MARIO EINAUDI, MAURICE BYE, and ERNESTO ROSSI. Nationalization in France and Italy. Pp. x, 260. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1955. $3.50

• Date: 01 March 1956
• Published date: 01 March 1956
• Author: Robert A. Brady
• DOI: 10.1177/000271625630400173
• Subject Matter: Articles

188

in

space-time

dimensions,

competent.

The

subtitle,

A

Study

of

Austro-French

Rela-

tions

is

more

descriptive

than

the

main

title,

but

unfortunately,

it

is

poorer

copy.

Although

we

hear

about

Franz

Joseph

from

time

to

time,

especially

in

the

conclusion,

we

meet

and

know

rather

his

chief

minis-

ters,

Schwarzenberg,

Buol,

and

Rechberg;

this

is

also

true

of

Napoleon

III

and

his

numerous

advisors.

Here

is

no

Napoleon

le

Petit,

no

Cae-

serean

Democrat,

but

Napoleon

III,

Re-

visionist ;

he

is

a

capable,

enigmatic

man

committed

to

overthrowing

the

Congress

of

Vienna

settlements

to

make

way

for

the

Idges

lVapol6onienne

of

nationalism

and

the

predominance

of

France.

The

whole

development

is

colored

by

Hallberg’s

adop-

tion

of the

standard

view

of

the

Congress

of

Vienna

as

anti-French,

antiliberal,

anti-

national.

Napoleon

III

saw

it

that

way

also.

To

examine

Hallberg’s

exposition

of

the

bases

of

Austro-French

antagonism

is

to

realize

that

we

have

no

corner

on

ideo-

logical

diplomacy.

Napoleon

III

is

fight-

ing

the

good

fight

against

dynasty,

op-

pression,

and

reaction

in

behalf

of

na-

tionalism

and

the

preponderance

of

France.

Austrian

actions

rested

on

an

opposing

policy

of

dynasty

and

conservatism.

All

this

is

evident

in

the

contretemps

over

recognizing

Louis

Napoleon

as

Napoleon

III,

in

his

Italian,

Rumanian,

and

Polish

ventures,

and

in

his

expansive

plans

for

a

general reorganization

of

all

Europe

which

would

at

once

emulate

and

repudiate

the

reorganizations

of

1815.

Hallberg

builds

securely

on

archival

ma-

terials,

especially

from

the

Haus-

Hof,

und

Staatsarchiv.

His

documentation

produces

the

security

of

detail.

More

specifically

it

shows

up

the

myths

of

an

Anglo-French

ultimatum

forcing

Austria

into

a

triple

alli-

ance

against

Russia,

of

Franz

Joseph

as

a

mere

tool

of

Buol,

and

of

Drouyn

de

Lhuys

being

jockied

out

of

office

in

1853

by

Lord

Cowley.

Buol,

Hallberg

rehabili-

tates

in

a

limited

and

gentle

manner.

Re-

grettably,

there

is

nothing

conclusive

about

the

reasons

for

Napoleon’s

early

with-

drawal

from

the

Italian

war.

Clear

in

style,

this

book

lacks

vivacious-

ness ;

this

is

not

to

suggest

dullness,

for

the

book

is

not

dull.

Skillfully

employed

quo-

tations

add

salt

to

a

meaty

dish.

The

riches

in

the

footnotes

are

disgustingly

hidden

between

the

conclusion

and

the

extensive

bibliography.

The

index

is

full

and

usable.

In

fine,

here

is

a

book

which

is

important

for

serious

students

of

the

mid-nineteenth

century.

GARLAND

DOWNUM

Arizona

State

College

Flagstaff

MARIO

EINAUDI,

MAURICE

BYE,

and

ERN-

ESTO

ROSSI.

Nationalization

in

France

and

Italy.

Pp.

x,

260.

Ithaca,

N.

Y.:

Cornell

University

Press.

1955.

$3.50.

The

fourth

&dquo;of

a

series

devoted

to

the

political,

economic,

and

constitutional

prob-

lems

of

post

war

France

and

Italy,&dquo;

this

volume

presents

a

brief

for

comprehensive

organization

of

most

of

the

nationalized

sectors

of

these

two

national

economies.

All

three

authors

assume

that

nationaliza-

tion

in

both

countries

is

here

to

stay-

perhaps

to

be

further

expanded

in

some

directions.

But

while

notable

improve-

ments

have

been

made

in

many

instances,

yet

management

is

frequently

subject

to

harassing

political

interference,

efficiency

is

sometimes

low,

responsibility

is

difficult,

to

fix,

and

the

need

for

technical

organi-

zation

and

planning

is

generally

evident.

In

both

countries

part

of

this

confusion

is

a

heritage

of

the

past

circumstances

under

which

nationalization

took

place:

&dquo;In

Italy,

amid

the

secrecy

imposed

by

the

fascist

dictatorship

trying

to

avoid

public

s’candal;

in

France,

in

the

rush

of

the

glittering

hopes

created

by

victory

and

liberation.&dquo;

Part

of

it

is

due

also

to

the

impact

of

conflicting

interests

and

policies

of

em-

ployers,

trade

unions,

established

govern-

mental

civil

service

bureaucracies,

but

above

all

to

the

rapidly

changing

power

structures

of

the

political

parties

to

the

center

and

left.

Several

lines

of

therapy

are

suggested.

Especially

favored

are

(1)

the

autonomous

public

corporation

of

the

type

developed

in

labor-dominated

postwar

Britain

where

gov-

ernment

has

taken

over

most

of

the

eco-

nomic

activity

as

in

&dquo;natural

monopolies&dquo;

public

utilities;

(2)

where

nationalization

has

stopped

short

of

complete

government

ownership,

the

reorientation

of

public

cor-