O'Connor, Sandra Day (1930–)

• Author: Edward J. Erler
• Pages: 1841-1842

Page 1841

Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman Justice to serve on the Supreme Court, was appointed by President RONALD REAGAN in 1981. She had served previously as the nation's first woman senate majority leader in her home state of Arizona and as a member of the Arizona Court of Appeals. In announcing her nomination the President extolled her as someone who would be a rigid adherent of constitutional principles, taking an exacting view of the SEPARATION OF POWERS as a limitation on JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, and respecting the role of FEDERALISM in the constitutional scheme. Although there is little doubt that one motivation in appointing O'Connor was to deprive the Democrats of the opportunity of appointing the first woman Justice, the President's expectations have, by and large, not been disappointed.

For O'Connor constitutional jurisprudence means, above all, an adherence to enduring constitutional principles, recognizing that, while the application of these principles may change, the principles themselves are rooted in the constitutional text and in the precepts that animate the Constitution. In her dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983), O'Connor complained that the majority's decision rested "neither [on] sound constitutional theory nor [on] our need to decide cases based on the application of neutral principles." It is not entirely clear yet whether the Justice mistakenly identifies constitutional principles with "neutral principles." Her opinions generally indicate an awareness that the Constitution is not neutral with respect to its ends and purposes. She has refused to accept the prevailing view that the Constitution is merely a procedural instrument that is informed by no purposes or principles beyond the procedures themselves.

In CRIMINAL PROCEDURE cases O'Connor has adhered to the principle she enunciated in KOLENDER V. LAWSON (1983): "Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual freedoms within a framework of ORDERED LIBERTY. Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression." The Justice has used this rationale to resist unwarranted attempts to expand criminal DUE PROCESS rights beyond those clearly prescribed or fairly implied by the Constitution. For example, in OREGON V. ELSTAD (1985) O'Connor refused to extend the FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE doctrine either to uncoerced inculpatory...