HAROLD L. ICKES. Secret Diary. Vol. III: The Lowering Clouds. Pp. 695. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954. $6.00

• DOI: 10.1177/000271625530000130
• Author: G.C. Osborn
• Published date: 01 July 1955
• Date: 01 July 1955
• Subject Matter: Articles

140

have

taken

had

he

been

furnished

with

the

information

available

in

the

Navy

Depart-

ment ;

in

chapter

IV,

Kimmel

relates

the

additional

measures

he

is

confident

he

would

have

taken

if

he

had

been

properly

informed;

he

had

proved

his

ability

to

in-

crease

the

efficiency

of

the

fleet,

in

all

probability

he

could

have

reduced

our

losses

and

inflicted

heavier

losses

on

the

enemy

if

these

measures

had

been

taken.

Kimmel’s

modesty,

his

long

sufferance

in

silence,

and

his

proven

abilities

make

his

many

civilian

and

military

admirers

regret

that

he

relied

too

confidently

on

Stark’s

assurance

of

providing

him

with

all

avail-

able

information

during

the

critical

pe-

riod

preceding

the

Japanese

attack.

He

had

many

means

of

communications;

radio,

cable,

even

a

telephone

were

available;

he

could

get

a

message

to

Stark

almost

in-

stantly ;

he

could

get

an

officer

courier

there

by

plane

in

a

day.

He

should

have

regularly

demanded

information

as

the

crisis

obviously

approached.

There

is

a

still

bigger

lesson for

com-

missioned

officers

of

the

Navy;

because

our

torpedoes

could

not

operate

in

shallow

har-

bors

we

assumed

the

Japanese

could

not;

with

one

exception,

Admiral

Turner,

no

officer

of

the

High

Command

in

the

Pacific

Fleet

or

Washington

claimed

to

expect

an

air

attack

on

Pearl

Harbor.

By

almost

elementary

security

measures

the

Japanese

High

Command

completely

concealed

their

intention

to

attack

the

Pacific

Fleet.

W.

D.

PULESTON

Captain,

USN

Retired

Lake

Wales,

Fla.

HAROLD

L.

ICKES.

Secret

Diary.

Vol.

III:

The

Lowering

Clouds.

Pp.

695.

New

York:

Simon

and

Schuster,

1954.

$6.00.

The

Lowering

Clouds

covers

the

period

from

September

1939

to

December

1941,

approximately

twenty-six

months,

and

is

the

third

volume

of

the

most

illuminating

diary

thus

far

published

of

the

New

Deal

Era.

Certainly

others

high

in

the

councils

of

the

nation

in

this

period

kept

diaries

but

none

will

surpass

the

Secretary

of

In-

terior’s

ability

to

preserve

for

posterity

the

bitter,

often

petty,

feuds

which

went

on

backstage.

Nor

will

anyone

outstrip

this

curmudgeon

in

easy

frankness,

in

obvious

sincerity,

and

in

uncanny

ability

to

turn

a

phrase.

Of

those

few

whom

Ickes

admired

he

wrote

in

glowing

terms.

Robert

Jackson,

for

example,

&dquo;was

too

much

of

a

gentle-

man&dquo;

to

have

&dquo;dead

political

cats

wrapped

around

his

neck.&dquo;

The

author

had

great

respect

for

his

&dquo;Chief&dquo;

but

at

times

the

official

relations

between

Roosevelt

and

Ickes

were

indeed

strained.

On

one

such

occasion

the

author

confided

to

his

diary

that

the

President

was

&dquo;being

so

damned

onery.&dquo;

Ickes

denounced

bitterly

those

whom

he

disliked

or

mistrusted.

Chairman

Dough-

ton

of

the

Ways

and

Means

Committee

was

&dquo;an

old

fuzzy-wuzzy&dquo;

whose

mental

capacity

was

&dquo;not

only

well

below

par,

it

has

become

atrophied.&dquo;

No

one

grated

on

Ickes’

sense

of

activity

or

interfered

with

his

policies

as

did

the

slow-moving

Secre-

tary

of

State,

Cordell

Hull.

Ickes

labelled

Hull

as

&dquo;a

false

alarm,&dquo;

denounced

his

col-

league’s

inertia

and

in

desperation

wrote

&dquo;Goddam

the

Department

of

State.&dquo;

One

of

the

first

to

propose

that

F.D.R.

run

for

a

third

term,

Ickes

played

a

sig-

nificant

role

in

preparing

the

way

for

the

President’s

third

nomination.

When

Gar-

ner

turned

against

the

President,

Ickes

urged

dropping

him

from

all

cabinet

meet-

ings

and

withholding

from

the

Garners

all

invitations

to

White

House

social

affairs.

As

evidence

accumulated

that

Farley

was

using

National

Democratic

Headquarters

and

party

money

to

gain

the

nomination

for

himself,

Ickes

prodded

Roosevelt

to

dismiss

the

Postmaster

General.

Ambitious

to

be

the

President’s

running

mate

in

1940,

Ickes

could

see

why

he

was

defeated,

but

he

could

not

visualize

why

Wallace

was

se-

lected.

Ickes

early

realized

Willkie’s

pos-

sible

nomination

and

his

potential

strength

as

an

opponent.

He

called

Willkie

an

American

fascist

and

declared

that

if

elected

the

Republican

nominee

would

cre-

ate

a

corporate

state

in

the

United

States.

Repeatedly

Ickes

urged

curbing

the

sell-

ing

of

scrap

iron

and

petroleum

to

Japan

and

the

strengthening

of

our

defensive

fortifications

in

the

Pacific.

Moreover,

he