Judicial Control of Administrative Decisions
| DOI | 10.1177/000271624222100124 |
| Date | 01 May 1942 |
| Published date | 01 May 1942 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
183
Judicial
Control
of
Administrative
Decisions
By
J.
ROLAND
PENNOCK
HE
foregoing
pages
have
made
clear
the
great
extent
to
which
the
traditional
device
of
general
legislation
enforced
by
prosecution
of
offenders
in
the
ordinary
courts
has
given
way
to
administrative
regulation.
The
issuance
of
positive
orders
requiring
or
prohibit-
ing
specified
acts,
and
the
granting
or
refusal
to
grant
permission
to
act
in
this
or
that
fashion,
are
becoming
the
characteristic
types
of
governmental
ac-
tivity.
Furthermore,
when
there
is
dis-
pute
between
the
government
and
af-
fected
individuals
regarding
the
terms
of
an
administrative
order,
the
refusal
to
grant
a
license,
or
the
like,
this dis-
pute
is
likely
to
be
adjudicated
in
the
first
instance
by
an
administrative
tri-
bunal
rather
than
by
a
regular
court.
In
other
cases,
even
disputes
between
private
individuals
which
arise
out
of
modern
regulatory
legislation
are
sub-
mitted
to
administrative
agencies
for
adjudication.
The
result
of
all
this
is
that
the
precise
way
in
which
legislation
af-
fects
private
rights
is
determined
by
administrators
rather
than
by
courts.
That
there
are
good
and
sufficient
reasons
for
the
change
has
already
been
pointed
out.
The
fact
remains,
how-
ever,
that
these
administrators
are
gen-
erally
hedged
about
with
considerably
fewer
guarantees
of
independence
than
are
courts.
It
is
natural,
therefore,
that
persons
whose
rights
and
interests
are
at
stake
should
demand
some
protec-
tion
against
illegal
and
arbitrary
actions.
Accordingly,
in
this
country,
most
final
administrative
determinations
af-
fecting
private
rights
are
subject
to
some
measure
of
judicial
review.
This
is
felt
to
be
in
line
with
the
Anglo-
Saxon
principle
of
the
&dquo;rule
of
law,&dquo;
and,
more
specifically,
it
is
held
by
the
courts
to
be
required
by
the
doctrine
of
the
separation
of
powers.
THE
COURTS’
SPHERE
OF
ACTIVITY
To
have
all
administrative
determi-
nations
reviewed
by
the
courts,
how-
ever,
would
impose
upon
the
judiciary
an
impossible
burden.
Such
procedure
would
also
reduce
the
administrative
process
to
little
more
than
a
formality,
and
would
destroy
its
advantages.
How
to
avoid
this
stultifying
result
and
yet
preserve
a
sufficient
check
upon
admin-
istration,
then,
is
the
problem.
The
solution
which
has
been
developed
takes
the
line
of
defining
certain
areas
with-
in
which
administrative
determinations
shall
be
final,
thus
confining
the
issues
which
can
be
appealed
to
the
courts
within
manageable
limits
and
preserv-
ing
sufficient
power
and
autonomy
for
the
administrators.
In
general,
the
courts
confine
themselves
in
this
field
to
a
threefold
sphere
of
activity:
they
see
to
it
that
the
administrators
act
according
to
law,
that
they
follow
a
procedure
which
is
fundamentally
fair,
and
that
their
determinations
of
the
facts
are
not
arbitrary
and
capricious.
One
should
hasten
to
add
that
the
courts
do
not
exercise
a
general
super-
vision
over
the
acts
of
administration
any
more
than
they
do
over
the
acts
of
legislatures.
In
the
former
case,
as
in
the
latter,
they
pass
upon
the
actions
of
agents
of
the
government
only
inso-
far
as
it is
necessary
for
the
settlement
of
&dquo;cases&dquo;
or
&dquo;controversies&dquo;
brought
before
them
for
decision.
Moreover,
statutory
and
other
provisions
for
judi-
cial
review,
with
greater
or
less
strict-
ness,
confine
the
right
to
sue
to
those
whose
private
rights
are
affected
by
the
acts
complained
of.
In
this
way
finality
is
given
to
many
administrative
deter-
at SAGE PUBLICATIONS on December 4, 2012ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from
To continue reading
Request your trial