusion that a drug treatment is effective because the conclusion is based on a sample of sufficient size, spread, and randomness and meets all other relevant criteria of rational argument. (3)

Second, an explanation of argumentation's ability to force an addressee to accept a conclusion may be primarily social. From this perspective, we may explain the compelling nature of arguments from analogy that meet traditional standards of rational argument by saying that such reasoning patterns are sanctioned by society. Or we may say that the physician is compelled to accept that a drug treatment is effective because the argumentation meets standards set by a society of professionals. In these cases, force is explained not by impersonal standards of rationality but by agreements among people about what counts as a valid, strong, appropriate argument. (4) This perspective grounds force primarily in intersubjective agreement.

If force pressures or compels to some degree, then social explanations are preferable to intellectual ones. The categories are not mutually exclusive, but emphasizing the social enables theory to cover cases of non-cooperative, adversarial argumentation. But social explanations are unsatisfactory since a theory of argumentation aims to explain the practice of argumentation rather than social norms. Thus, an explanation in terms of the practice of argumentation is preferable. Again, the categories are not mutually exclusive, but emphasizing practice takes us more deeply into argumentation whereas emphasizing the social directs us more toward context. Context is essential but the practice of argumentation ought to be the focus of inquiry.

A normative pragmatic approach to force addresses these considerations. It is a third kind of explanation for an argument's capacity to compel addressees to accept a conclusion. From this perspective, we may say that the physician is compelled to accept that the drug treatment is effective because to do otherwise would lead to negative consequences such as looking irrational or unprofessional. Accepting the conclusion appears to be the rational, professional choice, so the presentational design itself offers positive inducements for accepting the conclusion. Clearly intellectual and social dimensions--and other kinds of dimensions such as political--may be involved in a normative pragmatic explanation of force. But the normative pragmatic perspective (1) emphasizes the presentational design of the argumentation as the source of force, (2) explains how the design features themselves may serve as reasons (or not) for accepting a conclusion, and (3) evaluates the argumentation based on its reasonability under the circumstances.

A normative pragmatic approach to argumentation first was outlined systematically by the pragma-dialecticians. In their view, argumentation theory is a branch of what they have termed normative pragmatics--an approach to argumentation that attempts "to transcend the limitations of a purely normative or a purely descriptive approach to argumentation" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Systematic 10). A purely normative approach would propose an ideal model of argumentation without reference to the actual practice of argumentation; a purely descriptive approach would simply describe the properties of argumentation. A pragma-dialectical perspective transcends these approaches by studying actual argumentation, reconstructing it via a series of transformations (addition, deletion, substitution, permutation) to produce an analytic overview, and evaluating it according to the rules for a critical discussion. The pragma-dialecticians' attempt to merge the ideal and the real is a significant contribution to argumentation theory (see van Eemeren, "Argumentation" 9 and "Study" 40; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs, ch. 1; van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Systematic ch. 2).

Working from a rhetorical perspective, a number of scholars recently have developed a normative pragmatic approach to force that preserves the central insight of the need to merge the ideal and the real. This project involves a number of assumptions, some of which are shared by the pragma-dialectieal perspective. First, the force of arguments is derived from discourse strategies--from what arguers actually do. Second, these strategies or design features serve as reasons created by the argumentation.

These two assumptions may be illustrated by the following example. Arguers may design their argumentation in a way that pressures reluctant addressees to consider matters that otherwise they might disregard (Kauffeld, "Persuasive" 86). Qualities of argumentation that seem to compel consideration of a proposal may include an appearance of being well thought out and taking into account the addressees' interests; when argumentation manifests these qualities, addressees may be "vulnerable to criticism should they fail to contend with the speaker's argument" (Kauffeld, "Persuasive" 82). If the argument is not taken into consideration, addressees may not appear prudent or self-reliant; in this way the argument pressures or compels consideration (see also Kauffeld, "Presumptions"). Analysts focus not on the argument that is "in" the discourse and abstracted from the design elements, but on the design elements themselves and the reasons...