New Call for Assessing the Effects of 21st Century Juvenile Diversion

• Author: Mark C. Stafford
• Date: 01 August 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12242
• Published date: 01 August 2016

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

JUVENILE COURT AND DIVERSION

New Call for Assessing the Effects

of 21st Century Juvenile Diversion

Mark C. Staord

Texas State University

Increasing delinquency rates in the United States in the 1960s, along with social unrest

and a growing public distrust of government at all levels, led PresidentLyndon Johnson

to establish the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of

Justice (1967) to recommend reforms. After pointing to poverty, inequality, and lack of

opportunity as the causes of delinquency, the Commission took aim at the juvenile court,

which was perceived to have failed in achieving its idealistic child-saving goals. The juvenile

court had not only failed to rehabilitate offenders, according to the Commission, but also it

had made matters worse by labeling and stigmatizing offenders, denying them due process,

and placing them in overcrowded institutions. A series of reforms was recommendedto limit

the power and jurisdiction of the juvenile court: decriminalization, diversion, due process,

and deinstitutionalization (Empey, 1978). Soonafter, the same reforms were recommended

by another commission—the National Advisory Commission on Criminal JusticeStandards

and Goals—established in 1973 by PresidentRichard Nixon (1973a, 1973b), and all reforms

were adopted in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.

Diversion was the most widely adopted reform in the 1970s. A strong enthusiasm

for diversion among policy makers produced a diversion “explosion” during this period

throughout the United States (Klein, Teilman, Styles, Lincoln, and Labin-Rosensweig,

1976). The enthusiasm, however, was not always shared by researchers, many of whom

quickly raised serious questions about diversion (e.g., Binder and Geis, 1984; Blomberg,

1983; Klein, 1979; Lemert, 1981; Polk, 1984). One of the most frequent questions was the

meaning of diversion, and there were two prevailing views (Frazier and Cochran, 1986). To

some, when drawing from labeling theory, diversion meant that no sanction or treatment

would be imposed on juveniles (“judicious” or “radical” nonintervention; Lemert, 1967;

Schur, 1973). To others, diversion meant “diversion to service” or “removal of youth

Direct correspondence to Mark C. Stafford, School of Criminal Justice, Texas State University, Hill House, Room

107, 601 University Drive, San Marcos, TX 78666-4616 (e-mail: stafford@txstate.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12242 C2016 American Society of Criminology 949

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 15 rIssue 3