International Relations and World Government

• Published date: 01 March 1956
• DOI: 10.1177/000271625630400120
• Date: 01 March 1956
• Author: H.F. Angus
• Subject Matter: Articles

148

Book

Department

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

AND

WORLD

GOVERNMENT

LESTER

B.

PEARSON.

Democracy

in

World

Politics.

Pp.

ix,

123.

Princeton,

N.

J.:

Princeton

University

Press,

1955.

$2.75.

It

must

have

been

a

pleasure

to

listen

to

the

Stafford

Little

Lectures

for

1955

and

to

hear

Mr.

Pearson,

Canadian

Secretary

of

State

for

External

Affairs,

make

an

ef-

fective

apologia

for

such

respectable

things

as

democracy,

the

United

Nations,

North

Atlantic

Treaty

Organization,

the

Common-

wealth,

the

Canadian

monarchy,

parliamen-

tary

government,

and

even

diplomacy.

The

lectures

are

full

of

ideas

expressed

with

clarity,

directness,

and

vigor.

The

best

example

of

the

excellence

and

of

the

limitations

of

the

argument

is

the

discussion

of

the

hydrogen

bomb.

Massive

deterrence,

Mr.

Pearson

contends,

is

use-

ful

as

a

safeguard

against

the

sort

of

war

which

might

destroy

mankind

and

should

not

be

used

or

threatened

to

prevent

wars

with

traditional

weapons

(including

minor

atomic

weapons).

It

is

justifiable

to

resist

force

by

necessary

violence

but

not

by

ex-

cessive

violence.

It

follows

that

war

aims

should

be

moderate,

and

that

unconditional

surrender

should

not

be

sought.

Analogies

from

the

criminal

law

(self-

defence

does

not

justify

unnecessary

vio-

lence)

and

the

Bible

(the

threat

of

an

eye

for

an

eye

is

condoned,

but

not

the

threat

of

two

eyes

for

one)

are

chosen

to

support

this

doctrine.

They

cannot

be

pressed:

the

law

allows

violence

against

an

armed

burglar,

and,

indeed,

against

a

burglar

who

may

be

armed.

The

talio

regulated

re-

venge ;

it

did

not

concern

defence

or

deter-

rence.

And

unconditional

surrender

may

be

the

only

safe

war

aim

for

allies

who

dis-

trust

each

other.

The

practical

consequences

of

the

doc-

trine

are

important.

It

is

a

doctrine

for

the

strong

man

armed

and

not

for

the

weak.

A

country

disposed

to

practice

it

must

maintain

costly

armaments

at

two

levels,

if

not

at

three

(traditional,

fission,

and

fusion).

It

is

not

clear

what

is

to

happen

if

it

has

overestimated

its

strength

and

faces

defeat;

if

its

allies

collapse;

if

its

people

recoil

from

the,casualties

of

tra-

ditional

war.

Must

it

be

prepared

to

sur-

render

unconditionally?

Or,

satisfied

that

it

has

done

its

best,

may

it

resort

to

the

hydrogen

bomb?

It

is

well

to

ponder

these

questions

and

to

remember

that

our

ene-

mies,

particularly

if

as

we

hope

they

are

weaker

than

we

are,

will

have

them

in

mind.

Mr.

Pearson

does

not

press

them.

Hypothetical

questions,

the

stock

in

trade

of

the

academic

lecturer,

are

distasteful

to

the

statesman.

So

too,

one

might

think,