Labor & Employment Law
| Publication year | 2020 |
Labor & Employment Law
W. Jonathan Martin III
Alyssa K. Peters
Patricia-Anne Brownback
Graham Newsome
Aaron Chang
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This Article surveys revisions to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)1 and decisions interpreting Georgia law from June 1, 2019 to May 31, 2020,2 that affect labor and employment relations for Georgia employers.
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A. Vicarious Liability
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held vicariously liable for the negligence or intentional torts of employees that are committed within the scope of their employment.3 To hold an employer vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, the following two elements must be established: (1) the employee was acting in furtherance of the employer's business; and (2) the employee was acting within the scope of the employer's business.4
In Terry v. Old Hat Chimney, LLC,5 Matthew Terry (Terry), sued Old Hat Chimney, LLC (Old Hat) and its employee, Nickolas James Payne (Payne), "for damages allegedly sustained when a company van driven by Payne rear-ended Terry's vehicle."6 Terry brought a claim of negligence against Payne and a claim of vicarious liability through the doctrine of respondeat superior against Old Hat. Old Hat admitted that Payne was actually employed at the time of the accident, and that he was acting within the scope of his employment when the collision occurred.7 Following this admission, Old Hat then "moved for partial summary judgment on Terry's direct liability claim."8
In finding that the Cherokee County Superior Court properly granted partial summary judgment to Old Hat, the Georgia Court of Appeals largely based its decision on precedent established in Hospital Authority of Valdosta/Lowndes County v. Fender9 by the court in 2017.10 In that case, the court of appeals held "if a defendant employer concedes that it will be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if its employee is found negligent, the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs [duplicative] claims for negligent
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entrustment, hiring, training, supervision, and retention."11 Thus, the court of appeals held that since Old Hat admitted that the doctrine of respondeat superior applied, Fender required the court to hold that Terry's claim for negligent hiring, training, and supervision was duplicative of the claim for respondeat superior and must be dismissed.12 Terry attempted to convince the court to overrule Fender, claiming it contravenes O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b),13 Georgia's apportionment statute.14
In the case of Centurion Industries, Inc. v. Naville-Saeger,15 Jeremy Carter (Carter) worked as a millwright for A-Lert Construction Services, a division of Centurion Industries, Inc. (Centurion), performing "shutdown work," where a factory would shut down for multiple weeks and Carter would perform maintenance work at the factory during the shutdown period. Carter would often travel to out of town job sites to perform work at shutdown locations. Carter eventually was assigned to a location in Louisiana but requested leave to return to Georgia to take care of personal matters. Upon returning to Georgia, Carter attempted to pass a school bus and hit the car in which Naville-Saeger was a passenger. Carter was found to be driving under the influence of alcohol. The parents of Naville-Saeger then brought separate actions against Centurion, which moved for summary judgment on the basis that Carter was not acting in the course and scope of his employment when the collision occurred. The Lowndes County State Court denied Centurion's motion for summary judgment, and Centurion requested interlocutory review by the court of appeals.16
In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the court of appeals determined that Carter was engaged in the purely personal matter of driving to Valdosta while on unpaid leave from work and, therefore, was not acting in the course and scope of his employment.17 The majority of the court's analysis focused on the applicability of the "special mission" rule, which is an exception to the general rule that an "employee is deemed to act only for his own purposes while commuting to or from work." 18 Finding that the exception did not apply, the court focused on the fact that Centurion had not requested Carter to perform any
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particular task and that Carter's acts took place during a time when Carter was on approved leave.19
In re In/Ex Systems, Inc. v. Masud,20 Michael Green (Green) worked for In/Ex Systems, Inc. (In/Ex) as a technician, primarily in commercial construction. As Green drove northbound on Interstate 85 on his way to work, a vehicle suddenly entered his travel lane. Green quickly changed lanes to avoid a collision, at which time the front driver's side tire came off of his vehicle, and struck a vehicle driven by Tahsin Masud's (Masud) wife as she was driving southbound on Interstate 85. Green later pled guilty to driving with unsafe equipment.21
