Do lay people prepare both sides of an argument? The effects of confidence, forewarning, and expected interaction on seeking out counter-attitudinal information.

• Author: Turner, Monique Mitchell
• Position: Report

DO LAY PEOPLE PREPARE BOTH SIDES OF AN ARGUMENT? THE EFFECTS OF CONFIDENCE, FOREWARNING, AND EXPECTED INTERACTION ON SEEKING OUT COUNTER-ATTITUDINAL INFORMATION

Debaters consider it axiomatic that in order to argue effectively people must research all sides of an issue. In fact, studies suggest that persuasive messages presenting two sides of an issue are more effective than messages only presenting one side of an argument (Allen, 1991; O'Keefe, 1999). Although debaters are trained in effective ways to research and present all sides of an issue (Kuhn, 2005), lay arguers are not (typically) formally trained in such methods (Kuhn, 1991). Even worse, selective exposure research suggests that lay arguers might not want to search out counter-attitudinal information. People often purposely avoid information that they disagree with or that distresses them (Turner, Rimal, Morrison & Kim, 2006). This is unfortunate; information that is clearly biased in favor of one's own initial attitude can be risky. At best, searching out only pro-attitudinal information leaves individuals uninformed; at worst, it leaves people unaware of potential dangers, warnings, or salient information about a given issue (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Moreover, biased information search processes, such as selective exposure, lead to belief maintenance whether the position is justified on the basis of the existing information or not (Jonas et al., 2001).

The focus of this experiment is to examine the conditions under which people are likely to examine information that is counter-attitudinal. Participants were led to believe that they would be either writing an argumentative piece to the editor of a school newspaper or that they would be arguing (i.e., debating) with another participant face to face. Prior to the interaction or letter writing, participants were allowed to read and study articles (as many as they chose) that represented either side of the issue. Our central interest is in the factors precluding individuals' decision to examine information inconsistent with their opinion.

SELECTIVE EXPOSURE

According to Zillmann and Bryant (1985), selective exposure is the decision to avoid information that is inharmonious with one's own views or to only expose oneself to information consistent with one's pre-established viewpoints. Selective exposure to information was first investigated by Feather (1963) in a study regarding exposure to either consistent or inconsistent (what he termed dissonant or consonant) lung cancer information by smokers and non-smokers. Feather's data indicated that smokers were more interested in information about smoking than were non-smokers. Brock (1965) conducted a similar study whereby half of the participants were instructed to indicate their message preferences, and the other half were instructed that they would actually be reading the selected messages. Their results revealed that when participants believed they would be reading the information, they chose consonant information, whereas this selective exposure effect did not emerge when participants did not think they would have to actually read the message. Also, Sweeney and Gruber (1984) presented evidence showing that interest and attention to the Watergate hearings were highest among McGovern supporters and lowest among Nixon's supporters. Cappella, Turow and Jamieson's (1996) data revealed that 70 percent of Limbaugh's listeners were conservative. These aforementioned studies each provide evidence as to when people will selectively avoid information, but we extend this rationale to when people will selectively expose themselves to information prior to developing an argument.

With regard to understanding the strategies of lay (i.e., informal) arguers, Kuhn's work has been seminal (Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997; Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Kuhn, Weinstock, & Flaton, 1994). Kuhn and her colleagues have established that, generally speaking, lay people are unsophisticated in their arguing skills. Kuhn's (1991) study of lay people's ability to develop a case for their theories underlying their thinking indicated that some argumentation skills, like counter-arguing, are not likely to be performed. Felton and Kuhn's (2001) study of teenagers' dialogue about capital punishment showed that teens focused on supporting their own arguments and avoided addressing the arguments of their opponent. But these studies do not illuminate why people avoid counter-attitudinal information.

