The interacting arguments of risk communication in response to terrorist hoaxes.

• Author: Sellnow, Timothy L.
• Position: Report

The lingering threat and uncertainty generated by terrorism takes a psychological and financial toll. Potential victims live in nagging fear of future assaults. As Lerbinger (1997) explained, "In particular, it is the psychological element of malice that makes each terrorist act, no matter how small, deeply repugnant" (p. 145). Government agencies dedicate considerable financial resources to protecting citizens against terrorist assaults. This financial burden is complicated by the fact that terrorism is, by its nature, fraught with uncertainty. Government agencies can never be certain they have devoted sufficient resources for mitigating the most urgent terrorist threats. This uncertainty also diminishes the effectiveness of risk communication. Heath, McKinney, and Palenchar (2005) argued that terrorists exploit uncertainty in order to erode responders' ability to "communicate knowledgeably on the facts and issues surrounding a specific risk" (p. 157). Such uncertainty is paramount in terrorist hoaxes. These false claims of attack increase anxiety and force government agencies to devote valuable resources in response to claims that never actually manifest in assault. Thus, terrorist hoaxes pose a notable challenge for government agencies who must respond to them. A significant component of this challenge involves risk communication.

This study explores the complex communication required for responding to terrorist hoaxes. Specifically, the study examines the New Zealand government's risk communication in response to a bioterrorist hoax. In the study, we address the seemingly contradictory communication demands on government agents as they must explain that a threat is likely a hoax while noting simultaneously that they are responding as if the danger were genuine. Our analysis begins by reviewing the nature of terrorist hoaxes. We then characterize hoax responses as interacting arguments. Next, we apply this perspective to the New Zealand case. Finally, we offer a series of conclusions about the case and implications for communicating in a hoax environment.

CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

Heath and O'Hair (2008) vividly depict the inherent nature of uncertainty in terrorism with the statement, "uncertainty and instability are the playground of terrorism" (p. 25). By maximizing uncertainty, terrorists have the capacity to upset a system's stability. As such, uncertainty has the capacity to "demoralize and intimidate" innocent people (p. 25). Similarly, Heath et al. (2005) see uncertainty as a key variable in all communication surrounding terrorism. Ultimately, such uncertainty disrupts a targeted audience's ability to comprehend the actual likelihood of attack because the terrorists' actions "focus attention on the malevolence of the act rather than the probability of the occurrence" (Heath & O'Hair, p. 18). Clearly, hoaxers seek to heighten uncertainty by capitalizing on the fear that persists in a terrorist context. In other words, the fear of a looming attack, whether legitimate or not, can diminish the ability of a target audience to keep potential threats in proper perspective.

Hoaxes appear with some regularity in a variety of settings. One such setting involves explosive devices placed on or near school campuses. Such devices have recently been detonated on school property in Colorado, Missouri, and Georgia (Dorn, 2001). These attacks have increased the uncertainty and, consequently, the impact of bomb threat hoaxes. Ronald D. Stephens, Executive Director of the National School Safety Center, suggests that such hoaxes create a notable financial burden, because "you've got to respond as if it's the real thing every time" (Bowman, 2004, para. 10). This financial pressure is leading some school safety consultants to recommend preemptive strikes as a deterrent to hoaxers. Officials in states such as Vermont and New York have followed this advice by aggressively prosecuting such hoaxers at the felony level. Other states are following suit. Considering the frequency of hoaxes and the relative rarity of actual crisis events in schools, Halikias (2004) cautioned against treating all threatening situations the same way: "Myopic attention to low base rate or rare events is one factor that encourages judgment errors" (p. 599). Instead, he advocated that school administrators should "be willing to assess a diverse group of students and not adhere strictly to models of dangerousness evaluations or targeted school violence" (p. 606).

