Managing a Pandemic at a Less Than Global Scale: Governors Take the Lead
| Author | Ann O’M. Bowman,James H. McKenzie |
| Published date | 01 August 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0275074020941700 |
| Date | 01 August 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Public Management Opportunities & Challenges in the Era of COVID-19Testing the Size, Scope, Capabilities, Capacities, & Limits of State and Local Governments |
research-article2020
Testing the Size, Scope, Capabilities, Capacities, & Limits of State and Local Governments
American Review of Public Administration
2020, Vol. 50(6-7) 551 –559
Managing a Pandemic at a Less Than
© The Author(s) 2020
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Global Scale: Governors Take the Lead
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074020941700
DOI: 10.1177/0275074020941700
journals.sagepub.com/home/arp
Ann O’M. Bowman1 and James H. McKenzie1
Abstract
This article explores the roles played by state governments, and particularly governors, in dealing with an extremely disruptive
event—the coronavirus global pandemic. The inquiry focuses on March and April 2020, a period characterized by significant
public health challenges and severe economic stress. The coronavirus pandemic did not affect states at the same time or with
the same intensity and as a consequence, governors varied somewhat in terms of when they acted and which policies they
adopted. As shown in the article, gubernatorial interactions with other states were at times cooperative, in other instances
they were competitive. Two states—Texas and Pennsylvania—are singled out for an examination of within-state dynamics.
The article ends with brief reflections on the lessons of the coronavirus for public sector management in a federal system
of government.
Keywords
pandemic, federalism, states, governors, policy adoption
A pandemic is global, crossing international boundaries and
House Coronavirus Task Force to oversee the nation’s
affecting a large number of people (Porta, 2014, p. 209).
response to the virus and later installed Vice-President
Despite its global reach, the responsibility for managing a
Michael Pence as its chair, most assessments conclude that
pandemic rests with individual nations. In countries that
the president minimized the seriousness of COVID-19,
operate with a federal system in which power is shared
often claiming that it was “under control” as the number of
between a national government and regional governments,
cases increased (Lipton et al., 2020). At one point, for exam-
management responsibilities are not always explicit. In 2020,
ple, he told governors it was their job to find personal pro-
the highly contagious novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pan-
tective equipment (PPE) for their health care workers, not
demic generated a series of disruptions in the federal system
his, saying that the federal government was not a shipping
in the United States.
clerk (Forgey, 2020). However, some federal actions were
This article explores the roles played by state govern-
useful to governors as they sought to manage the crisis. For
ments, and particularly governors, in dealing with COVID-
instance, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
19. Governors occupy an increasingly important leadership
social distancing guidelines published in mid-March were
and management role in the intergovernmental system and
regularly cited by state governors as models for their own
effective performance in office has been shown to bolster
executive orders. Also, later in March, the president
gubernatorial approval among a state’s citizenry (Fording &
announced that the Federal Emergency Management
Patton, 2019). The inquiry focuses on a specific period of
Agency would fund the activation of U.S. National Guard
time—March and April 2020—a period of tremendous pol-
units in California, New York, and Washington to assist with
icy change as evidenced by the large number of executive
coronavirus response.
orders promulgated by governors. During this 2-month time
Still, intergovernmental tensions arose, many of them
frame, as the number of cases and deaths rose, Americans
with a partisan cast as the president criticized the Democratic
were told to stay at home, hospital workers risked their lives
governors of Washington, New York, and Michigan for their
caring for coronavirus patients, many businesses were shut-
handling of COVID-19, while praising Florida’s Republican
tered and their employees furloughed. The situation—the
governor (Montanaro, 2020). In April, when groups showed
virus itself and the concomitant impact—was often described
as unprecedented (Brown, 2020). Most Americans looked to
1Texas A&M University, College Station, USA
the public sector for ameliorative action.