According to Atkin (1985) exposure to information is based on a cost-benefit analysis on the part of the receiver. Content is selected when the receiver perceives that the reward value of the message outweighs the costs of receiving the message. Exposing oneself to messages has inherent cost factors including time and mental effort. In addition, there are psychological costs such as guilty feelings or irritation from discrepant (i.e., inconsistent with pre-established attitude) messages. Therefore, people must perceive that the benefits gained from the message outweigh these negative feelings. In fact, if the costs outweigh the benefits, people might engage in passive avoidance of counter-attitudinal information (Zuwerink-Jacks & Cameron, 2003).

There are several factors motivating information seeking (Turner et al., 2006). These motivations serve as potential benefits message receivers gain from exposure (Atkin, 1985). Learning is a one such motivation. Studies have indicated that people self-report that they watch certain television programs (e.g., news) because of the informational value (Rubin, 1981). So, if individuals perceive that their need to learn information outweighs the costs of looking into discrepant information, they will be more likely to seek out counter-attitudinal information. A second motivation, according to Atkin, is communication. People will acquire information to build a repertoire of conversational material (Rubin, 1981, 1983). A final motivation for selective exposure is reinforcement. People seek out information to reinforce their opinions. In other words, if people believe they have much to learn and that learning another side of an argument will facilitate communication, they will be more likely to look at the opposing side of an issue. If the need to reinforce one's own side, perhaps because one lacks confidence in one's own knowledge, is more pertinent then the motivation to look at counter-attitudinal information will decrease. We expand on these ideas subsequently.

Atkin's (1985) ideas on motivation underscore the observation that motivation serves as a critical variable in much of the research in persuasion. Borrowing from dual processing models (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981), we posit that when people are motivated to seek out counter-attitudinal information, they will be more likely to do so (1). Dual process models posit that the likelihood of receivers processing information systematically versus heuristically depends upon their motivation (and ability); when people lack either, the likelihood of systematic processing decreases (Chaiken, 1980; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Similarly, we propose that lay arguers must also be motivated to seek out another point of view on a topic, especially a view they disagree with. If people are sufficiently motivated to seek out counter-attitudinal information they will be more likely to do so (holding ability constant).

MOTIVATION TO SEEK OUT COUNTER-ATTITUDINAL INFORMATION

As previously mentioned, individuals often seek information to reinforce their current cognitions. This motivation is exacerbated in certain conditions. For example, people will seek reinforcing information when they have a securely held belief. In such cases, they might find agreeable messages comforting. Also, if people are genuinely uncertain or unconfident about the correctness of their beliefs or attitudes they will seek information that validates them (Atkin, 1985; Berkowitz, 1968; Freedman & Sears, 1965). Canon (1964) found that self-confidence moderates the selective exposure effect. A number of conclusions can be drawn from this research. It is argued here that confidence and expected interaction will interact to impact selective exposure of counter-attitudinal information.

Confidence and Expected Interaction

Lay arguers tend to engage in arguing in social situations. When individuals anticipate a social encounter, communicative and functional goals are particularly salient. Expected interaction regards knowing that in the future one will interact with, and exchange information with, another individual. Clarke and James (1967) argued that the anticipated use for information interacts with self-esteem to affect the need to seek confirming information. Clarke and James' participants prepared for either a debate or an informal discussion. The findings showed that the type of situation interacted with the participants' self-esteem: In the informal discussion condition, people with a high self-esteem sought more supportive information. However, in the debate condition participants with low self-esteem, relative to those with high self-esteem, asked for more supportive information. The researchers concluded that individuals with a low self-esteem predicted that they would only make a "modest contribution" (p. 243) and therefore were not compelled to prepare. High selfesteem participants, however, may have planned to be actively involved in the conversation and gathered information to bolster their participation. But in the debate condition, participants with a low self-esteem could not avoid participating in the interaction and consequently "their lack of confidence would lead them to prefer reinforcing information" (p. 243). Participants with a high self-esteem, on the contrary, may have wanted to enhance their status in the debate by showing a level of expertise in the opposing viewpoints and would thus...