Collins (2004) explained that in the wake of legitimate terrorist attacks, such as 9/11 and the succeeding attacks on transit systems in Madrid, London, and Glasgow, the countries affected experience an emotional sense of mass solidarity. After 9/11, for example, Collins noted that the display of all forms of American flags, claims to have donated blood, and the willingness to tolerate increased restrictions on privacy were commonplace. This solidarity was further reflected in popular culture as music, sports, movies, and television programs commemorated the loss. He concludes that this solidarity tends to fade over time, eventually regressing to normal levels. However, during the period of intense solidarity, Collins argued, prevailing attitudes promoted a sense of hysteria. This hysteria may be empowering to hoaxers. As emotions run high, hoaxers engage in what Collins described as "the attack emulation process" (p. 82). He explained that this emulation was most common during the period of heightened fear following the anthrax attacks on media and government officials in 2001. For example, during the period of October 1-18, 2001, there were 2,300 anthrax reports in the United States, some accidental and others stemming from innocuous white powder mailed by hoaxers. Nearly all reports were false. Collins contended that this increased vulnerability was due, in part, to the media's intense coverage of the subject while public concern was at its apex.

In fact, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll indicated that "67 percent agreed that the media were overreacting to the anthrax threats, and 47 percent said that the public was overreacting" (Collins, 2004, p. 83). This excessive coverage was due in part to what Ricchiardi (2001) called "a stroke of evil genius" (para. 3). By attacking the media, the perpetrator(s) behind the anthrax attacks assured intense media coverage of the event. Nevertheless, the mainstream media was relatively effective in sorting rumors from credible stories following 9/11. Larosa (2003) argued that "despite unusually difficult reporting circumstances, [the mainstream news media] did a remarkably good job of separating out false rumors" (p. 14). Larosa found that, while a myriad of rumors circulated the internet, there were only four instances "where the mainstream news media extensively carried false reports" (p. 14).

In her study of emotional reactions of diplomats, military personnel, and civilian Americans who were living abroad following 9/11, Speckhard (2003) found the majority of those she interviewed admitted to having experienced an "assault on previously held world assumptions" and to perceiving a "new sense of uncertainty about the future" (p. 156).

Speckhard also observed that the uncertainty related to new procedures for bomb drills and mail handling heightened anxiety levels. The following example of an anthrax hoax emphasizes the intensity of these emotions:

One woman told of her husband calling frantically from work to tell her to remove The Economist magazine from their home because an embassy e-mail (later discovered to be a hoax) warned that some copies had been laced with anthrax. "You should have seen me with my plastic gloves and tweezers trying to take it out of our house," she recounted. "He was so afraid. He didn't want the kids to be infected." (p. 156)

In retrospect, the above example seems rather extreme. Yet the complexity and uncertainty surrounding terrorist events made such behavior appear rational. Thus, this is the potential impact of hoaxes.

Speckhard (2003) offers several practical implications in her study of hoaxes. She observed that the public tends to focus excessively on the terrorist event and subsequent threat, "especially if the media supports an obsessive new interest" (p. 157). To counter this immoderation, Speckhard recommends keeping the threat in perspective so that the actual risk was clear. She also suggests that fear can be managed through efforts to enhance the public's "self-awareness and vigilance" in helping to prevent a terrorist attack (p. 157). Periods of increased concern are also times when safety measures such as workplace security measures and individual behavior can and should be assessed to determine their effectiveness, the need for compliance, and the importance of making life choices that are in line with one's tolerance for risk. Speckhard proposes that such measures can help the public "make adjustments to reduce anxiety, aid in creating new schemas, and even inoculate resilience into the workforce for the 'new world' we live in after September 11" (p. 157).

HOAX RESPONSE

By their nature, hoaxes begin with a threat communicated either verbally, as in a letter or phone call, or nonverbally, as in a benign device or substance designed to resemble a bomb or noxious material. In either case, responders must provide relevant stakeholders (often including the general public) with messages that either validate or refute the threat. At their inception, however, distinguishing between a well-designed hoax and a legitimate attack is at best difficult and at worst impossible. Because well-designed hoaxes capitalize on uncertainty and perceptions of vulnerability, responders have the difficult task of simultaneously enacting a response plan, while still assessing the threat's legitimacy. Thus, a hoax situation requires first and foremost that responders assess the veracity of the terrorists' claims. If this...