Law, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Perspectives

DOI10.1177/0002716205284197
Date01 January 2006
Published date01 January 2006
Subject MatterArticles
10.1177/0002716205284197THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYQUICK READ SYNOPSIS: LAW, SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY January 2006603
QUICK READ SYNOPSIS
Law, Society, and Democracy:
Comparative Perspectives
Special Editor: RICHARD E. D. SCHWARTZ
Yale Law School
Volume 603, January 2006
Prepared by Herb Fayer, Jerry Lee Foundation
DOI: 10.1177/0002716205284197
I. THE RULE OF LAW: WHAT ISIT?
Democracy and Equality
Robert Post, Yale Law School
This article closely examines the meaning of democracy and discusses the logi-
cal and practical connections between it and various forms of equality.
Democratic forms of government are those in which the laws are made by
the same people to whom they apply.
In autocratic forms of government the lawmakers are different from those to
whom the laws are addressed.
The question is, What is the relationship between autonomous forms of gov-
ernment and equality?
What does it mean for a form of government to be autonomous?
Democracy is not the same thing as popular sovereignty because a people
can decide to enact antidemocratic rules.
Nor is democracy equivalent to majoritarianism, in which the majority of the
people exercise control over their government.
NOTE: These examples suggest that popular sovereignty and majoritarianism
may be intimately associated with the practice of democracy, but they them-
selves do not define democracy. We can coherently speak of enactments of
popular sovereignty or of majorities that are antidemocratic.
Democracy refers to the values associated with collective self-determination.
Governments do not become democratic merely because they hold elec-
tions in which majorities govern.
292 ANNALS, AAPSS, 603, January 2006
Background
Autonomy
Democracy
Q
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It is a mistake to confusedemocracy with particular decision-making proce-
dures and to fail to identify the core values that democracy as a form of gov-
ernment seeks to represent.
The values of autonomy are essential to democracy—values associated with
the practice of self-determination.
Self-determination is more than making decisions or electing those who make
decisions.
The practice of self-government requires that a people have the warranted
conviction that they are engaged in the process of governing themselves.
Self-determination turns on the difference between making particular deci-
sions and recognizing particular decisions as one’s own. It is about the
authorship of decisions.
Collective decision making is democratic when there is a connection
between the particular wills of individual citizens and the collective will of
the state.
When citizens feel alienated from the general will, voting on issues is
merely a mechanism for decision making, a mechanism that can easily
turn oppressive and undemocratic.
The value of democracy can be fulfilled only if there isa continual media-
tion between collective self-determination and the self-determination of
individual citizens.
Democracy requires that citizens experience their government as their
own and responsive to their own values and ideas.
The First Amendment protects democracy by safeguarding the communica-
tive processes by which citizens seek to construct an uncoerced agreement
that is responsive to their views.
Citizens are free to engage in public discourse so as to make the state respon-
sive to their ideas and values.
Modern democracies must regard their citizens, insofar as they engage in
public discourse, as equal and autonomous persons.
It is the essence of democracy to replace the unilateral respect of authority
by the mutual respect of autonomous wills.
Democracy requires that persons be treated equally insofar as they are auton-
omous participants in the process of self-government.
Democracy must regard each citizen as an autonomous, self-determining
person, at least insofar as is relevant to maintaining a living identification
with the self-government of the state.
The purpose of communication within public discourse is to empower citi-
zens to participate in ways that will permit them to believe that public opin-
ion will potentially respond to their views.
If the state too closely regulates when and how a person may speak, speech
may lose its ability to mediate between individual and collective self-
determination.
The equality required by democracy can easily be experienced as thin and for-
mal, in contrast with the robust forms of substantive equality associated with
theories of distributive justice.
QUICK READ SYNOPSIS: LAW, SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY 293
Q
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Self-
Determination
First
Amendment
Democracy
Democratic
Legitimacy
Much depends on our understanding of the logic of democratic legitimacy.
This logic requires that citizens be treated equally with respect to the
requirements of autonomous participation in the practice of self-
government.
Democracy presupposes an equality measured in terms of the autonomous
agency required by democratic legitimacy.
As democracy is a form of government committed to self-determination,
democracy must also encompass self-determination about the meaning of the
moral equality of citizens.
A democracy will decide the meaning of moral equality in the context of
public discussion and debate.
Advocates of strong egalitarian principles regard debate as offering inade-
quate protection for distributive justice because they believe the judgment
of citizens may be distorted by prejudice and bias.
Democracy and strong egalitarian principles do not have to be in opposition
to each other.
Strong egalitarian principles may have significant democracy-reinforcing
effects.
Systematic violation of these principles may sometimes lead to the failure
of democratic legitimacy—democracy requires only that inequities that
undermine democratic legitimacy be ameliorated.
NOTE: Inequities need not be resolved for reasons of fairness or distributive
justice but simply because such inequities undermine democratic legitimacy.
The unsettling implication of the above reasoning is that democracy is quite
compatible with important forms of status subordination, as long as these
forms of subordination are not experienced by citizens as alienating.
At the time that disempowering of women was accepted, democracy did not
require that this subordination be ended.
Democracy requires self-determination by the people, but it does not itself
define who the people are.
Insofar as egalitarian norms developed that made the disempowerment of
women alienating, precluding the identification of citizens with the general
will of the state, democratic arguments emerged for ending this status sub-
ordination. This suggests that strong egalitarian principles are in a dynamic
and dialectical relationship to democracy.
As egalitarian principles become politically salient, as they make inequities
visible and oppressive, as they create alienation, they prepare the way for
democracy-based arguments for amelioration of inequities.
Thus democracy and strongegalitarian principles are intimately related.
Democracy does not entail these principles but is itself affected by them
because it must reckon with the threats to democratic legitimacy gener-
ated by these principles.
Democracy is in this sense tightly connected to egalitarian commitments.
Democracy and equality are bound in an indissoluble knot, mutually rein-
forcing and mutually antagonistic.
294 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
Moral
Equality
The
Implication
Q
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