Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over Knowledge‐based Resources

Date01 December 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2676
AuthorMatt Theeke,Hun Lee
Published date01 December 2017
Strategic Management Journal
Strat. Mgmt. J.,38: 2508–2531 (2017)
Published online EarlyView 25 July 2017 in WileyOnline Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/smj.2676
Received 9 September 2015;Final revision received31 January 2017
Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over
Knowledge-based Resources
Matt Theeke*and Hun Lee
School of Business, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia
Research summary: Research shows that multimarket contact (MMC) reduces rivalry involving
downstream activities. Yet,studies showing that MMC can increase the threat of imitation suggest
a need to better understand how MMC affects upstream rivalry over knowledge-based resources.
In this study, we argue that MMC increases rivalry over knowledge-based resources since the
deterrent threat of retaliation that typicallyleads to mutual forbearance in downstream activities
will not be sufcient to restrain rms fromprotecting their knowledge from imitation in upstream
activities. In support of these arguments we nd that MMC increases the likelihood that a rm
initiates patent litigation against a rival. This study suggests the relationship between MMC and
rivalry may depend on the competitive domain and the type of resources over which rms are
competing.
Managerial Summary: How does market overlap or MMC affect rivalry between two competi-
tors? Prior studies have largely found that an increasein market overlap decreases rivalry in less
knowledge-intensive context because of the deterrent threatof retaliation. However, in this paper,
we argue that an increase in market overlap may not reducerivalry in more knowledge-intensive
context because of heterogeneity in capabilities to protect knowledge. We nd that a rm is more
likely to initiate patent litigation against a rival as market overlap increases. Our ndings suggest
that the incentive to protect value across multiple product markets may surpass the motivation to
cooperate with rivals and that managers should have a morenuanced view of how market overlap
with competitors affects rivalry in more knowledge-intensive contexts. Copyright © 2017 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Knowledge-based resources play an important role
for rms in creating a competitive advantage(Grant,
1996; Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011). To achieve
competitive advantage from their knowledge, rms
need to both create valuable innovations (McEvily
& Chakravarthy,2002; Nelson & Winter, 1982) and
protect the value of their knowledge when compet-
ing against rival rms (Giarratana & Mariani, 2014;
Liebeskind, 1996; Teece, 1986). This competition
often occurs across multiple markets, increasing
Keywords: multimarket contact; rivalry;knowledge-based
resources; patent litigation; competitive dynamics
*Correspondence to: Matt Theeke, School of Business, George
Mason University,4400 University Drive, MSN 5F5, Fairfax, VA
22030. E-mail: mtheeke@gmu.edu
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
multimarket contact (MMC) with rival rms (Fuen-
telsaz & Gómez, 2006; Li & Greenwood, 2004).
Prior research on MMC has largely shown that
rms can benet from less intense rivalry as market
overlap increases between two competitors— the
mutual forbearance hypothesis (Edwards, 1955;
Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999; Korn
& Baum, 1999; Yu & Cannella, 2013). In par-
ticular, prior studies emphasize the benets of
reduced rivalry associated with MMC involving
downstream activities such as new product and
pricing actions (Kang, Bayus, & Balasubramanian,
2010; Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000) and
market entry and exit decisions (Haveman & Non-
nemaker, 2000; Korn & Baum, 1999). However,
Multimarket Contact and Rivalry 2509
other research suggests that competition can also
encompass upstream activities related to rms’
resources (Barney, 1986; Bergen & Peteraf, 2002;
Capron & Chatain, 2008; Markman, Gianiodis, &
Buchholtz, 2009). Upstream rivalry often entails
higher uncertainty than downstream rivalry, since
activities such as R&D rely on extensive search
and exploration (March, 1991; Nelson & Win-
ter, 1982). Moreover, recent research suggests that
MMC heightens the threat of imitation that rms
experience from rivals (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006),
and studies show that MMC increases patenting
(Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2004) and the extent to which
rival rms build on one another’s knowledge (Cas-
sidy & Loree, 2001; Scott, 2001).
These studies suggest the possibility that rms
face a tension on the one hand to leverage knowl-
edge across multiple markets but on the other
hand to protect the value of their knowledge from
multimarket rivals. In other words, a rm’s ability
to fully leverage the value from knowledge-based
resources may result in increasing MMC with
rival rms, which can expose knowledge-based
resources to an increased threat of imitation. Hence,
MMC encourages rms to be less rivalrous with
downstream activities but more rivalrous with
upstream activities to protect knowledge-based
resources. Extant research on MMC has not
fully addressed this tension or examined how
MMC affects the decision to protect a rm’s
knowledge-based resources from rivals.
With the goal of exploring this tension, this cur-
rent study develops theory about how MMC affects
rivalry over knowledge-based resources involving
patent litigation. Because MMC increases the threat
of imitation (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006) at the
same time that heterogeneity exists in rivals’ abil-
ity to protect their knowledge (Clarkson & Toh,
2010; Teece, 1986), we argue that the motiva-
tion to protect knowledge will tend to outweigh
the deterrent effect of retaliation by the rival.
Accordingly, we propose that the mutual forbear-
ance effect arising from the threat of retaliation
by a rival rm will not occur as MMC pushes
rms to protect knowledge-based resources. To
increase condence in our causal mechanisms, we
develop contingencies related to: (a) a rm’s moti-
vation to protect knowledge and (b) the deterrent
effect of retaliation by a rival. Hence, we argue
that the technological quality of the rm’s knowl-
edge and the rival’s ability to protect its knowl-
edge will respectively exacerbate and attenuate the
positive relationship between MMC and knowledge
protection.
This study adds new insights about the relation-
ship between MMC and mutual forbearance by
showing that this relationship may depend on the
competitive domain and the nature of the resources
over which rms are competing. In doing so, we
add to prior studies that have begun to unpack the
boundary conditions affecting the MMC– mutual
forbearance relationship (Yu & Cannella, 2013) by
examining factors such as market entry character-
istics (Fan, 2010), the observability of strategies
(Greve, 2008), and international market charac-
teristics (Yu, Subramaniam, & Cannella, 2009).
While we do not question the traditional mutual
forbearance hypothesis found in downstream
activities and in less knowledge-intensive contexts,
we suggest a more nuanced relationship depend-
ing on the domain. More specically, we argue
that rms may become more protective of their
knowledge-based resources in upstream activities
and in more knowledge-based contexts and that
MMC may lead to increasing rivalrous behavior.
This study also contributes to strategy research
on the defensive strategies that rms use to pro-
tect proprietary technological assets. Studies have
made important strides advancing understanding
of organizational and technological antecedents of
knowledge protection efforts (e.g., Hall & Ziedo-
nis, 2007; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001; Poli-
doro & Toh, 2011) and about the deterrent role
that a rm’s reputation for protecting its resources
plays in mitigating the leakage of knowledge and
the loss of employees (Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedo-
nis, 2009; Ganco, Ziedonis, & Agarwal, 2015). We
show that MMC between rival rms may be another
important determinant of a rm’s decision to pro-
tect its knowledge-based resources. Furthermore,
we also contribute to the resource base theory and
competitive dynamics literature by developing the-
ory about how downstream market contact between
rivals shapes rms’ subsequent upstream competi-
tive interactions in factor markets. We elaborate on
these contributions in the discussion section.
Theory and Hypotheses
Multimarket contact (MMC), which is essentially
the extent of market overlap between two rms,
has been shown to affect the intensity of rivalry
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J.,38: 2508–2531 (2017)
DOI: 10.1002/smj

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