Labor's Political Role
| Published date | 01 March 1951 |
| Date | 01 March 1951 |
| DOI | 10.1177/000271625127400116 |
| Author | Jack Kroll |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
118
Labor’s
Political
Role
By
JACK
KROLL
M OST
discussions
of
labor’s
role
in
politics
are
based
on
certain
as-
sumptions
which,
for
the
most
part,
are
the
result
of
carefully
nurtured
preju-
dices
or
misinformation.
The
correc-
tion
of
these
basic
errors
is
therefore
necessarily
preliminary
to
the
discus-
sion
of
labor
in
politics.
ERRORS
CORRECTED
Unions,
except
for
those
on
the
ex-
treme
fringes,
do
not
seek
to
&dquo;take
over&dquo;
established
political
parties,
nor
do
they
seek
to
use
political
parties
as
the
instruments
for
the
propagation
of
strange
and
new
social
doctrines.
The
notion
that
they
do
has
been
useful
to
those
who
oppose
labor’s
participation
in
politics
in
any
degree.
It
is
fostered
as
a
bugaboo
to
enlist
the
support
of
the
nonlabor
community
and
to
drive
a
wedge
between
the
party
politician
and
the labor
union
official
who
may
com-
monly
seek
the
election
of
a
particular
candidate.
Whatever
the
reasons
for
past
partici-
pation
by
labor
as
an
organized
group
in
national
and
state
elections,
labor’s
current
participation
in
politics
stems
largely
from
1924
when
a
large
number
of
unions
endorsed
the
candidacy
of
Senator
Robert
M.
LaFollette
of
Wis-
consin
for
the
Presidency.
It
was
the
first
move
in
the
political
field
by
unions
now
in
existence,
and
stemmed
from
the
postwar
rise
of
organized
labor.
More
recently
the
impetus
has
come
from
the
passage
by
recent
Congresses
of
antilabor
legislation.
The
first
of
such
measures
was
the
Smith-Connally
Act
of
1943,
which
was
passed
over
President
Roosevelt’s
veto.
It
intro-
duced
new
rules
into
the
labor-manage-
ment
relationship
for
the
first
time
since
1935
when
the
National
Labor
Relations
Act
was
passed,
and
contained
a
num-
ber
of
features
which
severely
limited
functions
which
organized
labor
re-
garded
as
legitimate.
More
important
than
the
act
itself
were
the
preliminary
versions
which
revealed
the
intent
of
a
well-organized
group
to
&dquo;get&dquo;
labor
via
the
legislative
route.
In
the
period
between
1944
and
1946
numerous
attempts
were
made
to
im-
pose
further
restrictive
legislation.
The
frontal
assault
was
the
so-called
Case
bill,
while
secondary
attacks
were
made
through
the
scuttling
of
appropriations
for
essential
Labor
Department
func-
tions
and
amendment
of
existing
stat-
utes.
The
elections
of
1946
produced
the
Eightieth
Congress,
and
the
Eightieth
Congress
produced
the
Taft-Hartley
law,
which,
propaganda
to
the
contrary
notwithstanding,
drastically
hampers
the
ability
of
labor
organizations
ade-
quately
to
fight
for
the
rights
of
their
members,
and
imposes
upon
unions
and
management
alike
an
unnecessary
and
unwarranted
burden
of
legalism.
In
a
period
of
anything
less
than
full
employ-
ment,
it
remains
a
weapon
that
can
dis-
rupt
and
destroy
the
trade
union.
It
was
the
Taft-Hartley
Act, against
the
background
of
previous
legislative
assaults
on
labor
organizations,
that
made
the
trade
union
member,
the
sec-
ondary
leadership
of
the
trade
union
movement,
and
the
more
conservative
old-line
trade
union
officials
conscious
of
the
necessity
for
political
action.
A
second
basic
assumption
generally
made
and
in
need
of
correction
is
the
notion
that
labor
seeks
through
politics
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