Initially President Donald Trump eschewed a leading
Corresponding Author:
Ann O’M. Bowman, Bush School of Government and Public Service,
role for the national government, leaving much policy space
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA.
in which governors could act. Although he created the White
Email: annbowman@tamu.edu
552
American Review of Public Administration 50(6-7)
up at some state capitols to protest gubernatorially imposed
and solutions. The governor is often considered a crisis man-
social distancing restrictions, the president encouraged them,
ager, a role that Ferguson (2018) contends has increased in
tweeting “Liberate Michigan” and “Liberate Minnesota”
importance over time.
(Shear & Mervosh, 2020). And on the issue of reopening the
economy, the president made the constitutionally suspect
Intergovernmental Relations During
claim that is was he who had total authority to order states to
reopen, not governors (Naylor, 2020). Clearly, the executive
COVID-19
leadership of the two levels of government did not necessar-
The coronavirus pandemic did not affect states and their
ily move in a coordinated or even complementary way.
localities at the same time or with the same intensity. The
After a brief review of U.S. intergovernmental relations
World Health Organization (WHO) declared a global
and the governorship, we discuss the coronavirus case. The
health emergency at the end of December 2019 as cases
actions taken by governors throughout the country are then
spread from China to other parts of Asia and into Europe.
examined. In the penultimate section, a closer look is given
The first case of COVID-19 in the United States was
to two states—Texas and Pennsylvania—to explore the
reported in Washington state in January 2020, involving an
state–local government connection. The concluding section
individual who had traveled to Wuhan, China where the
reflects on what can be learned about public sector manage-
outbreak originated. The first U.S. case of community
ment from this disruptive 2-month period.
transmission of the disease was reported in February 2020
in California; the first death in the country was reported in
State Governments in the U.S. Federal
late February in Washington at which time the state’s gov-
System
ernor proclaimed a state of emergency. Other governors
quickly followed suit with state of emergency orders for
The U.S. Constitution established a federal system of gov-
their own states.
ernment for the United States, one that divides power and
In the middle of March, President Trump announced a
functions between a central government and state govern-
national emergency, by then WHO had declared the corona-
ments. The line separating the domains of the two planes of
virus a pandemic. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
government is not clearly drawn and the distribution of those
Prevention (CDC) issued guidelines recommending that no
powers and functions is often a matter of dispute. However,
gatherings of 50 or more people be held in the United States
the federal system has survived significant crises and has
for an 8-week period, triggering a wave of cancelations of
proven to be resilient and adaptable. Most federalism schol-
weddings, festivals, concerts, sporting events, and confer-
ars would agree that the U.S. federal system has become
ences scheduled for the spring. Seattle had been the first big-
more nation-centered over time, but there remains significant
city school district to close its schools in early March; within
authority and responsibility at the state level (see Bednar,
2 weeks, the governors of most states had ordered their
2009; Bowman & Krause, 2003; Kincaid, 2019).
states’ public schools closed. Initially these orders were for a
As polities in the U.S. federal system, states can be
limited duration but, as conditions worsened, decisions were
expected to act in a self-interested manner, pursuing opportu-
made to keep schools closed through the academic year.
nities and resisting obstacles. This pursuit of self-interest
As these events unfolded and the coronavirus spread,
puts states on a path that inevitably intersects with other
increasing the number of confirmed cases and deaths, another
states. These intersecting paths may lead to cooperation
issue began to gain traction: the economic impact of COVID-
when working together is perceived to be mutually benefi-
19. Economic issues grew out of the significant loss of jobs
cial (Florestano, 1994; Zimmerman, 2012); however, com-
in small businesses and sectors such as tourism, and accord-
petition and conflict may result as each state vies for desired
ingly, high rates of unemployment. On March 27 the presi-
but scarce resources (Crain, 2003).
dent signed the US$2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Governors of the U.S. states have evolved from the early
Economic Security (CARES) Act. Beside stimulus payments
20th century when the offices...
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