Johnson v. Transportation Agency 480 U.S. 616 (1987)

• Author: John G. West
• Pages: 1435

Page 1435

Paul Johnson sought promotion to the position of road dispatcher with the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, California; he was deemed the best-qualified applicant for the job by a board of interviewers and by the Road Operations Division Director, who normally would have made the promotion decision. But the agency's affirmative-action officer intervened, recommending to the agency director that a woman seeking the position be appointed instead. The agency director agreed, and the woman was selected over Johnson. Johnson subsequently filed a suit alleging SEX DISCRIMINATION, and a federal district court found gender to be "the determining factor" in the promotion. The Supreme Court nevertheless sustained the agency's action, 6?3.

Writing for the majority, Justice WILLIAM J. BRENNAN invoked the language of UNITED STEELWORKERS V. WEBER (1979) and argued that the agency's AFFIRMATIVE ACTION program was justified because it sought to correct a "manifest imbalance" that existed in job categories that had been "traditionally segregated" on the basis of gender. According to Brennan, the determination of whether a "manifest imbalance" exists usually rests on the disparity between the percentage of a protected group employed in specific job categories and the percentage of the protected group in the local labor force who are qualified to work in those categories. Precisely how high the disparity has to be before a "manifest imbalance" arises, Brennan did not say; but he did indicate that the requisite disparity was something less than that required in cases like WYGANT V. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION (1986), where employees had to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against their employer.

Concurring, Justice JOHN PAUL STEVENS sought to push open the door to affirmative action still further. He implied that private employers should be able to discriminate in favor of "disadvantaged" racial and gender groups for a wide variety of reasons, including improving education, "averting racial tension over the allocation of jobs in a community," and "improving ? services to black constituencies."

Justice SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR concurred in the Court's judgment, but on narrower grounds than the majority. She maintained that affirmative-action programs can be invoked only to remedy past discrimination. But her standard of proof for past discrimination was nearly the same as the majority's standard for "manifest...