Constitutional law--the "knock and announce" rule becomes obsolete--Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).

• Author: Rediker, Rachel

The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of private citizens and their homes. (1) Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized the "knock and announce" rule, which requires that before entering a home with a warrant, police must first announce their presence and wait a reasonable time for residents to open the door. (2) Traditionally, courts have used the federal exclusionary rule as a tool to discourage Fourth Amendment violations by police officers. (3) In Hudson v. United States, (4) the Supreme Court considered whether the exclusionary rule could be applied to violations of the knock and announce rule. (5) The Court held that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable and that violations of the knock and announce rule did not warrant suppression of evidence subsequently recovered. (6)

On August 27, 1998, Detroit police officers arrived at Booker Hudson's home with a warrant permitting them to search for both firearms and drugs. (7) The police announced their presence and waited less than five seconds before entering through an unlocked door. (8) Upon searching the home, the police recovered a loaded gun and large amounts of cocaine. (9) Hudson was charged with unlawful drug and firearm possession in violation of Michigan law. (10) In a pretrial motion to suppress the incriminating evidence, Hudson argued that by not waiting a reasonable amount of time before entering his residence, the Detroit police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they failed to observe the knock and announce rule. (11)

The Michigan trial court granted Hudson's motion to suppress. (12) On interlocutory review, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling. (13) After the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, Hudson was convicted of drug possession. (14) Hudson appealed a second time, arguing that the drugs recovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment should have been excluded, but the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his appeal and affirmed his conviction. (15) In June 2005, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the knock and announce rule. (16) After considering the alternative remedies available for knock and announce violations and examining the relationship between the exclusionary rule and the interests protected by the knock and announce rule, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was an inappropriate remedy for knock and announce violations. (17)

The Founding Fathers drafted the Fourth Amendment to protect individuals and their homes from unreasonable searches and seizures because they recognized the need to preserve the personal privacy and sanctity of one's body and home. (18) In doing so, however, they provided no mechanism by which the Fourth Amendment's provisions should be implemented or enforced. (19) Nearly a century ago in Weeks v. Unites States, (20) the United States Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule as an appropriate remedy for such violations. (21) While not the only redress available, the exclusionary rule appears to be the one truly effective tool for preventing law enforcement officials from infringing upon individuals' Fourth Amendment rights. (22) The exclusionary rule functions as an incentive for police officers to comply with the Fourth Amendment. (23)

While the Court has invoked the exclusionary rule in a broad range of cases, it has not been blind to the rule's costs, and occasionally the Court finds that these costs outweigh the benefits. (24) As a result, the Supreme Court has subsequently narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule originally set forth in Weeks. (25) Evidence recovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment is traditionally referred to as "the fruit of the poisonous tree" and is inadmissible. (26) However, if the evidence recovered is far enough removed from the original Fourth Amendment violation so as to "purge itself from the original taint," it may still be admissible. (27) The Court has given some guidance as to what circumstances allow evidence to be "purged from the original taint," but has avoided the question of whether evidence recovered subsequent to a violation of the knock and announce rule is one of those circumstances. (28)

The common law principle reflected in the knock and announce rule can be traced as far back as the seventeenth century. (29) Historically, the knock and announce rule has been deemed important for several reasons, such as avoiding the destruction of property, protecting police officers from physical violence, and safeguarding individual privacy and personal dignity. (30) In Wilson v. Arkansas, (31) the Court recognized this longstanding rule and held that the Framers of the Constitution undoubtedly intended for the common law knock and announce principles to form part of a reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. (32) The Court acknowledged that there may be certain exigent circumstances where it would be unreasonable for police officers to knock and announce their presence before entering one's home, but nevertheless left the responsibility of determining such circumstances to the discretion of lower courts. (33) Such broad discretion has not only left an inconsistency among lower courts as to when law enforcement officials have acted reasonably in disregarding the knock and announce rule, but has also created an inconsistency among lower courts regarding the question of the appropriate remedy when such a violation has occurred. (34) While some lower courts have found the answer to the later problem encompassed within two Supreme Court cases, Miller v. United States (35) and Sabbath v. United States, (36) other lower courts have chosen not to follow those cases as binding precedent. (37)

In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a violation of the knock and announce rule requires that all evidence subsequently recovered during the search be excluded. (38) The exclusionary rule, the Court noted, must be used as a last resort given its substantial costs to society. (39) The Court explained that whether the exclusionary rule is invoked in a particular case is not directly tied to whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. (40) While causation between the constitutional violation and the recovery of evidence is a necessary condition for the exclusion of evidence, the Court explained that causation alone is not sufficient to justify exclusion. (41) The Court explained that if the "but for" causation is "too attenuated" the exclusionary rule is inappropriate. (42) In order to determine when causation may be "too attenuated to justify exclusion," the Court directed its attention to the purpose of the knock and announce rule, holding that the interests protected by the rule have no relation to the subsequent seizure of evidence; therefore, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to violations of the knock and announce rule. (43)

The Court next stressed that the exclusionary rule should only be applied "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'" (44) The Court concluded that the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock and announce violations are considerable and that the "deterrence of knock and announce violations is not worth a lot." (45) There are several methods other than exclusion, the Court noted, to deter police from violating the knock and announce requirement. (46) In addition to a growing trend of internal police discipline for misconduct, police officers may be held civilly liable for their inappropriate actions. (47) Lastly, the Court compared the facts from the case-at-bar to previous jurisprudence as further assurance that suppression was unwarranted in the case-at-bar. (48)

The Hudson decision renders the knock and announce rule virtually meaningless. (49) Without the threat of suppression, law enforcement no longer has an incentive to comply with the rule. (50) The Court mistakenly justified its holding by relying on alternative methods such as civil liability and internal police discipline as proper deterrence. (51) The evidence overwhelmingly suggests, however, that these alternative methods are ineffective. (52) As a result, the right to expect privacy and sanctity in one's own home, which has been highly coveted throughout history, is diminished. (53)

Without an effective deterrent in place for knock and announce violations, the Court has essentially taken away a right that is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. (54) The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable invasions of privacy, and the knock and announce rule is part of that reasonableness inquiry. (55) Contrary to the Court's belief, the interests that the knock and announce rule, and hence the Fourth Amendment, are intended to protect will no longer be protected without the application of the exclusionary rule. (56) Police officers are now more likely to enter residences without first knocking and announcing their presence, resulting in both the destruction of property and an increase in violence arising from the surprise and fright of an unexpected entry. (57)

Finally, the Court erred when it reached a conclusion that disregarded much of the relevant precedent. (58) The Court focused exclusively on the significant costs of the exclusionary rule and precedent narrowing the scope of its application while completely disregarding Miller and Sabbath, two Supreme Court cases where the court unmistakably suppressed evidence due to knock and announce rule violations. (59) While the Court was correct in...