Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell Jr.

• Publication year: 2000

Local Government Lawby R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*

The arresting officer established the case and the Defendant, sensing the inevitability of his plight, entered a plea of guilty. The City Court Judge, a compassionate man, . . . began his routine of delivering a short lecture on the evils of alcohol.... "Now you see, John, this . . . is a perfect example of what happens when you start drinking. You go out, you get drunk, you get behind the wheel, and here you are severely injured. By the way, what's your prognosis?"

It was apparent . . . that [the Defendant] considered the Judge's question to be of utmost importance. However, it was also evident that the Defendant had no idea what he was being asked. After a lengthy silence, while the Defendant considered all the ramifications of his possible responses, he looked the Judge square in the eye and said: "Baptist?"¹

Some believe that the "law" of local government, both decisional and statutory, frequently hinges upon issues of denominational significance.

I. Municipalities

A. Annexation

The survey period featured the first litigated appearance of a 1998 statute authorizing a county to impose a "bona fide land use classifica- tion objection" to a proposed municipal annexation.² Baker v. City of Marietta³ presented a trial court's decisions that the county had insufficiently invoked the statute⁴ and that the statute itself was unconstitutional.⁵ On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held the trial judge's first decision to render his second decision ineffective.⁶ The court reasoned as follows:

When the trial court turned its attention to the petition for declaratory judgment, it had already resolved the controversy between the county and the city on the annexation and rezoning of the 16-acre parcel at issue by ruling that the county commission chairman's objection, endorsed by the county commission prior to the entry of final judgment, was not sufficient to invoke the procedure which required resolution of county-city disputes about annexation prior to the annexation being effective.⁷

Accordingly, the court concluded, "there no longer existed an 'actual controversy' between the city and county regarding the contested annexation and re-zoning," and "the trial court could not enter a declaratory judgment" of unconstitutionality.⁸

B. Dissolution

In 1993, the Georgia General Assembly provided an additional method for dissolving municipal corporations via a procedure for identifying "inactive municipalities" as those failing to provide at least three of eleven enumerated services, failing to hold at least six council meetings per year, and failing to hold regular elections.⁹ Automatically repealing the charters of municipalities so identified on July 1, 1995, the statute also empowered any citizen to bring thereafter an action for "a declaration of the dissolution of the municipal corporation."¹⁰

City of Lithia Springs v. Turley¹¹ presented a citizen effort under the statute to dissolve a municipality allegedly failing to provide the requisite services.¹² Although finding that the city provided "road and street construction or maintenance"¹³ services, the trial court declared municipal-county contracts for other services unlawful¹⁴ and issued an order of dissolution.¹⁵ On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed: The court denied that the contracts clearly constituted illegal "gratuities"¹⁶ and also found triable issues of fact on other disputed services.¹⁷ Accordingly, the court vacated the order of dissolution and reversed summary judgment against the municipality.¹⁸

C. Officers and Employees

A focused issue of "duty" and the question of compensable "injury" under workers' compensation constituted matters of concern to municipal officers and employees during the survey period. Oglethorpe Development Group, Inc. v. Coleman¹⁹ featured an effort to mandamus the mayor's placement on the city commission's meeting agenda of a developer's presentation of a feasibility study for operating the municipal civic center.²⁰ Rejecting that effort, the supreme court observed that plaintiff had failed to counter the mayor's evidence that he "had no duty or authority to set the agenda for the Commissioners' meetings."²¹ The court emphasized that a "mandamus will not [be] issue[d] to compel an officer to perform acts not within his official powers or duties."²²

In Columbus Fire Department /Columbus Consolidated Government v. Ledford,²³ the court of appeals affirmed an administrative law judge's denial of a municipal firefighter's "post-traumatic stress" claim for workers' compensation benefits.²⁴ Emphasizing its "any evidence" standard of review,²⁵ the court agreed that the claimant had failed to satisfy the condition that "his psychological problems arose out of an accident in which a compensable physical injury was sustained."²⁶ In fact, the court observed: "[I]t is undisputed that on . . . the date of the purported accident," a panic attack during a survival training session, the claimant "did not sustain any physical injury."²⁷ Accordingly, the court reversed the trial judge's reversal of the administrative law judge's decision.²⁸

