Judge denies former employee's disability claim
Date | 01 December 2020 |
Published date | 01 December 2020 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/nba.30903 |
DECEMBER 2020 NONPROFIT BUSINESS ADVISOR
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© 2020 Wiley Periodicals LLC • All rights reserved
DOI: 10.1002/nba
against her by regularly displaying an unspecied
quote on an ofce computer program that appeared
to be a veiled threat directed at her. She also claimed
he had (1) stated very loudly to the plaintiff’s cow-
orkers that he was being forced to move elsewhere be-
cause of her, (2) accused her of lying and (3) claimed
she was trying to get him red.
The plaintiff complained about the supervisor
again in March 2018 and led a suit when the de-
fendant didn’t respond to her satisfaction.
One of her claims was gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII.
The plaintiff contended she had suffered the
requisite adverse employment action because the
retaliation included being denied the opportunity to
work on a high-prole project.
The defendant led a motion to dismiss, arguing
that selecting somebody else for that particular
assignment wasn’t an adverse employment action
because there was no material diminishment in the
terms of her employment.
The district court judge agreed that the plaintiff
couldn’t succeed with the hostile environment claim
unless she experienced an adverse employment action.
He explained that the term referred to “a materially
adverse change in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment more disruptive than a mere inconvenience
or an alteration of job responsibilities.”
The judge likened the plaintiff’s allegation about
failing to be assigned to a “high prole project” to
be similar to a denial of training opportunities. He
explained that the denial of a professional training
opportunity only amounted to an adverse employ-
ment action when the employee could show some type
of material harm from the denial, such as a failure
to be promoted or the loss of career opportunities.
EMPLOYER WINS ➔ The judge ruled that the
plaintiff didn’t allege an adverse employment action
because the failure to obtain a desired or requested
employment assignment alone was insignicant.
He also said the allegations didn’t plausibly suggest
discriminatory intent. Although he guessed that the
plaintiff was claiming that her male colleagues re-
ceived more favorable treatment, he said there were
no allegations of fact to support her belief.
Although he allowed other parts of the suit to
proceed, the judge dismissed the Title VII claim.
[Erno v. New York State Ofce of Information Tech-
nology Services, U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York, No. 1:19-CV-1457, 05/26/2020]
Disability
Judge denies former employee’s
disability claim
The plaintiff was an Erie County sheriff’s depart-
ment employee who was granted medical leave in 2015
to care for her terminally ill husband.
When the plaintiff didn’t return to work after her
leave was exhausted, the sheriff’s ofce accused her
of being absent without permission and scheduled
two separate disciplinary hearings concerning those
charges.
The plaintiff was red after she didn’t attend either
hearing, and she led a suit.
One of her claims was disability discrimination
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The plaintiff alleged there were two reasons why
she couldn’t return to work, and those were (1) she
had been her husband’s main caregiver and (2) she
had been mentally unable to work. She also alleged
that her mental disability was due to (1) the stress and
depression caused by seeing her husband slowly waste
away and (2) the demands that being a caregiver had
imposed upon her.
According to the allegations, the plaintiff request-
ed a reasonable accommodation in the form of a leave
of absence after her medical leave was exhausted by
(1) submitting medical documentation and (2) calling
the ofce about her continued inability to work.
The sheriff led a motion to dismiss, arguing:
(1) any stress caused by observing her husband’s
suffering was too temporary to be a disability, (2)the
plaintiff had admitted that she didn’t require an
accommodation for the purpose of performing her
job, (3) the “medical documentation” submitted by
the plaintiff was too vague to amount to an accom-
modation request and (4) a non-working plaintiff
couldn’t make the showing required by the ADA of
being able to perform the essential functions of her
job with an accommodation.
The district court judge assumed for the purpose
of argument that the stress and depression suffered
by the plaintiff because of her situation qualied as
a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
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