Loyalty or Competence: Political Use of Performance Information and Negativity Bias

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13108
• Date: 01 November 2019
• Author: Sounman Hong,Youngrok Kim
• Published date: 01 November 2019

Research Article

Loyalty or Competence: Political Use of Performance Information and Negativity Bias 829

Abstract: This article explores how political principals weigh loyalty and competence in public personnel decisions.

Exploiting the abrupt shift in political leadership following the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye of Korea, the

authors examine how the newly elected president made the decision to retain or dismiss 118 agency heads appointed

by the previous administration. The evidence shows the importance of loyalty in managerial survival: those who had

a political patronage relationship with the ousted president were less likely to survive in the new administration.

However, the authors also demonstrate the relevance of competence, as measured by the outcomes of agency performance

evaluation. Further, the article shows the existence of negativity bias: the punishment for low performance is greater

than the reward for high performance. Finally, the authors provide support for the idea that political principals reward

loyalists, but only if they show acceptable levels of competence.

Evidence for Practice

• This study explores how political principals weigh loyalty and competence in public personnel decisions.

• Political principals’ punishment for low performance is greater than their rewards for good performance.

• Political principals reward loyalists, but only if they show acceptable levels of competence.

• The availability of performance information may protect bureaucratic expertise from political opportunism.

Sounman Hong

Youngrok Kim

Yonsei University

Loyalty or Competence: Political Use of Performance

Information and Negativity Bias

Scholars tend to agree that the power of

selection, retention, promotion, and dismissal

of public managers is one of the most valuable

instruments of political principals (i.e., the president

or prime minister in a parliamentary system) for

influencing the bureaucracy. However, studies report

differing results as to how political principals, and

elected officials more broadly, exercise this important

power. Specifically, scholars have divergent views

about how loyalty is weighed against competence.

Some studies report the triumph of loyalty over

competence (Bach and Veit 2017; Moynihan and

Roberts 2010). Indeed, a political principal may

choose loyalists who can actively promote and

advance his or her political philosophy and missions

in key bureaucratic posts (Moe 1982; Wood and

Waterman 1994). However, other studies report the

importance of competence or other meritocratic

criteria (Boyne et al. 2010b; Hollibaugh, Horton, and

Lewis 2014; Lewis 2008).

Collectively, these findings suggest that elected

officials consider both political and meritocratic

selection criteria in their personnel decisions. Research

indicates that political principals select individuals on

the basis of political criteria (e.g., loyalty, ideology,

and programmatic support) to enhance responsiveness

and control, whereas they emphasize meritocratic

criteria (e.g., expertise, experience, and performance)

to improve the technical capacity of the organization

(Hollibaugh 2014; Moe 1985). The literature,

however, does not clarify how political principals and

elected officials balance these two sets of criteria. This

is especially important because principals’ demands

for “political preferment” and “technical competence”

generally clash (Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran

1999; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Heclo 1988; Wood

and Waterman 1991).1 Thus, we ask, How do

political principals weigh competing information on

loyalty and competence in the selection, retention,

promotion, and dismissal of public managers? The

lack of scholarly attention to this question represents

a serious gap in the literature given the increasing

politicization of public service, especially at the top

level of management (e.g., Ennser-Jedenastik 2015;

Rutherford and Lozano 2018).

To contribute to this line of scholarly discussion, this

article examines how political principals consider

political and meritocratic criteria when they decide to

retain or dismiss heads of public agencies. In doing

so, we propose a model in which political principals

reward the most loyal agents (or the least disloyal, as

we explain later), but only if their measured levels of

Youngrok Kim is a graduate student

at Yonsei University in South Korea.

Youngrok holds a master of public

administration degree from Yonsei

University and a bachelor’s degree in

psychology and public service from Chung-

ang University. Youngrok is interested in

political psychology, behavioral public

administration, public finance, and public

management.

E-mail: gof81373@naver.com

Sounman Hong is Underwood

Distinguished Professor at Yonsei University

in South Korea. His research focuses on

bureaucratic control, innovation, and

reform and how to achieve a more efficient,

responsive, and accountable public

administration. He holds master of public

policy and doctoral degrees from Harvard

University and a bachelor’s degree from

Yonsei University.

E-mail: sounman_hong@yonsei.ac.kr

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 79, Iss. 6, pp. 829–840. © 2019 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13108.