Neuroscience and the Potential Need for a New Bright‐Line Rule Concerning Miranda Waivers After CED Exposure

AuthorHenry F. Fradella
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12179
Date01 February 2016
Published date01 February 2016
POLICY ESSAY
TASER EXPOSURE AND COGNITIVE
IMPAIRMENT
Neuroscience and the Potential Need for a
New Bright-Line Rule Concerning Miranda
Waivers After CED Exposure
Henry F.Fradella
Arizona State University
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guarantees that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.” This so-called negative right gained international prominence
as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
Miranda recognized that custodial interrogations inherently generate “compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where
he would not otherwise do so freely” (pp. 467–468). Tosafeguard the privilege against self-
incrimination during custodial interrogations, the Court mandated that law enforcement
officers advise suspects of their rights to remain silent. Miranda also mandated that suspects
be informed that they have the right to have an attorney present during questioning—even if
they could not afford one—effectively creating “aFifth Amendment right to counsel during
pre-indictment custodial interrogation that is distinct from the right to counsel assured by
the Sixth Amendment” (Kuller, 1986: 260).
The Miranda decision specifically stated that after law enforcement personnel warned a
suspect of his or her rights, the suspect “may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings
and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him” (Miranda, 1966: 479).
The dissenting justices in Miranda feared that the required warnings would severely
impact the ability of police to investigate and solve crimes because if suspects were aware
of their rights, they would not voluntarily choose to waive them. One justice predicted
I thank Richard Leo for his thoughtful insights on this policy essay. Direct correspondence to Henry F. Fradella,
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona State University, Mail Code 4420, 411 North Central
Avenue, Suite 600, Phoenix, AZ 85004-0685 (e-mail: Hank.Fradella@asu.edu).
DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12179 C2015 American Society of Criminology 117
Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 15 rIssue 1

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