National Labor Policy

• DOI: 10.1177/000271625127400127
• Date: 01 March 1951
• Published date: 01 March 1951
• Author: George W. Taylor
• Subject Matter: Articles

185

National

Labor

Policy

By

GEORGE

W.

TAYLOR

OUR

national

labor

policy

has

numerous

components,

including

minimum

wage

legislation

and

social

security

legislation,

but

the

most

im-

portant

one

concerns

the

status

ac-

corded

to

collective

bargaining.

There-

fore

attention

in

this

article

is

centered

upon

that

institution.

This

status

has

changed

several

times

during

the

past

twenty

years.

Each

change

has

been

accompanied

by

severe

stresses

and

strains.

Nor

have

the

issues

been

finally

resolved

by

the

Taft-Hartley

Act.

On

the

contrary,

this

legislation

moves

the

national

policy

in

a

direction

that

must

be

reversed

if

relatively

free

collective

bargaining

is

to

be

the

corner-

stone

of

industrial

relations.

The

problem

about

the

place

of

col-

lective

bargaining

in

the national

labor

policy

can

quickly

be

placed

in

perspec-

tive

by

considering

three

successive

at-

titudes

which

the

government

has

as-

sumed

in

recent

years.

The

policy

set

forth

by

the

Wagner

Act

was

markedly

different

from

what

had

previously

pre-

vailed

and

also

from

what

is

enunciated

by

the

Taft-Hartley

Act.

PRE-WAGNER

ACT

POLICY

Prior

to

passage

of

the

Wagner

Act,

employees

had

a

right

to

form

a

union

and

then

to

call

upon

their

employer

to

engage

in

collective

bargaining.

The

employer

was

free

to

oppose

such

en-

deavors.

He

could

penalize

any

worker

who

joined

a

union

and

could

also

re-

fuse

to

engage

in

collective

bargaining

with

any

union

that

was

nevertheless

formed.

Some

methods

of

employer

op-

position

were

outlawed

even

prior

to

the

passage

of

the

Wagner

Act,

notably

the

so-called

&dquo;yellow

dog

contract&dquo;

and

cer-

tain

uses

of

the

labor

injunction.

The

strike

was

the

sole

means

available

to

employees

to

oppose

the

discharge

of,

or

discrimination

against,

union

mem-

bers

or

to

obtain

union

recognition

de-

nied

by

an

employer.

Industrial

rela-

tions

issues

arising

over

the

attempts

of

employees

to

organize

unions

and

to

secure

collective

bargaining

were

thus

determinable,

in

.the

last

analysis,

by

a

test

of

economic

power.

The

basic

government

attitude

during

this

period

was

official

unconcern

as

to

whether

or

not

collective

bargaining

would

become

established.

The

gov-

ernment

function

was

theoretically

that

of

a

referee

to

see

that

law

and

order

were

preserved

whenever

the

test

of

eco-

nomic

strength

was

undertaken.

There

were

times

and

places,

however,

when

certain

actions

of

the

referee

served

effectively

to

hinder

union

organization

or

union

recognition.

It

has

even

been

suggested

that,

as

a

practical

matter,

the

attitude

of

the

government

and

the

courts

evidenced

a

preference

for

indi-

vidual

bargaining

and

an

opposition

to

collective

bargaining.

In

some

industries,

employees

were

able

to

organize

and

to

establish

firm

collective

bargaining

relationships

with

employers

despite

the

unfavorable

con-

ditions

surrounding

their

endeavors.1

1

Unions

so

established

found

it

unnecessary

to resort to

the

Wagner

Act

when

this

legisla-

tion

became

effective.

The

leaders

of

some

of

these

unions

have

recently

stated

to

this

writer

that,

in

their

opinion,

organized

labor’s

de-

mand

for

the

Wagner

Act

was

a

mistake.

They

reason

that

the

Wagner

Act

brought

the

government

into

industrial

relations

and

laid

the

groundwork

for

enactment

of

the

Taft-

Hartley

Act

under

which

their

unions

are

"worse

off"

than

in

pre-Wagner

Act

days.