Labor Law - Stephen W. Mooney and Leigh Lawson Reeves

• Publication year: 1999

Labor Lawby Stephen W. Mooney*and

Leigh Lawson Reeves**

I. Introduction

This Article surveys the 1998 decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that addressed issues in the areas of traditional labor law. This article specifically discusses decisions by the Eleventh Circuit under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"),¹ the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),² the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"),³ and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").⁴ As in the years past, the Eleventh Circuit decided several cases that involved issues of interest in the area of traditional labor law. Due to page limitations, however, this Article cannot survey every relevant case. Thus, this Article focuses upon only the noteworthy cases and the cases of first impression decided by the Eleventh Circuit in 1998.

II. The Labor Management Relations Act

A. Preemption of State Law Claims for Assault, Battery, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In Peterson v. BMI Refractories,⁵ the main legal issue addressed by the Eleventh Circuit was whether section 301(a) of the LMRA prevented former employees' state law tort claims.⁶ In this case, the Eleventh Circuit held the LMRA did not preempt the state law claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.⁷

Plaintiffs were black males employed as laborers at BMFs Birmingham, Alabama facility. Both men were members of the Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. During the period of plaintiffs' employment, the union and BMI were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that contained a grievance and arbitration procedure.⁸

Giangrosso, a white supervisor, was a major source of racial hostility against plaintiffs in their workplace. The racial problems were not simply limited to verbal abuse. Eventually, they escalated to the level of violence and physical intimidation, including an incident when a black laborer was kicked by a white brick mason and another incident when, in Giangrosso's presence, the same brick mason threatened to throw one of plaintiffs off of a fifty foot scaffold. Giangrosso's only response was laughter.⁹

The situation came to a head when plaintiffs returned from lunch one day and found a pallet of gunnite bags had been overturned near where they had been working. When one of the plaintiffs leaned over to pick up the bags, he was kicked from behind by Giangrosso. Later, during that same shift, Giangrosso told plaintiffs to get in his truck with him. Then, Giangrosso pulled a nine millimeter pistol out of the glove box and pointed the gun in one of the plaintiff's general direction while saying, "[Y]ou see this here, well, I just wanted you to see it, that's all." Following this incident, plaintiffs returned to the job site, received their final paychecks, and were fired. The reason given to plaintiffs was that Giangrosso said they were no longer needed.¹⁰

The following day, plaintiffs went to their union office to file a grievance in the matter. However, the union representative informed plaintiffs that the union would not involve itself with their grievances, even though the collective bargaining agreement contained articles that addressed both nondiscrimination and grievances.¹¹

This action originally was filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. BMI removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama and moved for summary judgment on all counts. The magistrate judge assigned to the case issued a report recommending that BMI's motion be granted on all counts. The district court entered an order granting BMI's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action in all respects without prejudice. In entering its findings, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations, but also determined that the state law tort claims were preempted by the LMRA. Plaintiffs then filed a timely notice of appeal.¹²

Plaintiffs contended the district court erred in finding that their state law claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. Section 301(a) provides that suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization may be brought in any district court having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties.¹³

The Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the section 301(a) preemption issue focused on whether the state tort claims '"confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.'"¹⁴ The court analyzed the elements of each challenged state law claim to determine whether the claims required an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.¹⁵

The Eleventh Circuit first examined the state law claims for assault and battery.¹⁶ Here, the court rejected BMI's contention that adjudication of the merits of the claims required an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.¹⁷ Instead, the court said the inquiry was purely factual in nature and did not turn on any interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.¹⁸ Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs' "right to be free from assault and battery rests firmly on a nonnegotiable state right."¹⁹ Thus, section 301(a) of the LMRA did not preempt plaintiffs' state law claims for assault and battery.²⁰

The Eleventh Circuit also found the state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by the LMRA.²¹ Here, however, the court recognized that analysis of an employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress could foreseeably require interpretation of an employment contract or a collective bargaining agreement.²² Nevertheless, the court found that the employer's conduct in the instant case was so extreme and outrageous that examination of the collective bargaining agreement was unnecessary because BMI's conduct could not be arguably sanctioned by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.²³ Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held plaintiffs' state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA.²⁴

B. Preemption of State Law Claim for Tortious Interference with Employment

The case of Turner v. American Federation of Teachers Local 1565²⁵ also examined the preemption of a state law claim by the LMRA. However, in this case, the Eleventh Circuit found the former employee's state law claim for tortious interference with employment was preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA.²⁶

Here, plaintiff had been employed as a field representative by the American Federation of Teachers Local 1565 ("AFT"). Her employment contract with AFT was governed by the collective bargaining agreement between AFT and the Atlanta Staff Union ("ASU"). In 1995 the president of AFT fired plaintiff for insubordination and involvement in internal political activity.²⁷

Plaintiff filed suit against AFT in Georgia Superior Court, alleging tortious interference with employment. She also alleged a violation of the terms and conditions of her employment contract and defamation. AFT removed the case to federal district court on the grounds that the case involved a federal question, specifically, preemption by the LMRA. After AFT moved for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment for AFT on the contract claim. Similarly, the district court also granted AFT summary judgment on the tortious interference with employment claim because there was no interference by one who was a stranger to the employment relationship. Plaintiff appealed the district court's rulings on summary judgment of both the tortious interference with employment claim and the contract claim.²⁸

The Eleventh Circuit declined to follow the district court's decision to resolve the tortious interference with employment claim under Georgia law.²⁹ Rather, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether resolution of the state law claim for tortious interference with employment turned on an interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.³⁰

The Eleventh Circuit noted this circuit has not addressed this issue directly, but that other circuits have ruled tortious interference with employment claims necessarily require an examination of the terms of the relevant collective bargaining agreement.³¹ Therefore, these circuits have held tortious interference with employment claims are preempted by the LMRA.³²

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit found plaintiff's state law claim for tortious interference with employment required an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement.³³ In plaintiff's case, analysis of the collective bargaining agreement was particularly important because her tortious interference claim rested solely on the theory of wrongful discharge. Therefore, interpretation of whether the collective bargaining agreement's terms precluded such action was paramount. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit found plaintiff's state law claim for tortious interference with employment was preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA.³⁴

III. The National Labor Relations Act

A. Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) Unfair Labor Practices Violations

In National Labor Relations Board v. McClain of Georgia, Inc. ,³⁵ the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of what is, and what is not, considered to be an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the NLRA.³⁶ Specifically, the court addressed whether the employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) when it suddenly changed to a "zero tolerance" employee drug testing policy from its previous position of leniency shortly after the union filed its petition.³⁷ The court also examined whether...