Inevitable Change to Inevitable Discovery: the Eleventh Circuit's New Standard of Proof for Cases Addressing the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

• Publication year: 2022

Inevitable Change to Inevitable Discovery: The Eleventh Circuit's New Standard of Proof for Cases Addressing the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

Hannah Pressley

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Inevitable Change to Inevitable Discovery: The Eleventh Circuit's New Standard of Proof for Cases Addressing the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

Hannah Pressley^*

I. Introduction

The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the rule that evidence obtained by the government in violation of the Fourth Amendment will be excluded at trial. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally obtained evidence will be admissible at trial if the government can establish that it would have discovered the evidence even if the Fourth Amendment violation had not occurred. In United States v. Watkins,¹ the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the following question: what is the standard of proof that the government must meet to show that illegally obtained evidence would have been inevitably discovered? For decades, the Eleventh Circuit adhered to circuit precedent and held that the government had to show only a "reasonable probability" that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, despite the fact that the 1984 landmark Supreme Court of the United States decision recognizing the inevitable discovery exception, Nix v. Williams,² clearly

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stated that government should be required to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard.³ Perhaps bowing to the inevitable, in Watkins, the en banc Eleventh Circuit overruled its prior precedent and brought the law of the circuit into conformity with the Supreme Court and the other circuits.

II. Factual Background

Latecia Watkins was the criminal defendant at trial with several drug charges brought against her. However, she moved to have evidence obtained against her suppressed at trial because of the method in which that evidence was obtained by the federal law enforcement agents.⁴ Watkins was a supervisor of the Boca Raton, Florida Post Office at the time that two packages containing cocaine arrived from Trinidad and Tobago.⁵

Upon entering the country, these packages were discovered, and law enforcement agents removed the real cocaine, replaced it with fake cocaine, and attached a GPS tracking device in the packages before allowing them to continue in the mail stream.⁶ By the time the packages arrived in the Boca Raton area, the real cocaine was gone and the GPS tracking devices were activated, although they stopped functioning shortly after the packages arrived.⁷

Federal law enforcement agents used both the GPS tracking devices they inserted into the packages and the Postal Service's tracking system to confirm that the packages arrived at the Boca Raton Post Office despite the GPS devices having stopped working earlier that morning.⁸ Federal agents noted that both packages were improperly addressed, and the updates on the Postal Service's tracking system were not routine updates. This is one of the factors that led the agents to believe that the importation of the cocaine was being perpetrated by an employee in the postal system that had the ability to manipulate the tracking system and sneak the packages through the mail stream. Agents also deduced that the employee would need to be someone with "unique access to certain aspects" of the system, thus leading them to conclude it was most likely a supervisor.⁹

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In furtherance of this belief, two agents entered the post office on the day that the packages arrived, and Watkins's reaction upon recognizing one of them as a postal inspector only heightened their suspicions.¹⁰ According to the agents, Watkins seemed to be so nervous that her knees buckled, and she looked as if she might pass out. This physical reaction only subsided after the agents falsely told her that they were only there to retrieve some documents.¹¹

The agents monitored the post office until it closed that evening and decided to enter and search for the packages after all the employees, including Watkins, had left for the day.¹² Although the agents did not see anyone leave with the packages, the packages could not be found at the post office. Since they did not locate the packages at the post office, the agents testified that their next step would "probably" be to conduct a knock-and-talk at Watkins's home because she was their lead and only suspect.¹³ However, the GPS devices suddenly reactivated before the agents made the formal decision to conduct a knock-and-talk, which confirmed that the packages were at Watkins's address.¹⁴ This led the agents to Watkins's home, where a strong smell of marijuana emanated from the home as she answered the door for the agents. When asked if she knew why the agents were there, Watkins indicated that it was because of the boxes or packages.¹⁵

After Watkins answered the agent's first question, that agent asked Watkins to step outside of the house so they could continue the conversation.¹⁶ They walked to the end of the driveway as they spoke, where Watkins again indicated she had knowledge of the packages and what was supposed to be inside of them.¹⁷ The agent then asked Watkins if she would show them the packages. Watkins turned back up the driveway towards the house, seeming to indicate that she was consenting to the agents' entry into the house.¹⁸

Before they proceeded, the officers conducted a protective sweep,¹⁹ which revealed the marijuana and the two packages all in plain view

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within the home.²⁰ Watkins was informed of her rights, signed Miranda and Garrity waivers,²¹ and then told the agents how she met her coconspirator and that she feared he had already been arrested because she had not been able to get in touch with him.²²

Watkins was charged with four crimes and sought to suppress all evidence and statements obtained from the federal agents' warrantless installations of the GPS tracking devices inside the two packages.²³ Judge Matthewman issued a report after an evidentiary hearing, recommending that Watkins's motion to suppress be denied. This recommendation was founded on several principles: the testimony of the agents to be credible while the testimony of Watkins's witnesses to not be credible; the initial searches and seizures of the packages were lawful; the law enforcement agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct a knock-and-talk at Watkins's house and planned to do so anyway; Watkins consented to the agent's entry into her home and her incriminating statements were made voluntarily; probable cause and exigent circumstances justified a protective sweep of the home upon Watkins opening the door because of the marijuana odor emanating from the home and the fear that evidence would be destroyed. It is clear based on this extensive list that Judge Matthewman believed several avenues existed for the federal agents to be able to legally obtain the evidence against Watkins, and thus escape the restraints of the exclusionary rule at trial.²⁴

Despite the recommendation that the motion to suppress be denied, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida still granted Watkins's motion to suppress.²⁵ The court relied on Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Jones²⁶ and United States

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v. Karo²⁷ to hold that the government's failure to have a warrant to monitor the tracking device once it entered Watkins's home and left a public place constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.²⁸ This also led the court to rule that any alleged consent to search or voluntary statements were in fact the products of this Fourth Amendment violation and were not exempt from exclusion. The district court denied the government's motion to reconsider and held that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply.²⁹

On the interlocutory appeal by the government, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court's decision to exclude the evidence requested by Watkins. The court of appeals expressly held that the inevitable discovery doctrine would apply to the evidence obtained by law enforcement.³⁰ However, the court of appeals also granted a rehearing en banc to decide under what standard of proof the government must operate in the future to show that the evidence obtained against Watkins would have ultimately been gained through lawful means without a constitutional violation.³¹

III. Legal Background

The issue before the court en banc was what the proper standard of proof should be when dealing with the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.³² The Eleventh Circuit was operating under a lesser standard of proof than what was used by the Supreme Court. In addition, the district courts within the Eleventh Circuit seemed to be split on the issue, and the rehearing was meant to clarify that standard for use in all future proceedings. The two standards in dispute were whether the government must show that the ultimate discovery of evidence would have been obtained either by a reasonable probability or by a preponderance of the evidence.³³

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A. History of Applying the Reasonable Probability Standard of Proof

In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Brookins³⁴ that the government must show that there was a "reasonable probability" that the evidence would have been discovered by otherwise lawful means.³⁵ In Brookins, the defendant was convicted of receiving or concealing a stolen vehicle after the lower court refused to suppress a prosecution's witness who was discovered through incriminating statements that had been suppressed.³⁶ The Fifth Circuit reasoned that since the evidence pertaining to the witness could have been discovered through routine police investigations anyway, the lower courts were correct in not suppressing that particular evidence.³⁷

The government must also show that the lawful means that made...