Grutter v. Bollinger: Race as a Factor in Public Higher Education Admissions Policies - Valerie Njiiri

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Publication year: 2004
• Citation: Vol. 55 No. 2

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Grutter v. Bollinger'. Race as a Factor in Public Higher Education Admissions Policies

In Grutter v. Bollinger,¹ the United States Supreme Court held that the University of Michigan Law School's goal of student body diversity was a compelling interest.² The Court concluded that the Law School's narrowly tailored race-based admissions program was not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause because it furthered "a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."³ This decision was unexpected in light of affirmative action rulings which have limited the use of race in admission programs.⁴

I. Factual Background

Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, applied to the University of Michigan Law School ("the Law School") in 1996 with a 3.8 grade point average and a 161 LSAT score. The Law School initially found

Grutter admissible, then placed her on a waiting list, and subsequently rejected her application. Grutter filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Law School, the Regents of the University of Michigan, Lee Bollinger (Dean of the Law School from 1987 to 1994 and President of the University of Michigan from 1996 to 2002), Jeffrey Lehman (Dean of the Law School), and Dennis Shields (Director of Admissions at the Law School from 1991 until 1998). Grutter claimed that the Law School violated the Fourteenth Amendment⁵ by discriminating against her on the basis of race.⁶ Grutter alleged that the Law School "had no compelling interest to justify its use of race in the admission process."⁷

The district court conducted a bench trial on the degree to which race was a factor in the Law School's admissions decisions and whether the Law School's consideration of race in admissions decisions constituted a race-based double standard. The court concluded that the Law School's race-based admissions program was unconstitutional.⁸ The district court applied strict scrutiny as the reviewing standard.⁹ The court found that the Law School's goal of assembling a diverse student body was not a compelling interest because Regents of the University of California v. Bakke¹⁰ did not recognize it as such.¹¹ The district court determined that even if student body diversity was a compelling interest, the Law School's use of race in its admissions program was not narrowly tailored.¹² The Law School's use of race was not clearly defined, and no termination point was established.¹³ The Law School also failed to find an alternative solution to increasing minority enrollment.¹⁴ The district court granted the petitioner's request for declaratory relief and enjoined the Law School from using race as a factor in its admissions decisions.¹⁵

The court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the district court's judgment and vacated the injunction.¹⁶ The court concluded that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which ruled that student body diversity was a compelling state interest, was binding authority.¹⁷ The court determined Justice Powell's opinion was Bakke's holding because it authorized the most restricted use of race, and it was the narrowest rationale from Bakke.¹⁸ The court of appeals ruled that the Law School's use of race as a "plus factor" was similar to the Harvard College plan approved by Justice Powell because the admissions program did not use a quota, there was no separate admissions program for minority applicants, and factors other than race were considered to contribute to academic diversity.¹⁹ The court held that the Law School's use of race was narrowly tailored because it was modeled after the Harvard plan.²⁰

The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the courts of appeals disagreed on this question of national significance.²¹ The Court endorsed Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke that "student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions."²² The Court adopted strict scrutiny to decide the case because it was the applicable reviewing standard for all racial classifications.²³ In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the court of appeals decision and determined that the Law School's goal of attaining a diverse student body was a compelling interest.²⁴ The Court held that the Law School's race-based admissions program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it was narrowly tailored, and the educational benefits from a diverse student body were a compelling interest.²⁵

II. Legal Background

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment²⁶ provides that "no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."²⁷ Generally, the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons, not groups.²⁸ Justice Powell in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke²⁹ determined that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."³⁰

The Court has struggled with this proposition as applied to affirmative action programs. Affirmative action is defined as actions which seek to eliminate current discrimination, remedy the effects of prior discrimination, and programs which help prevent future discrimination.³¹ Affirmative action programs have been used to remedy the effects of prior discrimination in employment practices, contract procurement, and higher education.³² However, affirmative action in public higher education, specifically the use of race as a factor in the admissions process, has been most controversial.

A. The Development of Race as a Factor in Admissions Programs

In DeFunis v. Odegaard,³³ DeFunis, a white male, was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School ("Law School") in 1971. The Supreme Court held that the case was moot because DeFunis was later admitted to the Law School under its revised admissions program, and he was in his final year of law school when the case was reviewed.³⁴ Despite this holding, Justice Douglas in his dissent stated the case should have been determined on its merits because the use of race in university admissions was a significant issue.³⁵

The Law School's admissions process used an index called the Predicted First Year Average ("Average"), a formula combining an applicant's Law School Admission Test ("LSAT") score and his grades in the last two years ofcollege.³⁶ The admissions committee attached less weight to the Average in reviewing minority applicants.³⁷ Further, minority applicants were assigned to a separate admissions committee from the general applicants.³⁸ Minority applicants were only compared competitively with other minority applicants; they were never compared with non-minority applicants.³⁹ Thirty-six out of thirty-seven admitted minority applicants had an Average lower than DeFunis.⁴⁰ The Law School's counsel admitted that if the enrolled minority applicants were considered in the same pool as non-minority applicants, they would never have been admitted.⁴¹

Justice Douglas determined that the admissions policy limited the number of seats DeFunis could compete for based solely on his race.⁴² He concluded the Law School should be subject to strict scrutiny because it used racial classifications in its admissions process.⁴³ Justice Douglas further stated that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to "eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States."⁴⁴ He opined that reviewing each application without regard to an applicant's race would keep the admissions process consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.⁴⁵

In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,⁴⁶ the Medical School of the University of California at Davis ("Medical School") had a special admissions program consisting of a separate admissions system for minority and disadvantaged applicants.⁴⁷ The special admissions program had a separate committee, whose members were mostly from minority groups. The Medical School's entering class had seats for one hundred students. Sixteen seats were reserved for minority applicants. Allan Bakke, a white male who applied twice to the Medical School, was considered under the general admissions program. Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of California after his second rejection, alleging that the Medical School's special admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause.⁴⁸ The trial court ruled that "the special program operated as a racial quota because minority applicants . . . were rated only against one another."⁴⁹ The court did not order the Medical School to admit Bakke.⁵⁰ Bakke appealed to the Supreme Court of California, which applied strict scrutiny.⁵¹ The state supreme court held that the special admissions program was not the least intrusive means for the Medical School to achieve its goals of integrating the medical profession and increasing the number of physicians serving minority groups.⁵² The court ordered Bakke to be admitted to the Medical School; however, the order was stayed because the Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the important constitutional issue.⁵³

Justice Powell concluded that a "[s]tate has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin."⁵⁴

Justice Powell used strict scrutiny because the special admissions program classified applicants based on their race and ethnic background, which was a suspect classification.⁵⁵ He reasoned that race alone, in conjunction with a quota assigned to the admissions process, was not a necessary means to achieving diversity.⁵⁶ Justice Powell argued that restricting the focus to ethnic diversity would hinder the attainment of complete diversity.⁵⁷ However, he supported a diversity admissions program like Harvard College's, where race...