Masud, representing the interest of his deceased wife and juvenile daughter who were in the car struck by Green's tire, brought an action against In/Ex alleging vicarious liability for injuries incurred in the accident.22 "In/Ex filed a motion for summary judgment in both lawsuits, arguing, inter alia, that Green had not been driving negligently at the time of the collision."23 The Cobb County State Court denied In/Ex's motion for summary judgment, which led to In/Ex's request for review by the court of appeals.24
In reversing the finding of the trial court, the court of appeals held that "Green had no knowledge of any unsafe condition that caused the tire to separate from the vehicle."25 The court also gave credence to the fact that Green's passenger, a co-worker, did not notice any issue with the vehicle.26 Since Green had no knowledge of any unsafe condition, which was required to hold In/Ex vicariously liable, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in denying In/Ex's motion for summary judgment.27
In re Hernandez v. Schumacher Group Healthcare Consulting, Inc.28 arose out of an incident where Domingo Hernandez (Mr. Hernandez), husband of the plaintiff, went to the emergency room of Dorminy Medical Center because he was suffering from chest pain. Dr. John Glenn (Dr. Glenn) examined Mr. Hernandez and ordered tests. Dr. Glenn later arranged to transport the decedent to a better equipped hospital.29
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During the trip to the other hospital, "the decedent went into cardiac arrest and was pronounced dead upon arrival."30
Hettie Sue Hernandez filed a complaint against Dr. Glenn and Schumacher Group Healthcare Consulting, Inc. (Schumacher), claiming medical malpractice and wrongful death. Schumacher successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that Dr. Glenn had never been its employee or agent and was instead an independent contractor of Ben Hill Emergency Group, LLC, which provided emergency department staffing and management services to Schumacher.31
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Ben Hill County Superior Court's holding.32 In fact, the court held that Schumacher was a holding company and had never had any employees or agents.33 Because there was no legal relationship between Dr. Glenn and Schumacher, it was not possible to impose vicarious liability on Schumacher.34 Furthermore, no employment contract existed between Dr. Glenn and Schumacher.35
In Avis Rent A Car System, LLC v. Johnson,36 Brianna Johnson (Johnson) was seriously injured when she was struck by a sport utility vehicle that had been stolen from Avis Rent A Car Systems, LLC's (Avis) car rental lot in downtown Atlanta. Johnson sued Avis, Avis Budget Group, Inc., and Peter Duca, a regional security manager for Avis Budget Group, as well as CSYG, Inc. (CSYG), the operator of the downtown Avis location, and Yonas Gebremichael (Gebremichael), CSYG's owner. After a jury trial, the jury awarded Johnson $7 million in damages, despite finding CSYG and Gebremichael not liable.37 "Avis filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict [JNOV] or, in the alternative, for a new trial as to liability."38 The Gwinnett County State Court denied the motion for JNOV but granted a new trial as to liability. Avis appealed the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. "Johnson appeal[ed] the grant of Avis's motion for a new trial on the issue of liability."39
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the denial of Avis's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.40 The court largely based its
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decision on Avis's argument that it could not be held vicariously liable when CSYG and Gebremichael were found not liable by the jury.41
The case of Mannion & Mannion, Inc. v. Mendez42 involved an accident caused by Loren Blunkall (Blunkall), who worked for Mannion & Mannion, Inc. (Mannion) as a mechanic. Blunkall did not have a set lunch period, and he often went to lunch with a co-worker who lived across the street from Mannion's lot. Before he would leave for lunch, he would tell the other employees working in the office that he was headed out to get lunch. Mannion did have a time clock, but Blunkall did not always clock in and out for lunch. On the day of the accident, Mannion's employees heard Blunkall say he was leaving for lunch. As he was leaving, Blunkall pulled into the intersection and struck Jesus Mendez's (Mendez) motorcycle, knocking Mendez off the bike and injuring him.43
Mendez sued Blunkall for negligence, adding Mannion as a defendant under a theory of vicarious liability. Mannion moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be liable because Blunkall was not acting in the scope of his employment when he collided with Mendez, but the Liberty County State Court denied Mannion's...
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