D. Elections

The municipal mayor's election attracted challenge in Holton v. Hollingsworth,²⁹ an attack upon the validity of a vote cast by a convicted felon who had completed his sentence but failed to reregister to vote.³⁰ Although rejecting the attack, the supreme court conceded that a convicted felon could not vote or remain registered to vote while serving his sentence.³¹ Nevertheless, the court asserted, "a person who loses his status as a registered voter does not have to sign his name again before the registrars may lawfully restore his name to the list of registered voters."³² Consequently, the convicted felon "did not have to 'reregister' once he completed his sentence," and his vote was valid.³³

E. Powers

Municipalities confronted charges of bad faith and impropriety in an assortment of power contexts. City of Marietta v. Edwards³⁴ presented such a charge against the municipality's condemnation of property it had sold to the condemnees only three months earlier.³⁵ Plaintiffs claimed that they were misled during the sales proceeding and that the city had exercised its condemnation power in bad faith.³⁶ Reviewing the evidence, the supreme court viewed assurances by the city's sales facilitator to show "at most, that the [c]ity's condemnation plans were uncertain, changing, and inaccurately communicated during the course of . . . [the] sales transaction."³⁷ That evidence, the court asserted, "does not show bad faith in the subsequent condemnation," for it does not reveal "'conscious wrongdoing motivated by improper interest or will.'"³⁸

The court of appeals also turned a deaf ear to charges of condemnation improprieties in City of Griffin v. McKemie.³⁹ There, the municipality filed a petition to condemn plaintiffs' land for a sewer line but later (when the award exceeded the city's appraisal) abandoned the condemnation and redesigned its sewer system.⁴⁰ The court rejected plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the Georgia Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Act⁴¹ because no federal funds financed the city's sewer project.⁴² As for plaintiffs' remaining statutory authority for attorney fees, the court held '"there must be some evidence of improper conduct.'"⁴³ Yet, the trial judge's order revealed "only that the City made an economic decision to abandon the proceedings, a decision which is not the equivalent of improper conduct."⁴⁴

Providing a distinctive contrast in settings, Pyle v. City of Cedar-town⁴⁵ arose from the municipality's disposition of a cemetery lot. In conveying to her stepson the title to her late husband's lot, plaintiff charged that the city had acted fraudulently and with the intent of inflicting emotional distress.⁴⁶ Once again, the court could not find sufficient municipal culpability.⁴⁷ On the charge of fraud, the evidence revealed neither misrepresentation nor deception by the municipal agent.⁴⁸ Similarly, the court held that a mere breach of municipal duty did not rise to intentional infliction of emotional distress:⁴⁹

Even assuming the City breached its duty to [plaintiff] by transferring title to her husband's burial plot to her stepson, "[u]nder these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment . . . and leave him to exclaim '[o]utrageous!'"⁵⁰ °

F. Regulation

The Georgia Supreme Court passed upon the municipal exercise of regulatory power in the contexts of historic districting, alcoholic beverage sales, and the suppression of litter.⁵¹ In City of Dalton v. Carrol,⁵² the court rejected a plea in laches against municipal enforcement of historic district requirements.⁵³ Because the city did not discover until five months later that the landowner's predecessor in title had erected a metal carport in the historic district, "it was the failure of . . . [the] predecessor-in-title to seek the required building permit that caused the delay between the illegal construction in December and the city's discovery of it in May."⁵⁴ Consequently, the court reasoned, "the city was not responsible for any prejudice that [the landowner] suffered due to the five-month delay in enforcement."⁵⁵

The court likewise sided with the local government in Dickerson v. Augusta-Richmond County Commission,⁵⁶ an action to mandamus the issuance of a license to retail off-premises beer and wine.⁵⁷ Although the convenience store had operated under a license for thirty years prior to plaintiff's purchase of the establishment, the court denied the request for mandamus.⁵⁸ Observing the objections offered at the license hearing⁵⁹ and the government's stated reasons for its denial,⁶⁰ the court upheld the decision as "based on specific, objective criteria set forth in the . . . Code."⁶¹ '"Each licensing request is unique,'" the court...