Inequality Federalism and Economic Self-Interest in Subnational Progressive Tax Politics

• Date: 01 March 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912920905111
• Author: Benjamin J. Newman,Paul Teten
• Published date: 01 March 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920905111

Political Research Quarterly

2021, Vol. 74(1) 243 –252

© 2020 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912920905111

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Article

In the realm of redistributive politics, what evidence is

there of the exercise of economic self-interest by low-

income citizens who stand to benefit the most from redis-

tribution? Focusing on the United States, where economic

inequality has steadily grown since the early 1980s (Stone

et al. 2017) and inequality is higher and redistribution is

lower relative to peer nations (Brandolini and Smeeding

2006), do we observe a relationship between an individu-

al’s position on the income ladder and their support for

redistribution? When evaluating the linkage between

individual income and support for redistribution, we find

an interesting disjuncture between studies providing evi-

dence of self-interest in the realm of “abstract” policy

support and work evaluating specific, and often complex,

national policy proposals. To illustrate, existing research

finds that lower income Americans express greater sup-

port than upper income Americans for federal welfare

spending, guaranteed employment, taxation on inherited

wealth, and the abstract principle of reducing economic

inequality (Fong 2001; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Sears

et al. 1980; Soroka and Wlezien 2008). This work sug-

gests that, when it comes to views about general actions

taken by the federal government in the economic realm,

the preferences of lower income Americans appear to be

informed by economic self-interest.

However, influential work by Bartels (2008) demon-

strates that, when it comes to evaluating complex national

tax policies, such as the “Bush tax cuts” in 2001 and

2003, three pieces of evidence for what is termed “unen-

lightened self-interest” emerge: (1) Americans who

believed their own tax burden was too high were signifi-

cantly more likely to support the cuts despite the fact that

the cuts primarily benefited the wealthy, (2) lower income

Americans expressed a greater level of support for the

cuts than upper income Americans, and (3) support for a

specific feature of the tax cuts—the repeal of the estate

tax—was remarkably high among low-income Americans

who likely did not experience personal material gain

from its repeal. Bartels attributes these findings to deficits

in political information and sophistication (cf. Lupia

et al. 2007). Building on the work of Bartels, Piston

(2018), using more recent survey data, found that low-

and high-income Americans’ support for the federal

estate tax did not significantly differ, which he similarly

attributes to the fact that many Americas are not aware

that only the wealthiest pay the cost of the tax. Moreover,

Piston extends the work of Bartels by analyzing public

905111PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920905111Political Research QuarterlyNewman and Teten

research-article2020

1University of California, Riverside, USA

Corresponding Author:

Benjamin J. Newman, School of Public Policy & Department of

Political Science, University of California, Riverside, 900 University

Ave., Riverside, CA 92521, USA.

Email: bnewman@ucr.edu

Inequality Federalism and Economic

Self-Interest in Subnational Progressive

Tax Politics

Benjamin J. Newman1 and Paul Teten1

Abstract

In a national context of unabated inequality growth and recurrent tax cuts benefiting the wealthy, we have witnessed

a notable rise in “inequality federalism,” characterized by subnational initiatives to redress economic inequality

through progressive taxation and social spending. While leading research documents the tendency for Americans

to fall prey to “unenlightened self-interest” when evaluating complex national tax policy, recent research suggests

that the simplicity and clarity of emerging subnational redistributive initiatives facilitates the enactment of economic

self-interest, particularly among lower income citizens. This short article builds on prior work by offering the most

extensive analysis to date of the role of economic self-interest in public support for subnational progressive tax

policies. Drawing upon opinion polls covering eight separate state ballot measures or legislative enactments, we find

that in each instance the greatest level of support for the respective progressive tax policy is observed among lower

income citizens.

Keywords

inequality, federalism, public opinion, redistribution, taxation