New Car Emissions Feared to Increase Global Temperatures, State Standing: Massachusetts v. Epa - Nick Bisher

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Publication year: 2008
• Citation: Vol. 59 No. 3

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New Car Emissions Feared to Increase Global Temperatures, State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA

I. Introduction

As debate over global warming continues to intensify, the United States Supreme Court has taken steps to begin addressing the many interests asserted by private and public parties. In Massachusetts v. EPA,¹ the Court issued a landmark opinion that gives states the power to assert their rights under the Clean Air Act² in federal court.³ The Court also ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying a petition to promulgate a rule establishing limits on new motor vehicle emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases ("GHGs") under the Clean Air Act.⁴ This decision has centered the spotlight of the global warming debate on the EPA and may result in the regulation of GHG emissions from many sources other than just new cars.

II. Factual Background

The Court began by noting, "A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related."⁵ This phenomenon, known as global warming, begins when carbon dioxide that has been released into the atmosphere traps solar energy, resulting in a slower release of reflected heat. This is similar to how the ceiling of a greenhouse functions, which is why carbon dioxide is known as a "greenhouse gas" or "GHG."⁶

On October 20, 1999, a collection of nineteen private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA requesting the organization to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles pursuant to section 202 of the Clean Air Act.⁷ The group alleged that: (1) "1998 was the warmest year on record"; (2) "carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons" are GHGs; (3) "greenhouse gas emissions have significantly accelerated climate change"; (4) "carbon dioxide remains the most important contributor to [man-made] forcing of climate change"; and (5) "climate change will have serious adverse effects on human health and the environment."⁸ The group also pointed out in the petition that one EPA general counsel, prior to the time of the filing of the request, concluded in a legal opinion that the EPA was within its authority to regulate carbon dioxide, a sentiment that was later repeated by his successor only two weeks before the filing.⁹

However, on September 8, 2003, the EPA denied the rulemaking petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act did not empower the EPA to enact "mandatory regulations to address global climate change."¹⁰ Further, the EPA proclaimed that even if it had such authority, it would be unwise to do so. The EPA maintained that the Clean Air Act did not pertain to carbon dioxide, which is consistently concentrated in the atmosphere, because carbon dioxide is not a local air pollutant.¹¹ Also, because of prior "political history," potential political repercussions, and economic implications, the EPA concluded that the duty of enacting mandatory emissions limitations remained with Congress.¹² The EPA also justified its denial of the petition because of the scientific community's failure to establish an unequivocal causal link between increased global temperature and human activity.¹³ Lastly, the EPA claimed that a "piecemeal approach" to climate change, such as emissions limitations, would conflict with the United States President's "comprehensive approach to the problem."¹⁴

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the petitioners were joined by a number of state and local governments. In a split decision of 2-1, the court of appeals ruled against the petitioners, holding that the EPA properly used its discretion in denying the rulemaking petition. In his opinion, Judge Randolph did not present any concrete evaluation of the petitioners' standing to bring the claim.¹⁵ Judge Sentelle, while concurring in the court's holding that the EPA properly exercised its discretion, wrote separately to reveal his belief that the petitioners failed to "'demonstrative] the element of injury necessary to establish standing" because they could not allege "'particularized injuries'" as required by law.¹⁶ Conversely, Judge Tatel concluded in his dissent that standing had been established by the petitioners, arguing that the projected rise in sea level that could result in substantial loss of coastal property was a "'far cry " from an insufficient generalized harm.¹⁷ Further, Judge Tatel argued that the reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from American vehicles would "'delay and moderate'" the consequences of global warming and therefore sufficiently redress the petitioners alleged injury.¹⁸

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 26, 2006,¹⁹ and in a split decision of 5-4, ruled in favor of the petitioners.²⁰ Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that Massachusetts had appropriate standing, and with that threshold justiciability issue satisfied, the Court could appropriately adjudicate the merits of the case.²¹ The majority determined that the EPA failed to provide a "reasoned explanation" for its refusal to act on the rulemaking peti-tion.²² Therefore, the majority held that the decision was "'arbitrary, capricious, ... or otherwise not in accordance with law.'"²³ Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, dissented.²⁴

III. Legal Background

A. Statutory Background

Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act²⁵ was enacted by Congress in 1970.²⁶ Congress amended section 202(a)(1) in 1977,²⁷ which currently states,

The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.²⁸

This amendment was made in response to the Court's ruling in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,²⁹ which held that the Clean Air Act and "common sense demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable."³⁰

The term "air pollutant" is defined by the Act as "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air."³¹ Also, the term "welfare" is defined to include "effects on . . . weather . . . and climate."³²

Since the enactment of the Clean Air Act, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has continued to rise, and the scientific community has continued to progress in its understanding of the man- induced increase in global surface temperatures.³³ However, it is undisputed that some degree of uncertainty remains.³⁴ Thus, in deciding Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court engaged in a debate about what degree of uncertainty is acceptable for establishing appropriate standing.³⁵ The Court, however, did not establish what degree of uncertainty is generally acceptable.³⁶

B. Historically Significant Caselaw

1. Standing in General. Interpreting the standing requirement for federal jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held in Baker v. Carr³⁷ that a petitioner must have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination."³⁸ The Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,³⁹ further defined the holding in Baker by requiring litigants who seek to invoke federal jurisdiction to establish that they "have suffered an injury in fact" by proving two elements:⁴⁰ First, injury in fact requires the "invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized";⁴¹ and second, the injury must be "'actual or imminent, not . . . hypothetical.'"⁴² If injury in fact has been established, there must also be causation (the injury must be " 'fairly . . . tracei[able] " to the conduct of the defendant) and redress-ability (it must be likely "the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision ").⁴³

In Lujan, however, the Court established an exception to the general standing requirement known as "procedural rights."⁴⁴ Under this exception, "ia] person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy."⁴⁵ More importantly, as the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA⁴⁶ noted, a litigant with a procedural right has standing if there is merely "some possibility" that the requested reliefcould persuade the adverse party to reconsider the allegedly harmful decision.⁴⁷ Additionally, in a matter with multiple petitioners, the Court only requires one of the petitioners to qualify for standing for the petition to be considered by the Court.⁴⁸

2. State Standing. Over the past century, through a progression of cases, the United States Supreme Court has established that sovereign states are not normal litigants for the purpose of federal threshold justiciability issues.⁴⁹ In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,⁵⁰ the State of Georgia invoked federal jurisdiction to protect its citizens from out-of-state pollution.⁵¹ The Court held that states are quasi-sovereign and thus have an independent interest "in all the earth and air within [their] domain[s]" that supports federal jurisdiction.⁵² Modern Supreme Court cases, such as Alden v. Maine,⁵³ which declared that the states "retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty," have echoed this sentiment.⁵⁴

In Missouri v. Illinois,⁵⁵ the State of Missouri sought to invoke federal jurisdiction for equitable...