Gubernatorial Use of the Item Veto for Narrative Deletion

• Published date: 17 December 2002
• Date: 17 December 2002
• Author: Glenn Abney,Thomas P. Lauth
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00202

492 Public Administration Review •July/August 2002, Vol. 62, No. 4

Glenn Abney

Georgia State University

Thomas P. Lauth

University of Georgia

Gubernatorial Use of the Item Veto for

Narrative Deletion

Legislative use of narrative, such as conditions and riders, in appropriations bills has become

common and has had negative consequences for the executive budget and veto, as well as for the

legislative process. Some governors have used the item veto as a remedy. While they have not

necessarily diminished the amount of narrative, they have achieved some protection of the execu-

tive budget and veto power. Their success depends greatly on the type of legal authority embodied

in this constitutional power.

In the policy science literature and in political discourse,

a common misconception about the line-item veto in the

states is that it is primarily (if not always) used to elimi-

nate or reduce items of expenditure that appear in appro-

priations bills as specific dollar amounts. However, stud-

ies from Georgia (Lauth and Reese 1993) and Wisconsin

(Gosling 1986) indicate that sometimes, if not frequently,

governors use the line-item veto to remove narrative sec-

tions of appropriations bills. Such narrative may prescribe,

proscribe, or otherwise delineate spending requirements;

it defines the purpose of the expenditure.1 In other instances,

narrative may be a policy statement or rider that is largely

or totally unrelated to any appropriation. The vetoing of

narrative sections does not necessarily (though it may) re-

sult in the reduction or deletion of specific dollar amounts

from appropriations.

The potential use of the item veto in protecting the ex-

ecutive budget from legislation in the appropriations pro-

cess is not a new concept. In 1901, in Commonwealth v.

Barnett (48 A. 977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted

that an objectionable practice for which the item veto was

a remedy concerned the placement of riders in appropria-

tion bills so as to “coerce the executive to approve obnox-

ious legislation or bring the wheels of the government to a

stop for want of funds.” Has the remedy worked? That is,

is the item veto a restraint on the use of appropriations

bills for the purpose of legislating rather than just appro-

priating? In addressing this question, we rely on data ob-

tained from (1) a review of court cases, (2) a cross-sec-

tional study of state appropriations acts for two recent fis-

cal years, and (3) two surveys of executive and legislative

budget directors from the 50 states.2

The Role of Narrative

The use of narrative within budget bills and the use of

the item veto against it varies from state to state. Even so,

Rosenthal (1998, 315–16) reports that states increasingly

are including policy in appropriations bills: “[H]uman ser-

vices, education, and experimental voucher programs all

find their way into the budget.” He notes, “It facilitates

passage of legislation under the budget umbrella. Wiscon-

sin has pioneered in this area, with its budget bill running

to 1,557 pages in 1993 (having been 281 pages in 1973),

filled as it was with nonbudget policy items.” A current

example comes from the budget conflict in the state of New

York in 1998. After the Senate and House took the unprec-

edented action of adopting the state’s budget without the

involvement of Governor Pataki, he vetoed more than 1,000

items, including more than 50 “language bills.” The lead-

ership of the House, controlled by the opposition party,

challenged the legality of vetoes against the language items

but accepted the constitutionality of the governor’s actions

against dollar amounts. The legislative leadership com-

Glenn Abney is a professor and chair of the Department of Political Science,

Georgia State University. Email: polfga@langate.gsu.edu.

Thomas P. Lauth is a professor and head of the Department of Political Sci-

ence, University of Georgia. Email: tplauth@arches.uga.edu.